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Salience Perspectives 
Ella Whiteley 
Abstract 
 
In the philosophy of language and epistemology, debates often centre on what content a 
person is communicating, or representing in their mind. How that content is organised, 
along dimensions of salience, has received relatively little attention. I argue that salience 
matters. Mere change of salience patterns, without change of content, can have dramatic 
implications, both epistemic and moral.  
Imagine two newspaper articles that offer the same information about a subject, 
but differ in terms of what they headline. These articles can be said to adopt different 
linguistic salience perspectives. Making different things salient in language is a way of making 
different things salient in an audience’s mind: it is a way of encouraging the audience to 
adopt a particular cognitive salience perspective.  Building on Elisabeth Camp’s work on 
perspectives, and Sebastian Watzl’s work on attention, I suggest that one has a certain 
cognitive salience perspective in virtue of better noticing, remembering, and finding 
cognitively accessible certain contents over others.  
Drawing on psychological research into cognitive biases and framing effects, I 
argue that that simply making some content salient in the mind, perhaps through first 
making it salient in language, can be sufficient to activate substantive cultural beliefs or 
ideologies associated with that content. Where those beliefs and ideologies have 
epistemic and moral problems, we have grounds for criticising the salience perspective 
that causally produced them. Besides this instrumental harm, I also suggest that certain 
salience perspectives can themselves constitute harm. I draw on feminist work on 
objectification to argue that making the wrong thing salient about a person can constitute a 
way of dehumanising them. A great many factors, from physical and psychological 
violence, to false beliefs and credibility deficits, have already been identified as potentially 
harming an individual or group. What is distinctive about this argument, then, is the idea 
that, sometimes, mere patterns of salience can be damaging in and of themselves. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis is about salience perspectives, which refer to patterns of salience, either in 
language or the mind. One might make some content salient in language by mentioning 
it first. Making this content salient in language is a way of making it salient in an 
audience’s mind. Content is salient in a person’s mind when they better notice and 
remember that content—when they better attend to it. The aim of this thesis is to 
demonstrate that simply changing the pattern of salience in some linguistic or mental 
contents, without making any other changes to those contents, can both cause and 
constitute harm. This is interesting, I suggest, because, to many intuitions, a change in the 
salience pattern applied to a set of contents seems inconsequential; many of us would 
dismiss such a change as making no difference to the truth-value of those contents, let 
alone the potential for those contents to harm. In the main part, my focus is on 
demonstrating the causal part of my claim—namely, that a mere change in salience 
perspective can cause harm, in the form of activating harmful (and often epistemically 
problematic) biases that are prevalent in our folk-cultural context. I then turn to 
contemplating how a pattern of salience can itself constitute harm. Here, I suggest that 
making the wrong thing salient about a person might count as a way of harming them, 
such as by disrespecting their personhood.  
In this chapter, I begin by explaining how I came across the philosophy of 
salience in §1.1. Given that the topic of salience can sound obscure, it might be helpful 
to demonstrate how an everyday experience, which may well be familiar to the reader, 
can be illuminated by the concept of salience. In §1.2, I discuss how philosophers have 
tended to talk about salience, commenting on the relative lack of attention to the subject. 
I contrast this with the relative centrality the subject is given in certain other disciplines. I 
then spell out why the philosophy of salience matters in §1.3, commenting on how the 
very thing that might make it seem insignificant is what makes it powerful. Finally, I 
sketch a summary of the proceeding chapters in §1.4. 
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1.1 Pinpointing elusive disagreements 
 
Some of my background is in the philosophy of biology, which led to me having 
discussions with other philosophers about trait development. This involved discussing 
how genes and environment interact to produce an organism’s traits, such as eye colour. 
Sometimes, I would feel friction with my interlocutor, but it was hard to pinpoint 
precisely what that friction consisted in. This is because we seemed to agree on the facts. 
We agreed, for instance, that certain genes reliably correlate with certain traits across 
changes in the organism’s environment; a particular genetic variant might consistently aid 
in the development of blue eyes, for example, across a number of different 
environments. We might also agree that, for certain other genes, a shift in the organism’s 
environment can make that gene function in a surprisingly different way. For instance, 
one and the same gene might help a plant grow taller than other plants in high altitude, 
and yet help it to grow to a smaller height than other plants in low altitude. Ostensibly, 
then, we agreed on the facts. When I would hear them talk about trait development, 
however, I felt that something was amiss. In particular, I had a sense that they were not 
taking certain facts sufficiently seriously in some way.  
The facts in question concerned how the environment can dramatically alter the 
function of a gene. If I pushed my interlocutor on this, perhaps by reiterating such facts, 
I would quickly get reassured that we were in agreement, and that there was no need to 
repeat myself—we shared the same beliefs.  
 One might be tempted to explain this friction in relatively familiar ways. Indeed, 
there certainly are tools in the philosopher’s kit to diagnose such seemingly elusive 
disagreements. For instance, we might look to the distinction between explicit and 
implicit belief.1 Perhaps, rather uncharitably, I might argue that my interlocutor, whilst 
they had an explicit, conscious belief that the environment can wildly alter the function 
of our genes, on some deeper and less conscious level, they operated on the basis of a 
quite different belief. In particular, in their actual theorising, they applied, quite 
unconsciously, the belief that genes function in relative isolation from the environment. 
Perhaps, for instance, when considering the causes of a particular trait, they 
unconsciously tended only to think only of the organism’s genes, and not its 																																																								
1 See, for instance, Giordani (2015) and Wittenbrink & Schwarz (2007). Others have 
captured similar distinctions. See, for instance, Gendler’s (2008) distinction between 
beliefs and aliefs, and Haslanger’s (2006: 99) distinction between our manifest and operative 
concepts.  
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environment. Perhaps they had an unconscious association between genes and 
blueprints.2 Alternatively, my interlocutor might propose that I myself was operating with 
an implicit belief that diverged from my explicit beliefs. Perhaps, whilst I explicitly 
believed that the both genes and environment interact to produce an organism’s traits, I 
implicitly believed that the environment is what primarily causes our traits. Instead of a 
divergence in explicit belief, then, there may have been a divergence in implicit belief 
between us.  
Increasingly, however, I felt that the friction I experienced was about something 
more minimal than this, and yet something with significance. I began to wonder whether 
it was instead down to a difference in the salience that we accorded to the various beliefs 
that we held. My interlocutor, whilst they (explicitly and implicitly) believed that 
environments can change the function of a gene in sometimes wildly different ways, they 
did not appear to give this fact sufficient salience in their mind—it was not at the 
forefront of their attention. For me, this fact not only was most salient—I felt that it 
should be most salient. It should be at the forefront of their mind, I thought—without, yet, 
a clear understanding as to why. I simply had a feeling that this fact had an epistemic and 
moral significance to which my interlocutor was not doing justice.  
It was this experience that first led me to think about the topic of this thesis. 
With the notion of salience in my repertoire, I started to notice other instances of friction 
with an interlocutor that seemed like they had something to do with salience. For 
instance, I would hear a person, let’s call them Sally, described by my interlocutor in a 
way that felt like they made the wrong attribute salient about her. They might introduce 
Sally as a lesbian, before mentioning her job as a politician, for example. Something felt 
wrong with how they gave Sally’s sexual orientation such salience in mentioning it before 
her other identities—identities that I felt were more important in some way. In 
particular, I felt that it was in Sally’s interests for her job as a politician to be made more 
salient than her sexual orientation—to be made more noticeable and memorable. Again, 
I didn’t yet have the resources to fully explain this intuition, but the fact that I could at 
least pinpoint my initially inchoate feelings of unease as having something to do with 
salience, felt a step in the right direction.  
Across these experiences, I sensed that the issue I was having was not with the 
content of what my interlocutor said or thought, but rather how they structured that 																																																								
2 There is a question as to whether implicit beliefs really are beliefs. Some have argued 
that they are instead non-propositional things like associations (Kihlstrom, 2004).  
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content so that some of it stood out more than others. I turned, therefore, to what 
existing theory I could find on the subject of salience. The first research that I came 
across that seemed helpful was psychological research into framing effects, which I will 
introduce in the next section. 
 
1.2. Where is the philosophy of salience?  
 
Whilst interest is growing,3 salience has generally received relatively little recognition in 
philosophy. There is no general entry on salience in the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, for 
instance. One does find mention of salience in certain areas, but this tends to occur in 
relatively circumscribed discussions. One of these discussions concerns reference fixing in 
language. For instance, taking the example of the proposition the cat is in the carton, David 
Lewis suggests that facts about which cat is most salient in a given context (e.g. it is the 
only one in the room) help to fix the reference for this proposition.4 As we will see, the 
sort of salience that interests me is not to do with reference fixing, but to do with the 
consequences for harm (as well as false beliefs and unwarranted ideologies) that come 
with giving relatively more salience to some linguistic or mental contents over others. 
Something closer to this latter notion of salience can be found in certain debates within 
the philosophy of moral virtue. It has been suggested that what one finds salient, in the 
sense of being attention-grabbing, is relevant to the evaluation of one’s character as virtuous 
or vicious. 5  It might be argued, for instance, that finding the needs of others 
insufficiently salient is partially constitutive of a moral vice. I too am interested in moral 
dimensions to salience, but my interest is wider than this narrow focus on virtue and 
vice.6  
																																																								
3 See, for instance, Archer’s (forthcoming) edited book on the philosophy of salience. 
Introducing this book, Archer (forthcoming) also comments that salience is relatively 
underexplored as a philosophical topic. 
4 Lewis (1979: 348). 
5 Chappell & Chappell (2016), Bommarito (2013). 
6 Further, the notion of salience discussed by these virtue ethicists is sometimes 
explicated in ways that imply it is more substantive than the particularly minimalist 
notion that interests me. Sometimes, these philosophers talk about the moral 
consequences of paying attention to x (i.e. making it salient) whilst ignoring y (Chappell & 
Chappell, 2016). In chapter 2 (§2.4.2), I describe this as a sin of omission. The notion of 
salience that interests me is more minimal. I want to show that, even when we do not 
ignore y, simply giving it relatively less salience in our attention can cause and constitute 
harm. This latter claim is more controversial. 
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Outside of these quite delimited discussions, however, salience is comparatively 
undertheorised. Sebastian Watzl also makes this point. Watzl writes about salience in the 
mind, which, as we will see in chapter 3, is constituted by dispositions to attend better to 
some contents over others. Commenting on this sort of salience, Watzl suggests that “In 
stark contrast to the intensity of public interest in attention and to the richness and detail 
of its scientific investigation, for a long while professional philosophers [in the West] 
have almost completely neglected attention [and therefore salience in the mind] as a topic 
of study”.7  
Part of the neglect seems to be down to a focus on linguistic and mental content, 
at the expense of considering how that content is structured and presented. In the 
philosophy of language, the focus is often on what a person communicates (whether that 
content is explicitly asserted, or what philosophers call not-at-issue content, in the sense 
that it is presupposed, or otherwise implicitly communicated).8 In the philosophy of 
mind, the focus tends to be on what someone is mentally representing—namely, which 
beliefs, desires, feelings, and so on, that person has.9 Issues of how that content is 
structured along dimensions of salience, receive less discussion.  
This is in sharp contrast to certain other fields. Salience is a familiar topic in the 
worlds of advertising and journalism, for instance. Here, there is a keen appreciation for 
the great variety of ways in which one can influence one’s audience in order to sell more 
products, or better persuade one’s readers or listeners to adopt a particular view. An 
advertiser for a given medicine, for instance, knows that they will find much greater 
success in selling that medicine if it is advertised as having a 90% success rate, instead of 
as failing to work in 10% of cases. In other words, consumers will respond differently to 
logically equivalent information, depending on whether success or failure is made salient. 
This is an example of a framing effect, something that I will discuss in chapter 2. Other 
framing effects occur when the order in which content is discussed is played with. In the 
next chapter, we will hear of evidence that our moral intuitions can vary significantly 
depending on the order in which we read two hypothetical scenarios. Journalists also 
capitalise on our susceptibility to framing effects. Journalists and editors know that which 																																																								
7 Watzl (2017: 5). Watzl does concede that philosophical exceptions to this can be found 
in writings on phenomenology, as well as in Eastern philosophical traditions. He also 
cites the discussions of salience in moral virtue debates, as I mention above. 
8 See, for instance, Stanley’s (2015: Ch. 4) discussion of not-at-issue content. 
9 Camp picks up on the emphasis on content in imagination (one topic analysed in the 
philosophy of mind). She says that the emphasis tends to be on “what is represented in 
imagination…[as opposed] to ‘how’ that content is imagined” (Camp, 2017: 77).  
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content is made headline, and which is put front page, matters a great deal for how an 
audience thinks and feels about a topic.10 As I will discuss in the next chapter, framing 
effects can have significant implications; simply shifting the salience in some content can 
mean the difference between believing something false and harmful, and not.  
Whilst this sort of effect of salience is much less discussed in philosophy, 
philosophers certainly do recognise the importance of salience in a different regard. 
Whilst not a philosophical topic, the notion of salience crops up in the context of building 
a good philosophical argument. We are told, for instance, to mention our key argument at the 
beginning of our paper (one way of making something salient in language, remember, is by 
discussing it first). Usually, the rationale is that using salience in this way helps us to make 
the best argument that we can. Students might also get told that leaving one’s key 
argument until the very end might be inadvisable because one’s examiner might miss it—
their attention and interest might have waned by the time they reach it. These 
suggestions as to what a shift in salience can do, however, are rather conservative. Shifts 
in salience can help one to achieve a stronger, more persuasive argument, or can help 
one to ensure that one’s core argument is actually noted by a sleepy examiner. This is 
quite different to the more radical claims, made in the framing effects literature. Here, 
simply shifting the pattern of salience in some content is understood to be capable of 
eliciting wildly different responses to that content in its audience.  
One might wonder, perhaps rather uncharitably, whether this latter sort of (more 
radical) effect of salience is discussed less in philosophy because we in this field can have 
a tendency to presume ourselves to be too rational and logical to be susceptible to things 
like framing effects. Framing effects, as we will hear, are regularly discussed as revealing 
something irrational about human thought. Our training, a philosopher might think, 
guards us against such irrationalities; it allows us to reflect only on the content of what is 
being said, instead of being swayed by mere presentational shifts in salience within that 
content. Indeed, Louise Antony has speculated that philosophers tend to suffer from 
what psychologists call over-confidence bias, insofar as philosophers presume themselves to 
be too rational to suffer from the various irrational biases that psychologists suggest 
influence human thought. In her words, “In my experience, philosophers are quite ready 
to allow that other people are affected by irrelevancies like the pitch of a candidate’s 
																																																								
10 Wahl-Jorgensen & Hanitszch (2009). 
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voice, or a stereotype that links prettiness with vacuity, but not them.”11 Patterns of 
salience might count as another so-called irrelevancy.12  
Elisabeth Camp, whom I will introduce more fully in chapter 3, has also 
suggested that philosophers often neglect aspects of human thought that do not fit what 
she calls “a philosopher’s fantasy of rationality”. 13  She explicitly mentions our 
susceptibility to framing effects in this regard.14 Fortunately, despite this general neglect, 
both Camp and Watzl’s philosophical discussions on salience in the mind provide 
excellent platforms for the discussions in this thesis, and their accounts influence a great 
deal of what is to come.   
 
1.3. The significance of salience 
 
Why talk about salience? Firstly, the effects of shifts in salience will likely surprise us. To 
many of our intuitions, a mere shift in the pattern of salience in some content seems too 
trivial to affect substantially how we think, feel, and at act towards that content. Imagine, 
for instance, being asked a question about gendered leadership styles. Surely it doesn’t 
matter, one might think, whether one is asked how do women differ from men as leaders? or how 
do men differ from women as leaders? Whether women are made more salient than men, by 
mentioning them first, surely makes no difference to how one answers this question. 
Even the subtlest shifts in salience can be impactful, however. In chapter 5, we will look 
at evidence that asking how women differ from men, as opposed to how men differ from 
women, can make us more likely, amongst other things, to endorse stereotypes about 
sex/gender.15 If we find these stereotypes to be harmful, then we can see one way in 
which salience can be relevant to epistemology. Shifts in salience might make the 
activation of false beliefs more likely. If we find these stereotypes to be harmful, then we 
can also see one way in which salience is relevant to ethics.  
																																																								
11 Antony (2012: 236). 
12 Antony does in fact mention a non-verbal counterpart to framing effects. When 
introducing the sorts of irrational, implicit biases to which philosophers presume 
themselves to be immune, she mentions “we prefer products placed on the right side of 
the supermarket shelf” (ibid. 236). As we have heard, some framing effects play with 
order, and this example also involves playing with order (namely, the order in which 
products are placed). 
13 Camp (2015: 601).  
14 Ibid. (602, fn. 8). 
15 See chapter 5 for a discussion of why I use the conjunction sex/gender. 
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We will also hear in forthcoming chapters more intimate, and also likely 
surprising, ways in which salience can have relevance to epistemology and ethics. In 
chapters 2 and 3, I will briefly consider how patterns of salience might constitute an 
epistemic flaw. Certain patterns of salience might themselves be unwarranted for instance. 
In chapter 6, I consider in more detail the ethical counterpart to this idea. Certain 
patterns of salience, I will argue, can constitute harm. This conclusion in particular might 
strike one as unexpected. Intuitively, we might think that so long as one listens to what a 
person says, values their conversational contributions, does not harbour false beliefs, 
derogatory feelings, or malign desires concerning them, and acts towards them with 
respect, one cannot harm that person simply by finding one of their attributes more 
salient than another. Merely attending more to one trait of theirs rather than another, 
especially if these attentional dispositions do not have any negative consequences regarding how one thinks 
(or feels, etc.) about or acts towards that individual, is surely morally insignificant. This 
assumption, I will suggest, is mistaken; giving relative salience to one trait of a person 
over another in one’s attention can, in itself, count as a way of harming them. We should 
learn about salience, then, because we might learn something new and unexpected.  
Secondly, we should learn about salience because the very thing that makes 
salience surprising is also what makes it powerful. Generally, we are surprised by what a 
shift in salience can cause or constitute because that shift seems too minimal to matter. 
Importantly, the minimal nature of salience perspectives can give them an insidious 
strength, in two ways. Firstly, their minimal nature means that, not only are the patterns 
of salience in language and attention themselves rarely consciously noticed by the 
audience or thinker, but the inferences that those patterns of salience solicit us to make are 
also rarely consciously registered. As we will hear in forthcoming chapters, where 
inferences are activated under our conscious awareness, such as those to the gender 
stereotypes mentioned above, the beliefs and associations that we have inferred are 
especially likely to go on to influence our thought and behaviour. This is because, 
unaware of how a salience perspective is soliciting us to think and act, we do not attempt 
to block any problematic inferences that we might be making. The under the radar nature 
that salience perspectives tend to have, then, can give them a special power. 16   
																																																								
16 Generally, many philosophers of language have highlighted the power that under the 
radar language has to shape an audience’s responses. See, for instance, Stanley (2015), 
who discusses not-at-issue content, Langton & West (1999) who discuss back-door speech 
acts, and Sbisà (1999), who writes about presupposition. 
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In addition, the fact that salience perspectives are rarely consciously registered 
means that any harm that they constitute (as opposed to cause) can more easily continue 
unchecked. Further, where the harm that a salience perspective constitutes is noticed and 
articulated, it is all too easy to dismiss it as morally insignificant. Unlike harmful beliefs 
that certain races or genders are inferior, or harmful practices of discrimination against 
these social groups, harming someone simply by making the wrong thing salient about 
them likely will not elicit the same sympathetic responses. This, I will argue, can give 
salience perspectives an insidious power, in virtue of making them effectively 
unchallengeable. 
Thirdly, salience is pervasive. It structures all of our language and mental content. 
We cannot communicate without making some contents more salient than others, not 
least because we must inevitably say one sentence before another. We cannot give 
everything equal attention in our mind. It is inevitable that we find some things more 
eye-catching and memorable than other things—inevitable that some things remain at 
the periphery of our attention. There will always be more memorable, as well as more 
forgettable, aspects of a person that one meets, for instance. If, as I have suggested 
above, these patterns of salience have implications regarding whether or not we harm a 
person or group, then we should reflect on which patterns of salience we use. Further, if, 
as I suggested above, salience has an under the radar nature that makes any harm it causes 
and constitutes particularly difficult to notice and challenge, then its pervasive nature is 
all the more concerning—we might be causing and constituting harm to others (and 
perhaps to ourselves) much more regularly than we think.  
 
1.4. Chapter Summary 
 
I begin my investigation in chapter 2 by considering the linguistic side of salience 
perspectives. I build this notion from psychological research into framing effects. This 
research provides the empirical support that undergirds many of the arguments in this 
thesis, namely, that merely changing the pattern of salience in some (in this case 
linguistic) content, without making any other adjustments to that content, can indeed 
have significant repercussions for how audiences respond to that content. Linguistic 
salience perspectives structure contents by giving some relative salience over others. In an 
utterance consisting of two contents, x and y, one might choose to give x relative salience 
over y (such as by talking about x before y), or to give y relative salience over x (such as by 
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talking about y before x). It is this shift in relative salience that can generate a framing 
effect—that can move an audience to respond in different ways to that utterance. In 
particular, I focus on examples of framing effects that require us to look to facts about 
our culture in order to explain why a given pattern of salience in language has the effect 
that it does. These examples set the tone for proceeding chapters; generally, I am 
interested in how salience interacts with prevalent beliefs and ideologies in our culture. 
For instance, where a belief is particularly prevalent in culture, I demonstrate that simply 
making salient in language content that is central to that belief can be sufficient to 
activate an inference to it. Where that belief is harmful, and/or has epistemic faults, we 
can criticise the salience perspective that leads to it. This provides an instrumental 
critique of linguistic salience perspectives—a way of criticising a pattern of salience on 
the basis of the problems with that which it causes. This is briefly contrasted with some 
ways to critique linguistic salience perspectives on non-instrumental grounds. I conclude 
by suggesting a naturalised methodology for selecting linguistic salience perspectives, 
which I take up in forthcoming chapters. This methodology suggests that we first review 
which (morally and epistemically) problematic beliefs and ideologies concerning a given 
subject are prevalent in our folk-cultural context, and choose a salience perspective that 
helps to avoid activating those beliefs and ideologies.  
 Chapter 3 considers the cognitive side of salience. I build upon Elisabeth Camp 
and Sebastian Watzl’s work to suggest that cognitive salience perspectives consist in 
attentional dispositions—dispositions better to notice, remember, and find more 
cognitively accessible certain mental contents (such as beliefs, or one’s experience of 
things in the world) over others. As with linguistic salience perspectives, cognitive 
salience perspectives are also characterised by the notion of relative salience. For 
instance, one might have two beliefs, x and y, but it is a further question which belief has 
relative salience over the other; does x grab one’s attention more than y? I suggest 
various ways in which cognitive salience perspectives might be evaluated, along moral 
and epistemic dimensions. These involve instrumental and non-instrumental ways of 
critiquing cognitive salience perspectives, to parallel the suggestions in the previous 
chapter. This chapter also discusses the type of attention that cognitive salience 
perspectives consist in; instead of being fully under our voluntary control, for instance, a 
cognitive salience perspective involves our better attending to one thing rather than 
another in an automatic and intuitive way. This fact has repercussions for our ability to 
change our cognitive salience perspectives at will. Sometimes, I suggest, wider changes to 
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the culture in which we live will be necessary for us to be able, intuitively and 
automatically, to find certain things more attention-grabbing than others.  
 These first two chapters aim to provide a broad account of salience perspectives: 
what they are, the various ways in which we might critique them, and so on. Having 
offered this account, I then turn to using linguistic salience perspectives as tools in 
practice, by applying them to case studies. The case studies discussed in chapters 4 and 5 
focus on bringing to life the instrumental critique of salience perspectives, whilst those in 
chapter 6 aim to make vivid the non-instrumental critique. All chapters focus on harm, 
instead of epistemic faults.  
I turn first in chapter 4 to an example of a generic salience perspective. A generic 
salience perspective is one whose pattern of salience can be applied to multiple subjects, 
because the content that it makes salient is of a relatively abstract nature. The generic 
salience perspective on which I focus is one that makes salient the internal properties of 
the subject in question, and the distinctive traits that it happens to be exhibiting. I call 
this the substance salience perspective. Because of its generic nature, I suggest that this salience 
perspective makes salient content that is central to a number of prevalent biases in our 
culture: the correspondence bias, psychological essentialism, and the fixed mindset bias. This, I 
suggest, makes the substance salience perspective liable to activate these biases—biases 
that, according to common readings of them, are constituted by substantive beliefs about 
the contents in question. Given that many find the beliefs constituted by these biases to 
be harmful and false, I argue that we can take issue with the substance salience 
perspective insofar as it plays a causal role in bringing about their harms and falsehoods. 
My aim in this chapter is to demonstrate the breadth of impact that a single salience 
perspective might have. A single pattern of salience is liable to activate multiple biases.  
 In contrast to the broader focus of chapter 4, I turn in chapters 5 and 6 to focus 
on a single subject: sex/gender. In chapter 5, I pick up on one of the cognitive biases 
introduced in chapter 4, psychological essentialism, and explore what this bias 
encourages us to believe about the topic of sex/gender in particular. According to how it 
is commonly understood, this bias encompasses a range of harmful, and false, beliefs. In 
light of this survey, I suggest which patterns of salience we ought to avoid for the subject 
of sex/gender, in our language and attention, if we wish to prevent activating sex/gender 
essentialist beliefs. This includes, for instance, being wary of giving relative salience to 
sex/gender differences over sex/gender similarities. As part of this discussion, I consider 
how the idiosyncracies of sex/gender essentialism affect how the substance salience 
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perspective of the previous chapter is likely to function when applied to this specific 
topic.  
 Chapter 6 marks a break with what has been a focus on instrumental critiques of 
salience perspectives. In this chapter, I consider how patterns of salience might in and of 
themselves constitute sex/gender harm. (A constitutive epistemic critique of salience 
perspectives may well be possible, and indeed, I briefly detail some approaches that we 
might take in chapters 2 and 3, but this is not my focus.) I examine two case studies 
related to sex/gender that motivate the idea that salience perspectives can constitute 
harm. Firstly, I argue that rape victim-survivors can be harmed if others make their 
experience of rape their most salient feature. Secondly, I argue that women can be 
harmed if others make their bodies more salient than their faces, or conversational 
contributions. This latter discussion allows me to develop the notion of perspectival 
objectification; this refers to the idea that certain attentional dispositions can themselves 
count as a form of sexual objectification. In other words, salience perspectives count as a 
form of sex/gender harm. Following this idea, I also consider another sex/gender harm: 
sex/gender essentialism. Certain attentional dispositions might themselves count as form 
of this bias, which I call perspectival essentialism. 
 In chapter 7, I sum up the main points made in this thesis. I then suggest how 
these points might affect debates not yet considered in this thesis, such as those relating 
to racism and hate speech. I also reflect on the implications that this thesis has for social 
policy, especially where this regards advising how governments and corporations 
communicate. Further, I reflect on the limitations of this thesis, including, for instance, 
the lack of psychological studies testing the specific predictions that I make, and suggest 
related avenues for further research.  
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I unite discussions of salience in language with discussions of salience in 
the mind, to create the concept of a salience perspective. Salience perspectives refer to the 
patterns of salience that we use to present and structure linguistic and mental contents, 
so that some of those contents stand out more than others. The key insight that this 
thesis argues for, and builds upon, is that changing only the salience perspective applied 
to some contents, without making any other changes to those contents, can both cause 
and constitute harm. To demonstrate that salience perspectives can cause harm, I look at 
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case studies of certain salience patterns activating harmful beliefs and ideologies in our 
folk-cultural context. To demonstrate that salience perspectives can constitute harm, I 
demonstrate that certain salience patterns themselves count as sex/gender harms.   
		 14	
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CHAPTER 2 
SALIENCE AND LANGUAGE 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Ground beef tastes nicer, and is considered leaner and less greasy, when it is labelled 75% 
lean, as opposed to 25% fat.1 At least, that’s what study participants’ evaluations of one 
and the same sample of beef, under these different labels, would lead you to think. This 
is an example of a framing effect. Framing effects occur when people respond differently to 
logically equivalent linguistic content when that content is presented in different ways.2 
More specifically, they respond differently when different aspects of one and the same 
linguistic content are made salient. 
The guiding questions for this chapter are as follows. Firstly, what does it mean 
for something to be more salient in language? Secondly, how is it that a mere shift of 
salience in language can have the sorts of dramatic consequences identified by framing 
effects research? Thirdly, can we evaluate mere patterns of salience in language, and if so, 
how? And finally, can the answers to these questions tell us anything about how we should 
be using salience in language? The aim in this chapter and the next is to give a relatively 
broad overview of salience in language and salience in cognition respectively. This will 
allow the reader better to grasp the lay of the land in respect of salience perspectives, 
before I consider some applications of the concept in future chapters. 
 In what follows, I will begin by introducing the concept of a linguistic salience 
perspective in §2.2. This concept refers to the structuring of linguistic content, so that 
certain parts of it are made more salient than others. Psychological research into the 
phenomenon of framing effects demonstrates that simply changing the salience patterns 
in some linguistic content, without making any other changes to that content, can have 
significant implications for an audience’s cognitive and behavioural response to that 
content. One explanation as to why some linguistic salience perspectives have these 
effects is, as I suggest in §2.3, that they are able to activate pre-existing cultural and 
cognitive biases of ours. This can occur simply by making certain content salient in 
language that is also central to an existing cultural or cognitive bias. Problems arise where 																																																								
1 Levin & Gaeth (1988).  
2 Kahneman & Tversky (1979).   
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that bias is false, misleading, and/or harmful. This, I suggest, provides us with a way of 
evaluating linguistic salience perspectives on instrumental grounds, which I make explicit 
in §2.4.1. In §2.4.2, I contrast this instrumental critique with some brief suggestions as to 
how we might critique linguistic salience perspectives on non-instrumental grounds. 
Finally, in §2.5 I consider the wider implications that this discussion has for how we ought 
to use linguistic salience perspectives when communicating with our audience. In 
particular, I suggest that where a linguistic salience perspective is liable to activate a 
problematic bias, we ought to adopt a counter-salience perspective that helps to avoid 
this. This suggestion follows the logic of naturalised epistemology.  
 
2.2. Introducing linguistic salience perspectives 
 
2.2.1. Framing effects. 
Think back to the example of ground beef in the introduction. This sort of framing 
effect uses an attribute frame. Here, people are presented with logically equivalent 
information (75% lean is simply another way of saying 25% fat),3 and yet make different 
judgements depending on which attribute is valenced.4  
Another type of framing effect involves order frames.5 Here, the same linguistic 
content is presented in different orders. Consider two common scenarios discussed in 
the famous trolley problem6—Push and Switch. The Push case involves pushing a single 
person in front of a train in order to prevent it from killing five others further down the 
track, whilst the Switch case involves pressing a switch to divert a train away from five 																																																								
3 Some may wonder whether this sort of change in linguistic salience actually changes the 
truth-value of that linguistic content (Fisher, 2017). Along with many others writing 
about framing effects, I take for granted that this is not the case; two texts that differ 
only in virtue of which attribute frame they use are logically equivalent (see, for instance, 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, and Rybash and Roodin, 1989). This is consistent with the 
two texts having different truth-values when considered through a pragmatic lens — 
namely, one that takes into account how a speaker’s wider communicative context shapes 
the linguistic content’s meaning. In fact, I will look at an argument for a type of 
pragmatic inequivalence in §2.3. 
4 Levin & Gaeth (1988).  
5 Another type of framing effect often discussed in the literature involves issue frames, 
which involve different aspects of a single phenomenon being emphasised, such as free 
speech vs. public safety regarding a Ku Klux Klan rally (Nelson et al., 1997). Instead of 
subtle changes to the structure or presentation of a single set of contents, issue frames 
involve clearly substantively different linguistic contents being communicated, and, as 
such, are not relevant for my purposes. Others have also argued that they do not count 
as a real framing effect (Otieno et al., 2013). 
6 Foot (1967), Thomson (1985). 
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people, instead directing it to hit one person. When asked if these cases are morally 
equivalent, studies have found that the professional philosophers surveyed were more 
likely to answer in the affirmative if the scenarios were presented (in a written text) in the 
Push/Switch order than the Switch/Push order.7 Further, telling philosophers about framing 
effects did little to actually minimise the impact that they had.8 
The framing effect has consistently proven to be one of the strongest cognitive 
biases in decision-making,9 and is observed in many diverse areas, including the media, 
marketing, academia, and politics. There is a question as to whether people of different 
cultures display the same susceptibility to framing effects. One study found that Chinese 
participants demonstrated a stronger susceptibility to framing effects than American 
participants. 10  Whilst the degree of susceptibility may alter, however, all populations 
studied have indeed shown to be susceptible to framing effects.11 I return to the issue of 
cultural variation in susceptibility to cognitive biases in chapter 4. A different issue of 
cultural variation – namely, variation in how people respond to framing effects (i.e. which 
inferences they make) – will be mentioned in §2.3 below. 
What can we take from the existence of framing effects? For starters, they appear 
to reveal something irrational about human thought. Rationally speaking, it is thought, we 
should not evaluate one and the same cut of beef differently when hearing different, but 
logically equivalent, descriptions of its fat content. Similarly, logically speaking, the order 
in which we hear the switch and push scenarios should not make a difference to their 
moral equivalence (or lack thereof). As Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman put it, 
“different representations of the same choice should yield the same preference. That is, 
the preference between options should be independent of their description.”12  
Some have questioned whether all framing effects do indeed demonstrate 
irrationality. For instance, Shlomi Sher and Craig McKenzie suggest that, at least for 
some types of framing effects, the audience is making rational, pragmatic inferences 
based on their speaker’s choice of frame. 13 For instance, whilst half full is a logically 																																																								
7 Schwitzgebel & Cushman (2012). The participants were drawn from a website, as well 
as from 25 major research universities.  Further studies concerning framing effects 
affecting our moral intuitions are documented in Sinnott-Armstrong (2008).  
8 Schwitzgebel & Cushman (2012). 
9 Kühlberger (1988). 
10 Levinson & Peng (2007). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Tversky & Kanheman (1986: 253).   
13 Sher & McKenzie (2008). Also see Mandel (2014) for a different defence regarding the 
rationality of (at least some) framing effects. 
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equivalent attribute frame to half empty, the audience might, through inferring some 
background knowledge of the speaker, find these to be informationally inequivalent. The 
speaker chose the framing of half full, the audience might think, because the glass had less 
water in it earlier; the speaker’s positive framing implies, so goes the thought, a positive 
development regarding the amount of water in the glass.  
This is not a debate that I wish to enter into here. Instead, I want to focus on a 
different issue: namely, the unconscious nature of making these ir/rational inferences. 
Framing effects research receives so much press precisely because our responses surprise 
us. Psychologically, we do not tend to think that small shifts in the presentation of 
content will shift our response to that content. This suggests that any inferences that we 
are making are largely unconsciously processed. Even the sorts of rational inferences 
proposed by Sher and McKenzie are, in their words, “surely implicit—i.e., drawn below 
conscious awareness. Otherwise, the non-equivalence of attribute frames would have 
been self-evident prior to our analysis”.14 We will return to the implications that this has 
in §2.3.  
Whilst most of us do not tend to think that we will be susceptible to framing 
effects, we heard in the introduction that philosophers might be particularly reticent to 
accept this fact. We have already seen evidence, however, that order effects sway 
professional philosophers. But it is not just us. Physicians have been swayed by framing 
effects when deciding which treatment programme to adopt during a disease outbreak.15 
Senior police officers, experienced in making criminal justice-related decisions, have been 
susceptible to framing effects when evaluating the accuracy of counter-terrorism 
techniques.16 Financial planners have been found prone to framing effects when making 
judgements about financial risk avoidance. 17  Generally, those with high academic 
credentials have been found to be affected by framing effects in a similar way to those 
without such credentials.18 The sorts of deliberative skills and expertise knowledge that 
experts in these fields might develop, then, do not protect one from this bias. 
 
 
 																																																								
14 Sher & McKenzie (2006: 489).  
15 Tversky and Kahneman (1981). 
16 Garcia-Retamero & Dhami (2013). 
17 Roszkowski & Snelbecker (1990).  
18 Loke & Tan (1992). 
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2.2.2. Linguistic salience perspectives  
I build the notion of a linguistic salience perspective from this discussion of framing 
effects. Consider a journalist, making decisions about how to present the costs and 
benefits of immigration in a newspaper article. They are obliged, let’s say, to include 
statistics on crime committed by immigrants, as well as information about the skills and 
taxes that immigrants contribute. They are obliged, then, to include a particular set of 
linguistic content. Even with this constraint on what content they can communicate, the 
journalist can decide which of these facts to headline—namely, which of these facts to 
make salient. They mock up two articles, the only difference between them being which 
implication of immigration is in bold at the top of the page.  
We can say, in this case, that the two articles invoke different linguistic salience 
perspectives. A linguistic salience perspective refers to the structuring or presentation of 
linguistic content. (The term structuring looks better to capture the order frames discussed 
earlier; it captures ways of making some content more salient than another by discussing 
it first. The term presenting looks better to capture the attribute frames; namely, it captures 
ways of making some content more salient than another by choosing one or other of a 
logically-equivalent attribute to describe it.)  
Linguistic salience perspectives structure contents by giving some relative salience 
over others. 19  So, while an article might discuss both the costs and benefits of 
immigration, by discussing the costs first, those costs are given relative salience over the 
benefits. With those costs more salient in language, this linguistic salience perspective will 
tend to make those costs more salient in the audience’s minds. In other words, a linguistic 
salience perspective will tend to produce its counterpart cognitive salience perspective in its 
audience. Having the costs of immigration relatively more salient in one’s mind means 
better attending to those costs—it means better noticing and remembering them. 20 
																																																								
19 I have borrowed talk of relative salience from Watzl (2017: Ch. 4), who, as we will see in 
the next chapter, applies this idea to salience in the mind. 
20 Indeed, order effects most commonly have the effect of the participant favouring 
information that is presented first (a primacy effect). This effect occurs because the initial 
content becomes anchored in the person’s mind. In some limited cases, however, 
information presented last is favoured by the participant (a recency effect). Where this does 
occur, it is usually where the topics under discussion are ones that individuals know little 
about, or show little interest in. By contrast, primacy effects are strongest for subject 
matter that subjects are highly familiar with, and those that subjects find controversial 
and/or interesting (see Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994). As will become clearer in what 
follows, I am interested in salience patterns for content that subjects are highly familiar 
with—in particular, where there are culturally entrenched biases concerning that content. 
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Precisely what making something salient in one’s mind amounts to will be addressed in 
the next chapter. There, I will be examining the work of Elisabeth Camp and Sebastian 
Watzl, who discuss patterns of salience in the mind. Indeed, it is from Camp’s account of 
salience in the mind that I have borrowed the terminology of perspective.21 This chapter 
draws out the linguistic counterpart to this idea.   
One question one might have is this: do the two newspaper articles above, with 
their different linguistic salience perspectives, present identical content? Can we say, in 
other words, that they have the same truth-value? Or, does changing the order in which 
various linguistic contents about immigration are communicated mean that one alters the 
truth-value of those contents? Whilst these are important questions, they are not ones 
that concern me here.22 Linguistic salience perspectives are interesting not because, 
where they change audience responses to some content, they do so without altering that 
content’s truth-value. They deserve our attention because their effects tend to surprise 
us. As already mentioned, the framing effects literature has received so much press 
because we do not tend to expect simple shifts in linguistic salience to be consequential. 
We are surprised when we are confronted with evidence that, for instance, our responses 
to some content shift simply when that content is reordered.  
In part, our surprise is explained by the fact that linguistic salience perspectives 
function in an under the radar manner. We are usually unaware of how a linguistic salience 
perspective is soliciting us to respond to some linguistic content. This is because they do 
not make their requests explicit, such as through the plea you should pay more attention to the 
costs of immigration! Instead, they subtly play with the presentation and structure of 
content, in a way that often bypasses our conscious awareness. This can give them a 
manipulative quality, insofar as they do not, in Cass Sunstein’s words, “sufficiently engage or 
appeal to [people’s] capacity for reflection and deliberation [emphasis in original]”.23 This, as we 
will see, can make them especially effective in shaping our thought and behaviour.  
An important question that I will be asking in this chapter is as follows. Suppose 
that an article communicates only truths about a subject, such as UK immigration. 
Further, suppose (rather idealistically) that it communicates all relevant truths about that 																																																																																																																																																														
When I discuss linguistic salience perspectives that play with order, then, I will presume 
that they will have a primacy effect.  
21 Camp (2017).  
22 See Fisher (2017) for a discussion concerning whether various changes in linguistic 
salience do in fact change the truth-value of the linguistic content communicated.  
23 Sunstein (2016: 82) is talking about modes of manipulation more generally here, as 
opposed to the specific issue of using salience in language.  
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subject. Might there nevertheless be grounds for criticising that article for giving relative 
salience to certain truths over others? Might it, by encouraging its audience to make one 
fact relatively more salient in their minds than another, mislead its audience? In other 
words, whilst we cannot criticise the article for being untrue, or perhaps for being 
misleading in virtue of omitting certain truths, can we nevertheless find some other 
epistemic and moral grounds on which to critique linguistic salience perspectives?  
 
2.3. Linguistic salience perspectives in context 
 
In what follows, I will look at three examples of how knowledge of cultural beliefs and 
ideologies is necessary to understand why a linguistic salience perspective has affected 
audience responses in the way that it has. 
 
2.3.1. Example 1: Advertising beef.  
Why did people evaluate one and the same cut of beef as tasting worse and being greasier 
when it was labelled as 25% fat? Part of the explanation requires looking at the cultural 
associations with, and beliefs about, fatness and leanness.24 Our culture associates leanness 
with health and desirability, and fatness with the opposite; all around us are adverts 
selling products on the basis that they include 0% fat (exploiting a prevalent belief that 
fat per se is bad for you, and that lean products per se are healthy), adverts depicting thin, 
toned bodies without a gram of cellulite as desirable, and narratives associating fatness 
with laziness, greed, and so on.25 
Inferences to these cultural associations and beliefs are cognitively accessible, in the 
sense that it takes little cognitive labour to think of them—they easily pop into our 
minds. In part, this is because of the sheer number of times that these beliefs and 
associations are repeated around us. They are also socially licensed, insofar as, in our 
culture, most people are disposed to regard inferences to these associations and beliefs as 
																																																								
24 Various explanations as to why framing effects occur have been proposed. See, for 
instance Sher & McKenzie (2006), for an information leakage account, and Levin (1987) for 
an associative theory. My aim in this section is simply to offer one explanation as to why 
certain shifts in linguistic salience perspective result in a framing effect. 
25 See, for instance, Eaton (2016) on the association between fatness and laziness, 
amongst other negative traits. I will return to the specific issue of cultural associations 
with fatness in the next chapter. What precisely associations are, I do not address here. 
Minimally, we can say that A and B are associated when they are reliably correlated 
(Simpson, 2012: 572-3: fn. 16).  
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legitimate. 26 It takes very little to activate these associations and beliefs. Simply making 
salient content central to these beliefs and associations – namely, making either fatness or 
leanness salient – can be sufficient causally to activate them.  
 Part of the success of this framing effect was down to its subtlety. The 
experimenters did not explicitly mention any cultural associations or beliefs. They did not 
say this cut of beef is 25% fat, and fat, remember, is unhealthy, greasy, and will make you unattractive. 
Interestingly, if they had, it is possible that the study participants might not have as 
consistently responded in ways congruent with those cultural associations and beliefs (i.e. 
in ways that are consistent with their endorsing the belief that fat is undesirable, and so 
on). That is because implicitly activated cultural associations and beliefs are especially 
effective in shaping our thought and behaviour. Research shows that where stereotypes 
(i.e. cultural associations and/or beliefs whose content involves a social group and an 
attribute) are implicitly activated, more people respond in stereotype-congruent ways. 
Implicit activation might involve, for instance, unscrambling a word, e.g. emotional (from 
mtoeinlta), before evaluating the behaviour of a person who is stereotypically associated 
with that word, e.g. a woman.27  
Implicit stereotype activation even affects individuals who explicitly reject 
stereotypes, and who usually make efforts to respond in ways that demonstrate this 
rejection.28 Implicitly activated stereotypes are so successful at producing stereotype-
congruent responses in us because we are not consciously aware of their activation. This 
means that our ability consciously to monitor our thought and behavioural patterns, and 
to supress any stereotypes that we might on reflection reject, is precluded. This has 
benefits for a speaker who wishes to activate a stereotype in their audience’s mind 
without wanting to argue for that stereotype.29 Whereas the audience can ask the speaker 
for evidence when they explicitly assert a stereotype, this option is precluded when the 
hearer is not aware that a stereotype has been activated. Advertisers are quick to take 
advantage of this fact.30  
 It is worth emphasising the behavioural dimension of this stereotype activation. 
In the case at hand, the activation of the stereotype about fat being unhealthy does not 
stay in the head. It translates into people being more likely to buy products advertised as 																																																								
26 These definitions of cognitively accessible and socially licensed are borrowed from Fraser’s 
(2018: 735-6) paper on rape metaphors.  
27 Banaji et al. (1993). 
28 Devine (1989: 194-5) 
29 See, for instance, Simon-Vandenbergen, et al. (2007). 
30 Till et al. (2011), Schmidt et al. (2017: 3). 
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lean. Other stereotypes have more complex relationships to action, as I will be discussing 
in future chapters. For instance, stereotype threat refers to scenarios where people either 
are, or feel, at risk of conforming to stereotypes about their social group. Consider 
another example of implicit stereotype activation. Research demonstrates that putting a 
gender tick box at the top of a maths test leads to girls performing worse in that test than 
in a test without such a tick box. 31 This occurs because of how cognitively accessible and 
socially licensed is the stereotype that women are bad at maths; simply reminding girls of 
their gender in the context of a maths test is sufficient to result in the implicit activation 
of this stereotype.32 The point most relevant for my purposes, however, is that this 
stereotype does not stay in the head. It results in girls unconsciously living up to the 
stereotype by performing worse in that test. We can also flag the epistemic consequences 
that many have identified with stereotype threat. Whilst belief standardly aims to fit the 
world (my belief that the table is brown aims to fit the way the actual table in the world 
is), the belief that girls are worse at maths shapes its subject matter in the world to fit it 
(the girls come to fit the belief). This is often said to give the belief an epistemic flaw in 
virtue of having the wrong direction of fit with the world.33  
If linguistic salience perspectives count as one way of implicitly activating 
stereotypes, then, we should be mindful of the complex behavioural (and epistemic) 
consequences that they might engender. This should warn us that small can be powerful. 
The sort of change in some linguistic content that comes with altering its linguistic 
salience perspective is often so small that the audience does not even notice it (or, 
perhaps, dismiss as too trivial to be of consequence). The discussion here demonstrates 
that we should not underestimate the impact of small changes to salience patterns in 
language.  
 
2.3.2. Example 2: Oral health messages.  
Compare the following two health messages:  
(A) “If you floss your teeth regularly, you will have healthier teeth and gums”!  																																																								
31 Danaher & Crandall (2008).  
32 Whilst this is an example of implicit stereotype activation, this is not an example of a 
linguistic salience perspective implicitly activating a stereotype. The difference between the 
maths test in the intervention condition (i.e. with the M/F tick box) and the control 
condition (i.e. without the M/F tick box) went beyond merely altering the structure or 
presentation of one and the same set of linguistic contents; instead, the difference was 
one of introducing new content (i.e. an M/F tick box) that was not present in the control. 
33 See, for instance, Langton (1993a, 2000), who is building upon Anscombe (1957), and 
Humberstone (1992) for a discussion of these issues. 
		 24	
(B) “If you don’t floss regularly, the health of your teeth and gums is at risk”!34 
This is a standard example of attribute framing; (A) presents information with a gains 
frame (i.e. it makes gains salient), whilst (B) presents that same information with a loss 
frame (i.e. it makes losses salient). Research demonstrates that using attribute frame (A) 
is more effective with White American and White British study participants; these 
individuals were more likely to report intentions to floss more regularly when the positive 
health impact of flossing was made salient. Things are different, however, in East Asia. 
East Asian participants (largely from Japan and China) are more likely to be motivated to 
floss when they receive the oral health message with the negatives made salient, as it is in 
(B).35  
Why is this the case? Again, the suggestion is that we look to culture. It has been 
argued that dominant cultural narratives in the U.S. and Britain focus on individual 
achievement, distinction, and autonomy, as well as self-promotion. Steven Heine and 
colleagues refer to various socio-historical factors as demonstrating this focus, including 
media tropes of lone cowboys, and men who are masters of their fates, as well as social 
practices involving regularly praising children, and calling them special.36 This, the authors 
suggest, motivates White Americans and White Brits to pursue positive gains. Framing 
oral health care in terms of the gains that can be made, then, appeals to this 
demographic.  
Instead, dominant narratives in Japan and China are said to focus on the 
relationships that an individual has, and how an individual’s own reputation is 
interdependent with the reputation of the groups (e.g. familial, societal) of which they are 
a part. Losses of an individual’s own reputation, therefore, negatively impact their group, 
and group reputation is easily damaged but not easily saved. Various cultural practices 
have developed, therefore, that focus on avoiding reputation losses. For instance, Ki ga 
sumanai and hansei are two Japanese practices that involve drawing attention to one’s 
deficits, and communicating one’s shame in, and one’s efforts to fix, these deficits.37 The 
fact that avoiding losses (of reputation) is a central cultural narrative in this part of the 
world helps to make sense of how framing oral health care with a loss frame is 
particularly motivating for those with an East Asian upbringing. 																																																								
34 This example is cited in Brick et al. (2016). 
35 Ibid.  
36 Heine et al. (1999: 769). Their focus is on North America, but similar things have been 
said about Britain (see the references in Brick et al., 2016). 
37 Heine et al. (1999: 770-1). For similar practices in East Asia (including China) more 
generally, see Hamamura et al. (2009). 
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We can understand the cultural variation in this framing effect only by taking into 
account the differences in the formative cultural upbringings of the participants. In the 
case at hand, it looks like we need to look beyond the more simple sorts of associations 
and beliefs that were mentioned in the previous example. The differences between the 
cultures look to be more amorphous than this—they look to involve differences in 
ideology. Whilst there has been a lot of attention on the notion of ideology, Eric 
Swanson’s recent account provides a clear definition. 38  An ideology, according to 
Swanson, is a mutually supporting cluster of beliefs, associations, affective dispositions, 
codes of interaction, values, practices, and so on. 39 In East Asia, for instance, caught up 
with beliefs that one is a relational self are affective dispositions of shame connected to 
feeling oneself lacking, and codes of interaction that require one to communicate this feeling 
to others. It is this ideology that is cognitively accessible and socially licensed in East Asian 
countries, and is liable to become activated simply through making salient content central 
to that ideology—namely, the potential for loss.40  
What the examples in §2.3.1 and §2.3.2 do both demonstrate, however, is how 
cultural biases (whether they be associations, beliefs or ideologies) might play a role when 
it comes to explaining how linguistic salience perspectives function. (I will sometimes use 
the term bias as an umbrella term for these phenomena—as will become clearer later, I 
do not take the term bias to be inherently pejorative.) Both examples involve emphasising 
different attributes of logically equivalent linguistic content. How about linguistic salience 
perspectives that play with order? Can these also activate existing cultural associations, 
beliefs and ideologies?  
 
2.3.3. Example 3: Genetics pedagogies.  
Many of us will have come across the idea of dominant and recessive traits in relation to 
genetics, notions that have become associated with Gregor Mendel. Mendelian genetics41 
is often explained through experiments with peas; the idea is that if one breeds a yellow 
and green pea together, the first offspring is always yellow, as the gene for the yellow trait 																																																								
38 The notion of ideology has a rich history. See, for instance, Althusser (1965), Gramsci 
(1971 [1929-1935] 323-3), West (1989: 232), Tirrell (1999), and Haslanger (2011).  
39 Swanson (forthcoming). 
40 This means, therefore, adding mere patterns of salience in language to the growing list of 
ways in which it has been proposed that ideologies can be activated. See Swanson 
(forthcoming) for other examples. 
41 We should distinguish Mendelian ideas from those of Mendel himself; in addition to 
not using the language of genes, Mendel had a far more complex view of genetic qualities 
such as dominance than the common reconstructions of his ideas. See Olby (1979). 
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is dominant. Similarly, the gene for the smooth seed is dominant to its recessive wrinkled 
counterpart, and tall is dominant to short. Mendelian ideas – for example, of genes for 
traits and genes as relatively isolable units separate from the environment – frame the 
introduction and basis for classical genetics textbooks and curricula. Later, the students 
learn the qualification that, whilst Mendelian genetics accurately captures some instances 
of genetic causation, much of genetics is not as simple as this; the environment (both 
within and external to the organism) profoundly complicates the function of genes. (The 
reader may remember that these ideas were briefly introduced in the previous chapter.) 
In particular, the students learn about interactionism, which emphasises how traits 
arise from the complex interaction between biology and environment.42 For example, 
interactionist research focuses on how the same gene contributing to a plant being the 
tallest in comparison to its competitors in one environment, e.g. high altitude, might 
contribute to that plant being the smallest in another environment, e.g. low altitude. A 
change in the environment of a so-called dominant gene can even render it recessive.43 
Interactionist research is not simply reminding us that the environment also contributes 
to the traits of an organism, i.e. in addition to genes. It is showing that the function of a 
gene can be so profoundly shaped by its environment that one and the same gene might 
be for tallness in one context whilst being for shortness in another. A single gene can 
dispose an organism to develop opposite traits in different environments. This means that 
we cannot, for many genes, refer to them as being for any trait in particular—at least not 
without specifying the environment. This interactionist research is discussed much later 
(i.e. in the final chapter or two) and more briefly in mainstream textbooks.  
Now consider a pedagogy that reverses the information in the standard textbook. 
In other words, consider a pedagogy that starts with interactionist research, and ends 
with Mendel. Could this mere shift in order – in linguistic salience perspective – impact 
how students conceptualise genetics? 
It certainly can, according to the results of Annie Jamieson and Gregory Radick’s 
Genetics Pedagogies Project. 44 Retaining largely the same content as the original, so that none 
of the traditional views are rejected, and no completely new ideas are introduced, 
Jamieson and Radick altered the chronology of the traditional pedagogy in precisely this 																																																								
42 The term interactionism can be used to mean a range of different things (Tabery, 2014: 
chapter 1). The way in which I cash out the term in the paragraph above follows what 
Tabery (ibid. chapter 2) calls developmental concept of interactionism, inspired by the work of 
Hogben and Lewontin.  
43 Jamieson and Radick (2013: 589). 
44 University of Leeds (2019).  
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way.45 Their project sought, in Radick’s words, “to take what is peripheral in the existing 
curriculum and make it central, and to take what is central and make it peripheral”.46 The 
result? Students came away with less deterministic beliefs about genes after taking the 
revised course.47 Genetic determinism is the view that genes are the super-causers of most if 
not all of our traits, in the sense that environmental factors play little to no causal role in 
the creation of our traits.48 Even for complex traits like sexuality, genetic determinists are 
prone to posit a single gene for these traits. Where a trait is deemed determined by genes in 
this way, it is considered to be largely unchangeable. (It should be noted that this 
reduction in genetically determinist beliefs in the students did not come at the expense of 
a proper understanding of genetics. One might worry that starting with the complex cases 
and ending with the simple cases might hinder the students’ ability to pick up knowledge 
about genetics. Jamieson and Radick found, however, that the intervention group 
received similar results in their end-of-semester exam on genetics to the control group, 
who were instead following the traditional pedagogy.)49 
 Why did Jamieson and Radick’s revised pedagogy have the impact of reducing 
support for genetic determinism? Just as with the example concerning beef labelling 
earlier, we find the answer by examining the different curricula through the lens of our 
cultural context. We are surrounded by oversimplified and deterministic conceptions of 
genes in the media, as well as in scientific and educational communities. For instance, 
there is an obsession in the media with finding the gene for homosexuality, or the gene for a 
high IQ.50 In fact, it has even been proposed that genetic determinism constitutes a 
prevalent folk psychological bias—namely, a bias that affects most people across many 																																																								
45 Now, it is true that Jamieson and Radick’s project did not achieve the status of a pure 
framing effect. Some content changes were necessary in the end due to practical 
limitations in the study, contrary to the authors’ original intentions. But, as the authors 
conclude, “[i]t is not difficult to imagine a successor study that, conditions (and funding) 
allowing, would enable the design of a more closely comparable Mendelian counterpart 
course—no different in length, delivery, content, assessments, accreditation and so on” 
(Jamieson & Radick, 2017: 1282). The results from the framing effects literature suggest 
that a project refined in this way could well still alter student attitudes. 
46 Radick (2016: 169). 
47 Jamieson and Radick (2017: 1273) tested this by asking the students how much they 
agreed to various statements congruent with genetic determinism, such as cloning can 
produce an identical copy of an animal, so you could recreate a much-loved pet. 
48 This definition of determinism is influenced by Kampourakis’ definition of genetic 
determinism (in Jamieson and Radick, 2017: 1265). 
49 Ibid. (1275). This paper also provides examples of power point slides and other 
teaching materials used by Jamieson and Radick, which demonstrate how they adroitly 
made the complex cases accessible (ibid. §3.2).  
50 Condit et al. (1998), Dar-Nimrod & Heine (2011).  
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different cultures.51 However widespread, the bottom line is that genetic determinism is a 
cognitively accessible and socially licensed bias. The traditional pedagogy, by beginning 
genetics education with the sort of gene for language that Mendelian genetics encourages, 
gives relative salience to instances of genetic causation that are also central to genetic 
determinism. Namely, it makes salient instances where a given gene does reliably 
correlate with a particular trait, across different environments. In this way, the traditional 
pedagogy was liable to activate existing biases that also make those instances of this type 
of genetic causation salient—namely, our existing genetic determinism biases.  
  
2.4. Ways of evaluating linguistic salience perspectives 
 
2.4.1. Instrumental critique.  
This last example of genetics textbooks provides us with more evidence that linguistic 
salience perspectives can causally activate a bias (whether it is constituted by beliefs, 
associations, or ideologies). Most importantly, however, it provides us with evidence that 
a mere shift in linguistic salience perspective can mean the difference between believing 
something false and damaging, and not. Genetic determinism is considered to be false by 
contemporary (philosophy of/) biology.52 It is not the case that most if not all of our 
traits are caused by our genes, with little to no environmental influence. Further, the false 
beliefs of genetic determinism have a long history of being used to further social 
oppression.53 Partly, this is because genetic determinists treat the outcomes of social 
inequality as instead caused by unchangeable genetic factors. For instance, unsound 
genetically determinist arguments have been used to justify removing educational 
resources for black people. Where evidence has been cited of black people having lower 
IQs than white people, presuming intelligence to be genetically determined instead of 
socially shaped has allowed individuals to argue that trying to improve the IQs of black 
																																																								
51 Dar-Nimrod & Heine (2011) suggest that it might be a specific strand of a more 
general, essentialist folk psychological bias. This more general essentialist bias will be 
discussed in more detail in Ch. 3. Sometimes, folk psychological biases are distinguished 
from cultural biases by claiming that the former are universal and innate. Increasing 
research into the cultural variability of our biases, including those once supposed 
universal and innate, is casting doubt on this distinction. For a brief discussion of these 
issues, see Chapter 4 (§4.3). 
52 Lewontin (2000), Kitcher (2001), Oyama et al. (2003) and Kampourakis et al (2014).  
53 In addition to the references in fn. 52, see Belkhir & Duyme (1998) and Keller (2005). 
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people through education is a pointless task.54 The fact that Jamieson and Radick’s 
revised pedagogy managed to reduce acceptance of genetic determinism, then, looks to 
be a good thing both epistemically and socially. 
We can say, then, that a linguistic salience perspective can be criticised on 
instrumental grounds where its effects are problematic in some way. We might criticise it 
for activating false and/or harmful beliefs, as per the traditional genetics textbooks. We 
might also criticise it for leading to problematic non-doxastic phenomena. The examples in 
§2.3.1 and §2.3.2 demonstrated linguistic salience perspectives activating certain 
associations and ideologies. Whilst associations and ideologies are not things with truth-
conditions, given that they either are or include components that are non-propositional, 
they can be assessed on epistemic grounds. For instance, it is commonly said that an 
emotion can be warranted or not, depending on facts (facts about the situation may show 
that my fear of someone is unwarranted, for example). 55 As with beliefs, associations and 
ideologies might also be harmful, such as where black people are associated with low 
intelligence, or where an ideology prescribes that one treat black people as second-class 
citizens.  
Let’s return to the UK immigration newspaper article, to assess the ways in 
which we might critique its choice of linguistic salience perspective. Consider the version 
of the article that headlines the statistics on immigrant crime, and discusses how many 
immigrants are coming into the UK in its opening paragraphs. Much later, it discusses 
how the UK benefits from immigration—from the skills and revenue that immigrants 
contribute. By giving relative salience to immigration numbers and immigrant crime over 
the benefits from immigration, could this newspaper play into existing biases?  
Xenophobic beliefs and ideologies – namely, those involving prejudice against 
people from other countries – are arguably widespread, and have a long history.56 As for 
the UK in particular, it is often argued that right wing parties using xenophobic claims 
are increasingly entering the centre-ground in UK politics. Consider the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP), who surprised the nation by taking the most votes and seats 																																																								
54 See Jensen (1969) and Hernstein & Murray (1994) for examples of such an argument, 
and Lewontin (1970) for a rebuttal. 
55 See, for instance, Elgin (1996). Others talk of emotions being fitting or appropriate 
(D’Arms & Jacobson, 2000). For discussions of epistemic criteria beyond truth and 
falsity, more generally, see, for instance, Richard (2008), Gibbard (1990), Langton (1993a, 
2004), Haslanger (2013), and Anderson (1995). These alternative criteria include, for 
example, accuracy, warrant, and aptness.  
56 Rydgren (2004), Wearing (2016). 
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in the 2014 European elections, and who is often credited with the success of the Brexit 
movement. UKIP has regularly been accused of taking advantage of latent xenophobic 
attitudes in British society. One incident that sparked controversy was their use of a 
poster with the words Breaking Point over an image of a long, winding queue of non-white 
immigrants. Some were concerned that it was no coincidence that this poster had 
uncomfortable visual similarities to Nazi propaganda of migrants post-WW1, a poster 
describing such migrants as “parasites”. 57  We might worry, then, that this poster 
represents a cultural association between immigrants and swarms of parasites. Even the 
main parties, however, have been criticised for pandering to Xenophobic attitudes.58 The 
fact that immigrants are discriminated against in the labour and housing market could be 
taken as material proof of xenophobia.59  
Some might argue, on the basis of this sort of evidence, that xenophobia is a 
cognitively accessible and socially licensed bias. In fact, some have argued that this type 
of cultural xenophobia is symptomatic of a broader, more universal bias. Psychologists 
Catherine Cottrel and Steven Neuberg suggest that our psychology has been primed by 
evolution to emphasize the potential threats associated with people from other groups.60  
If these biases are cognitively accessible and socially licensed, this gives us reason 
to think that a linguistic salience perspective that emphasises that which is central to 
those biases is able to activate them. The newspaper article above does indeed make 
salient content central to xenophobia, namely, the threats and costs associated with 
immigration. It might, then, play a role in the activation of this bias. 
If we can show that xenophobia is epistemically problematic and/or harmful, 
then we can criticise linguistic salience perspective that leads to the epistemic and moral 
problems that xenophobia encompasses. Here, we employ an instrumental critique of 
linguistic salience perspectives. A linguistic salience perspective can be evaluated on the 
basis of its upshots. 																																																								
57 Stewart & Mason (2016). 
58 The Guardian editorial (2016).  
59 See Rydgren (2004: 124) and the references therein. That xenophobia is an ideology 
would help to explain this material dimension; immigrants would likely be discriminated 
in this way because of, for instance, associations between immigrants and low 
competence, feelings of fear towards immigrants, and codes of interaction such as treat 
immigrants as less trustworthy. Others have referred to xenophobia in ways consistent with it 
being an ideology. For instance, it is often related to common emotional responses (such 
as fear and scorn) and codes of interaction (such as anti-social behavior towards those in 
an out-group). See Cottrel & Neuberg (2005). 
60 Cottrel & Neuberg (2005).  
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2.4.2. Non-instrumental critique.  
Can a linguistic salience perspective be criticisable in its own right, namely, independent 
of its effects? Whilst this is not something that I will discuss in depth here, I suggest two 
ways in which an argument along these lines might proceed. I mention these non-
instrumental critiques here for two reasons. Firstly, as mentioned in the introduction, my 
aim in this chapter and the next is to give a broad overview of salience perspectives in 
both linguistic and cognitive form. Whilst I focus on instrumental critiques in the case 
studies considered in chapters 4 and 5, discussing both instrumental and non-
instrumental critiques here provides the reader with a better grasp of the lay of the land 
regarding salience perspectives. (I do return to non-instrumental critiques in chapter 6, 
considering in detail a version introduced briefly in the next chapter.) Further, the second 
instrumental critique that I discuss below helps us to clarify the notion of salience used in 
this thesis, by contrasting it with another everyday use of the term.  
The first method for criticising linguistic salience perspectives on non-
instrumental grounds concerns the concept of licensing. Language licenses a belief or 
ideology where it makes it seem normatively acceptable. How can language do this? Swanson 
suggests that when we use a certain word, such as nerd, we imply that, all things 
considered, it is acceptable to use the word nerd—that is to say, we license use of that 
word.61 Generally, Swanson suggests that where we presume a speaker to be rational, 
cooperative, and so on, “we will have reason to think that the speaker is putting things in 
an acceptable way”.62 Now, there is an ideology associated with the word nerd, including, 
for instance, associations between those with concern for academic achievement and 
social awkwardness, and codes of interaction that encourage disparaging and subjugating 
those deemed to be nerds. For use of the word nerd to be acceptable, Swanson argues, the 
ideology associated with it “would itself have to be acceptable—indeed even good 																																																								
61 Swanson (forthcoming: §1) refers to these normative implicatures associated with use 
of a given word as “acceptability implicatures”. He says that uses of any word (to which I 
add uses of any linguistic salience perspective) are associated with a family of 
acceptability implicatures. These acceptability implicatures are, in Swanson’s 
(forthcoming: 3) words, “reflexive and higher-order: their content is a commentary on 
how what was said was said. In a word, they convey that it was acceptable to put it that 
way”. The particular term licensing is borrowed from Tirrell (2012), whose account has 
similarities with Swanson’s.  
62 Swanson (forthcoming: 4). The speaker may try to cancel this implicature, by, for 
instance, saying “But I don’t mean to suggest that putting it that way was acceptable all 
things considered”. Cancelling the implicature is not always possible, however; for 
instance, it is often argued that one cannot cancel the implicatures of a slur (Swanson, 
forthcoming: 2-3).  
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[emphasis in original]”.63 In an important sense, then, the speaker implies that the 
ideology associated with nerd is acceptable simply by using the word nerd. Swanson’s 
suggestion, then, is that a word can normatively license ideologies (or associations and 
beliefs) related to it.  
The significance of this fact is that licensing is a normative, as opposed to causal, 
notion. 64  This means that, where the word nerd licenses an ideology about nerds, if we 
deem that ideology to be problematic, then our use of the word nerd bears a constitutive 
relation to the problems of that ideology. Applying this to linguistic salience perspectives, 
then, the idea would be that use of a linguistic salience perspective can, in addition 
causally to activating associations, beliefs and/or ideologies associated with that 
perspective, normatively license them. Where it does so, it bears a constitutive relation to any 
problems inherent to those biases. Where a linguistic salience perspective constitutes the 
(for example) falsehoods or harms of a bias, we can find it non-instrumentally 
problematic.  
Relating this back to the immigration article, making salient instances of 
immigrants posing threats might be a way of saying this way of using salience in language is 
acceptable. One obvious way in which using that linguistic salience perspective would be 
acceptable is if xenophobia – an ideology associated with immigrants being threatening – 
is also acceptable. We might, then, want to pursue an argument that the immigration 
article above is a way of licensing xenophobia. If we were successful, we could say that 
instead of just causing the epistemic and moral problems constituted by xenophobia, the 
linguistic salience perspective employed by the immigration article constitutes those 
problems, in virtue of licensing them. In other words, we can criticise it on non-
instrumental grounds. 
The second way in which we might offer a non-instrumental critique of a 
linguistic salience perspective is if certain patterns of salience can themselves constitute a 
type of epistemic flaw. To see this, let’s first consider Elizabeth Anderson’s claim that a 
linguistic account of a phenomenon that contains only truths and yet omits other, relevant 
truths constitutes an epistemically biased account of that phenomenon. To illustrate this 
idea, Anderson cites a book by the controversial American Black Nationalist Louis 
Farrakhan. Farrakhan’s 1991 book The Secret Relationship between Blacks and Jews describes 
the role of Jews in the Atlantic slave system. Anderson lists many claims made by the 																																																								
63 Swanson (forthcoming: 10).  
64 Tirrell (2012), Swanson (forthcoming). 
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book that are true. For example, “that Jews had considerable investments in the Dutch 
West India Company, which played a significant role in the seventeenth century Atlantic 
slave trade…[and] that a larger percentage of Jews living in the U.S. South owned slaves 
than did Southern whites as a whole”.65  
The problem, Anderson claims, is not that Farrakhan’s book contains falsehoods. 
It is that it does not put the true facts that it discusses into a wider context that would 
allow the reader to assess the significance of those facts. Taken by themselves, these facts 
give the impression that Jewish people played a particularly special and large role in the 
Atlantic slave system, larger than other ethnic groups. The larger context, however, 
shows this impression (though not the facts themselves) to be false. As Anderson notes, 
“The share of the Jewish investment in the Dutch West India Company was small, and 
the Dutch played a significant role in the Atlantic slave trade only in the seventeenth 
century, when the trade was small … [Further, a] greater proportion of U.S. Southern 
Jews owned slaves than other Southern whites only because they were concentrated in 
urban areas, where rates of slave ownership were higher”.66  
 Anderson concludes that The Secret Relationship constitutes an epistemically biased 
account of the Jewish role in the slave trade in virtue of omitting significant facts that are 
crucial to our understanding of that topic. In this way, Anderson adds to a large literature 
suggesting that we need to look beyond mere truth when judging the adequacy of our 
language.67 In so doing, Anderson suggests a non-instrumental critique of The Secret 
Relationship that does not rely on assessing its truth-conditions. One of the ways in which 
we can directly assess the epistemic standing of an account of a subject, in other words, is 
by assessing whether it includes all pertinent and significant facts. 
What can this tell us about linguistic salience perspectives? Speculatively, we can 
suggest that making the wrong content salient might also be constitutive of epistemically 
biased language. If it is, then the linguistic salience perspective employed by the 
immigration article might be criticisible on non-instrumental grounds because of its 
emphasis on the wrong content—in this case, the wrong facts.  
One thing that the discussion of Anderson helps to clarify in this chapter is the 
concept of salience behind this thesis. I am not concerned, in this thesis, with sins of 
omission. Salience, at least in the sense that interests me, is not about making an issue 
prominent in a way that involves omitting or otherwise ignoring pertinent content. 																																																								
65 Anderson (1995: 38).  
66 Ibid.  
67 See the references mentioned in fn. 55. 
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(Whilst we do sometimes use the word salience to refer to such a scenario, this is not an 
everyday usage of the term that is relevant to this thesis.)68 The sort of salience that 
characterises salience perspectives is about including all pertinent contents but giving 
relatively more salience to the wrong content. The problems that I wish to highlight, 
then, look subtler than those on which Anderson focuses.  
 
2.5. How to choose linguistic salience perspectives 
 
Let’s return to the main point. I have suggested that we examine prevalent cultural 
beliefs, associations and ideologies in our folk-cultural context to determine how a 
linguistic salience perspective is likely to function. In particular, I am interested in 
whether a given linguistic salience perspective, even if not false in itself, is likely to 
activate false (and/or harmful) beliefs, or unwarranted (and/or harmful) associations and 
ideologies. What can this tell us about which linguistic salience perspectives we should be 
using? 
 To answer this, I borrow from Jennifer Saul and Louise Antony’s discussion of 
implicit bias. I will spend the next few pages exploring this discussion. This detour will, I 
hope, prove fruitful, as it will put me in better stead to answer my question.  
An implicit bias is an unconscious belief, association or attitude that affects our 
judgements and actions. For example, whilst assessors working in a university institution 
think that they are not racist, research shows that they nevertheless rate a CV as less 
impressive if it has a stereotypically black name at the top of it, than an equivalent CV 
(i.e. with the same qualifications) with a stereotypically white name at the top of it.69 
Another example might be a company manager who, whilst they explicitly hold gender 
egalitarian beliefs, they nevertheless unconsciously associate women with the domestic 
setting. This leads them to avoid hiring women for professional jobs, and to trust advice 
and feedback from female colleagues less. 70  That these biases can harm, is hardly 
																																																								
68 We might, for instance, talk of a newspaper making the potential benefits of Brexit 
salient in virtue of neglecting to mention the potential costs. Indeed, this notion of 
salience seems to be behind what communications researchers refer to as issue salience 
(See, for instance, Entman, 1993, and the general topic of issue frames, mentioned in fn. 5.) 
69 Saul (2012: 244). 
70 Brownstein (2017). 
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controversial. As these examples indicate, implicit biases can involve treating people 
unfairly.71  
They can have epistemic costs, too. For instance, implicit biases can encourage us 
to make decisions on the basis of factors that are evidentially irrelevant to the matter at 
hand (e.g. a person’s skin colour), which can quickly lead us to make mistakes (e.g. to rate 
a person’s intelligence incorrectly, or to judge their credibility wrongly). Where we hire 
and promote individuals who are not as good as our implicit biases lead us to think, we 
end up with an organisation that is not as good as it could be.72 If our organisation 
publishes research, for instance, implicit biases can mean that the standard of research 
being published is lower than it would be without such biases influencing our hiring and 
promotions.  
 In her 2012 paper Scepticism and Implicit Bias, Jennifer Saul discusses which 
epistemic norms we should endorse in light of the fact that we are subject to these biases. 
She first considers the most intuitive suggestion, namely, to become consciously aware of 
the biases that are affecting our thought, and to try and overcome them by being more 
objective. Let’s say that I am implicitly biased against people of colour, so that I consider 
people of colour to be less intelligent than white people. The suggested solution here is 
to make conscious efforts to ignore the colour of a person’s skin—to really focus on 
assessing each individual in a neutral light.  
 This approach, unfortunately, does not tend to work. Ironically, trying to be 
more objective can work to give one a false confidence that one has become more 
objective, meaning that one is even less likely to correct for one’s biased judgements.73 
Implicit biases simply work on a far too subconscious level for us to be able to correct 
for them through standard modes of reflective deliberation. This demonstrates, for Saul, 
the problems that we incur when we approach the issue of implicit bias with our a priori 
expectations of ourselves as neutral, rational agents—ones that can consciously reason 
their way out of a bias.74  
 What does work, then? Many successful interventions involve flipping stereotypes 
on their head. For instance, spending time thinking about counter-stereotypical 																																																								
71 Saul (2013: 246). Generally, there is a lot of evidence that implicit bias correlates with 
real-world behavior congruent with those biases (Greenwald et al., 2009). 
72 Saul (2013: 246-50). 
73 Antony (2016: 159-60) makes this point. See Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton (2008) 
for evidence on this.  
74 Generally, many biases cannot be eliminated simply through making them explicit 
(Fischhoff, 1977).  
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exemplars is one effective way of supressing the activation of implicit biases.75 This 
includes, for instance, spending 5 minutes creating a mental image of a counter-
stereotypic person (e.g. a strong woman, a black professor). Another effective 
intervention is repeating intentions such as “when I see a black face I will think ‘safe’”.76 
Saul suggests, then, that we correct for our implicit biases using “counter-intuitive 
mechanical techniques that draw not upon our rational agency but upon automatic and 
unconscious responses” [such as one’s unconscious response to one’s mental image of a 
counter-stereotypical person]. 77  She continues “We can consciously enlist these 
unconscious responses, and use them to improve our epistemic responses”. 78  The 
epistemic norm becomes something like this: follow those techniques that science has proved 
successful, whether or not they accord with our a priori intuitions about what counts as good epistemic 
practice. 79  
 Louise Antony frames Saul’s suggestion as using a Quinean naturalised approach 
to the study of knowledge. This involves selecting epistemic norms by empirically 
investigating how humans actually think, qua the limited, situated creatures that we are. 
From this investigation, we then judge what is in fact conducive to epistemic success. In 
Antony’s words, this involves “[writing] a blank check for warrant”.80 This naturalised 
approach, Antony suggests, demonstrates that “we should not strive to put aside all 
bias”. 81 Whether a bias is good or bad is something to be judged on its consequences for 
our understanding. The effective interventions mentioned above – such as spending five 
minutes mentally picturing a counter-stereotypical person, and repeating intentions such 
as when I see a black face, I will think ‘safe’ – count as ways of biasing one’s thought. They, in 
Antony’s words, “incline us to one judgement [or, we might add, association or ideology] 
rather than another”, for instance that black people are safe.82 These instances of bias, 
however, have been shown to help us, by counteracting our existing bad biases, to form a 																																																								
75 Blair (2002), Kang and Banaji (2006). 
76 Stewart & Payne (2008). 
77 Saul (2012: 260).  
78 Ibid.  
79 The type of interventions considered here are individualistic. Saul (ibid. 260-1) does 
suggest that individual corrective measures have limitations, and that we should be 
looking to make wider societal changes if we want to fully combat our implicit biases. I 
return to this point in the next chapter. 
80 Antony (2016: 161). 
81 Ibid. Others have made similar suggestions. See for instance Richardson’s (2013) 
account of introducing what she calls productive partialities (in other words, good bias) into 
scientific method.  
82 Antony (2016: 162).  
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more accurate impression of the subject in question. A bad bias is that which, in 
Antony’s words, “incline[s] us in the wrong direction: away from the truth”. 83 A good bias 
is that which inclines us towards truth. Given my earlier discussion of epistemic criteria 
beyond truth and falsity, we might add that bad biases incline us towards a less accurate or 
warranted picture of our subject, whilst good biases do the opposite.84 We might also add 
a moral dimension to this: bad biases incline us towards harm, whilst good biases incline 
us away from harm.  
What can these suggestions offer to my discussion of linguistic salience 
perspectives? Linguistic salience perspectives have an implicit nature. They subtly play 
with the presentation of linguistic content in a way that most often bypasses our 
conscious awareness. When these presentational shifts activate existing biases of ours, 
this generally occurs without our noticing. As with implicit bias generally, then, linguistic 
salience perspectives might be resistant to having their effects counteracted through 
standard modes of conscious reflection and deliberation. In fact, research does suggest 
that consciously reflecting on being subject to framing effects, and consciously trying to 
overcome them, is not a successful strategy. As I mentioned earlier, telling philosophers 
about framing effects does little to actually minimise the impact of framing effects in the 
trolley problem example discussed in §2.2.1, for instance. Generally, being given longer 
to reflect on how some linguistic content is presented has been found to be ineffective in 
reducing the impact of framing effects.85  
Mirroring the suggestions from Saul and Antony, then, I suggest that we adopt 
an epistemically naturalised methodology when deciding which salience perspectives to 
use in our communication. This involves two key steps. The first is to take stock of 
which (epistemically and morally) problematic biases are likely already influencing our 
thought, or take little to become activated in our minds. These include associations, 
beliefs and ideologies about a subject that are cognitively accessible and socially licensed. 
Secondly, we should empirically investigate which linguistic salience perspectives are 																																																								
83 Ibid.  
84 See Antony (ibid.) for a more detailed account of how to judge which biases are bad, 
and which are good. Antony (ibid. 184) also addresses the problem of how we can carry 
out these judgments “when we know that it is precisely such judgments that embody 
implicit bias”. She suggests that one “mechanically [notes] all the “facts,” and [makes] all 
inference principles as explicit as possible. Thus, for example, if we realize that we are 
likely to underestimate the productivity of women job applicants, we can force ourselves 
to explicitly count the number of publications by each applicant, and to relate them to 
precalibrated grades” (ibid.).  
85 LaBoeuf & Shafir (2003).  
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effective in neutralising, or preventing the activation of, these existing bad biases. Those 
that are effective may well involve using good bias. 86 (Given that I do not conduct my 
own empirical studies for this thesis, I instead consult existing, relevant empirical studies 
that can help me to judge which salience perspectives are likely to be effective.) 
Just as saying when I see a black face I will think ‘safe’ is a way of constructively using 
bias in order to neutralise an existing bad bias, using a linguistic salience perspective that 
emphasises the opposite of what our existing bad biases make salient might also help to 
neutralise, or prevent the activation of, those bad biases. Indeed, what worked for 
Jamieson and Radick’s genetics textbook was a reversal of the order in which they 
presented information about genetics. Whilst this arguably introduced a different bias 
into the textbook (it inclined its audience to make interactionist research most salient in 
their minds), this bias was one that resulted in the students having a more accurate (and 
less harmful) understanding of genetics. In particular, the students were less likely to 
endorse false (and harmful) claims about genetic causation. Adopting linguistic salience 
perspectives that invert the emphases of our bad biases looks to be a good first place to 
start, then.87  
Let’s relate this back to the immigration article. If we have found in our survey 
that its linguistic salience perspective does indeed risk activating our (bad) xenophobic 
biases, then we can suggest reversing its pattern of salience. In particular, perhaps we 
might advise that we begin discussions of immigration by discussing its advantages, and 
mention potential costs later. As I will reiterate in future chapters, this advice is not 
tantamount to saying that no article (or book, or speech) is permitted to begin with a 
discussion of the threats and costs associated with immigration. It is simply that one will 																																																								
86 Using salience perspectives to prevent the activation of problematic biases in our 
audience’s minds brings up issues connected to epistemic and ethical paternalism. In other 
words, we are using patterns of salience to shape our audience’s inferential patterns for 
(what we deem is) the better, without consulting them on the issue. Whilst there are interesting 
things to be said here, I do not discuss this issue. For a defence of epistemic paternalism, 
the reader can turn to Ahlstrom-Vij (2013).  
87 The suggestion here, then, only concerns linguistic salience perspectives that are liable 
to lead to epistemically and morally problematic biases. When it comes to framing effects 
like the oral health care example in §2.3.2, there is no obvious single option that is clearly 
wrong (changing the framing of flossing information from a loss to a gain does not mean 
the difference between activating bad biases and not, arguably). Thinking about which 
linguistic salience perspective to use can still be important for prudential and/or practical 
reasons, though; if more East Asian people will form better oral healthcare intentions 
when information about flossing is framed as a loss instead of a gain, then this 
information may well rightly influence a government’s choice of linguistic salience 
perspective.   
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need to justify choosing this linguistic salience perspective, given the potential cost of 
employing it (i.e. the cost of activating false and harmful xenophobic biases). In other 
words, the fact that a linguistic salience perspective can activate a (bad) bias of ours gives 
us one reason to avoid that perspective. This consideration must, of course, be weighed 
against the many other considerations that shape our overall decision-making process 
about how to communicate with others.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have introduced the idea of a linguistic salience perspective, which 
refers to the structuring and presenting of linguistic content, so that certain parts of it are 
made relatively more salient than others. Citing research into framing effects, I showed 
that simply shifting the pattern of salience in linguistic content, without making any other 
changes to that content, can nevertheless result in significantly different cognitive and 
behavioural responses to that content. 
In the introduction, I asked four questions. Firstly, what does it mean for 
something to be more salient in language? We might make something more salient in 
language, in the sense that interests me, by playing with the structure and presentation of 
some linguistic content in such a way that many would dismiss as inconsequential. This 
might involve mentioning it before some other content. Alternatively, where we have a 
choice between different logically-equivalent presentations of some content, whichever 
presentation we choose is that which we make salient. For instance, by presenting the 
fat/lean content of some beef as 25% fat, as opposed to 75% lean, we make its fatness 
more salient than its leanness.  
Secondly, I asked how is it that a mere shift of salience in language can have the 
sorts of dramatic consequences identified by framing effects research. My explanation 
focussed on culture. Where there is a cognitively accessible and socially licensed bias in 
our culture, I argued that simply making salient content that is central to that bias is liable 
to activate it in the audience’s mind. 
Thirdly, I asked whether and how we could evaluate mere patterns of salience in 
language. To this end, I focused on offering an instrumental critique of linguistic salience 
perspectives; where a linguistic salience perspective has bad effects, such as through 
activating a problematic bias, it can be judged instrumentally problematic. I briefly 
contrasted this instrumental critique with some non-instrumental ways of critiquing 
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salience perspectives. Where a salience perspective normatively licenses a bias, or where it 
counts as an epistemic flaw, it can be judged on non-instrumental grounds.   
Fourthly, I asked how we should use salience patterns in language. In answering 
this, I suggested following the lessons of naturalised epistemology. More specifically, I 
suggested first assessing which problematic cultural biases are particularly cognitively 
accessible, and thus take little to activate. On the basis of this assessment, I suggested 
using linguistic salience perspectives that make the activation of these biases less likely. 
Often, these counter-salience perspectives will involve making salient the opposite of 
that which our biases make salient. By helping to avoid the epistemic and moral 
problems encompassed in those biases, these counter-salience perspectives will help the 
audience in question to develop more accurate, and less harmful, conceptions of the 
subject matter in question.   
We should pay more attention to how we use salience in language. All linguistic 
content must be presented in some way or other. Whilst we might pass off as trivial (or 
fail to even notice) the choices that we make when structure our communication along 
dimensions of salience, these choices might be shaping audience responses in important 
ways, with epistemic and moral implications.  
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CHAPTER 3 
SALIENCE AND COGNITION 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Imagine a person, let’s call them Charlotte. Charlotte attends to people differently 
depending on their weight. When a person is slender, it tends to be that person’s 
personality that Charlotte finds to be their most salient feature, in the sense that their 
personality catches her attention and stays in her memory, more so than their figure. 
When a person is fat,1 on the other hand, it is their size that is usually most salient to 
Charlotte. She does notice their personality, and she can remember certain of their 
character quirks when she later reflects on them, but she finds these things less striking, 
less memorable, than their weight.   
The guiding questions for this chapter are as follows. Firstly, what does it mean 
for something to be more salient in a person’s cognition? Secondly, can we evaluate a 
person’s cognitive salience patterns, and if so, how? And, thirdly, if we do indeed judge 
that we are making the wrong thing salient, how can we change the salience patterns in 
our mind? 
In what follows, I will introduce the notion of a cognitive salience perspective in §3.2, 
building from Elisabeth Camp and Sebastian Watzl’s work. Cognitive salience 
perspectives are constituted by dispositions to attend more to certain mental states in the 
mind over others (these states might include beliefs, desires, perceptions of things in the 
world, and so on). It is this that separates them from the linguistic salience perspectives 
discussed in the previous chapter, which were instead constituted by ways of 
manipulating the structuring or presentation of linguistic content, such as by shifting the 
order of that content. Whether we can evaluate a person’s private attentional dispositions 
will be addressed in §3.3. In particular, I consider the instrumental and non-instrumental 
critiques of linguistic salience perspectives discussed in the previous chapter, and discuss 
																																																								
1 Here, I follow Anne Eaton (2016) in using the word fat as a value-neutral descriptive 
term. As Eaton points out, this parallels its usage in Fat Studies and the Fat Pride 
Community. She says: “The basic idea is to avoid seemingly well-intentioned 
euphemisms like “saftig” or “heavy” that depend on the tacit understanding that “fat” is 
an impolite term of derision, and also to avoid euphemisms like “overweight” and 
“obese” that medicalize fat as a disease.” (ibid. 39). 
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how these might apply to cognitive salience perspectives. Finally, I consider the issue of 
how to change our cognitive salience perspectives in §3.4. In addition to individualist 
approaches modelled on habit formation, I also consider structural approaches, which 
place the burden of change on society.  
 
3.2. Introducing Cognitive Salience Perspectives 
 
3.2.1. Some examples 
A. Music  
Chun is listening to a band. She finds herself focussing on one instrument over the 
others. That synth is really grabbing her attention! She hears the drums and guitars, but 
they’ve melted into the background of her experience.2 A week later, a friend asks Chun 
about the gig. The synth comes to her mind straightaway, and she mentions how great it 
sounded. Her friend knows the guitarist, and so asks about their performance. Chun has 
to try a little harder to remember the guitar; trying to jog her memory by imagining 
herself back in the room, the sound comes back to her, and she reports back to her 
friend. 
 
B. Personal Outlook 
Imran is a relatively anxious person. When he meets a new person, he focuses on any 
awkward moments that arise, such as when he stutters or says something embarrassing. 
When he reflects on his past actions more generally, the moments where he has slipped 
up loom largest in his mind. He does at least remember his achievements, but they don’t 
take centre stage in his mind like his failures do.     
 
C. Intellectual Theories   
Susan and Arif come to agree on the facts about the role of genetics in trait 
development. They differ, though, in which fact jumps out at them. When reading 
academic articles about genetics, what stands out to Susan are discussions of how one 
and the same gene can contribute to near-opposing traits thanks to shifts in its 
environment. These are the articles that most easily pop into her mind when she reflects 
on the role of genes in trait development. For Arif, it’s instead papers detailing how 																																																								
2 A version of this example is borrowed from Sebastian Watzl (2017: 74), whose work 
echoes some of the ideas in this chapter.  
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particular genes reliably correlate with particular traits when the environment is held 
constant. Arif also believes what Susan believes about how genes and environment 
interact in sometimes surprising ways, but he has to try a little harder to remember the 
relevant facts. Susan similarly must push her memory slightly more when it comes to the 
cases that are most salient to Arif.3 
 
3.2.2. Cognitive salience perspectives 
A cognitive salience perspective is constituted by attentional dispositions to find various 
mental states more salient than others. For instance, one might better attend to one 
belief that one has about the topic of biology over another. Alternatively, one might 
better attend to (one’s experience of) the synth in a band over the sound of the guitar. 
The idea of a cognitive salience perspective finds echoes in Elisabeth Camp’s account of 
what she calls perspectives. Whilst Campian perspectives are broader than what I call 
cognitive salience perspectives, they are partially constituted by the structuring of contents 
along dimensions of salience.4 For Camp, something is salient in our attention when “it 
sticks out relative to the background, like a bright light or a hugely bulbous nose”.5 
Sebastian Watzl’s work on attention also picks up on this idea of signal-to-noise ratio. 
Salience in attention, he suggests, is about how that attention is structured so that “some 
things are in the foreground relative to others”.6   
As with linguistic salience perspectives, cognitive salience perspectives are 
individuated not in terms of content (in this case, cognitive content), but rather in terms of 
the structuring of that content. Again, we see this shift of focus from content to structure 
made explicit in Camp and Watzl’s accounts. For Watzl, the study of attention means 
recognising that the “relations between the parts of our conscious mental life [i.e. the 
foregrounding and backgrounding of mental states] are as important as the intrinsic 
features [i.e. the content] of various mental states”.7 Similarly, what interests Camp (as we 																																																								
3 This example builds upon an experience of mine that I discussed in chapter 1 (§1.1). 
4 Campian perspectives go beyond mere salience. For instance, they include dispositions 
to find certain properties more causal and explanatory (in her words, more “central”) 
than others (Camp, 2017: 80). (See §3.2.2.1 below.) I use the phrase salience perspective to 
highlight how my account of perspectives is narrower than Camp’s. 
5 Ibid. 80.  
6 Watzl (2011: 849). Watzl (2017: Ch. 4) offers what he calls the priority structure view of 
attention, which involves the activity of structuring mental states so that some are 
prioritized over others. He compares our mind to a newspaper, where certain stories 
make the headline, and others are granted less priority (ibid. 70).  
7 Watzl (2011: 849). 
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heard in chapter 1) is not “what is represented in imagination … [but rather] ‘how’ that 
content is imagined”.8  
Further, as with the linguistic salience perspective of the previous chapter, 
cognitive salience perspectives are about giving relative salience to one thing over another 
(this time, in one’s attention). Let’s return to Charlotte. Whilst Charlotte might hold 
various beliefs about a subject, such as that her acquaintance Jane is fat, and that she 
does a lot of charity work, it is a further question which of these beliefs is given relative 
salience in her mind over the other. Let’s say that she gives relative salience to Jane’s 
fatness. When I implore Charlotte to change her salience perspective on Jane so that she 
attends more to her charity work, then, I am not claiming that Charlotte is unaware of this 
trait of Jane’s, or that she is ignoring it.9 Instead, I am imploring Charlotte to give it relative 
salience over her weight. 
This discussion helps to make explicit one way, then, in which cognitive salience 
perspectives relate to linguistic salience perspectives. They are connected by the relation 
of similarity, insofar as the notion of relative salience applies to them both. They are also 
causally connected. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, making something 
relatively more salient in language tends to make that thing relatively more salient in an 
audience’s minds. If Charlotte makes Jane’s weight particularly salient when talking to 
Bill, such as by mentioning her weight before her other attributes, then this will tend to 
result in Bill giving relative salience to Jane’s weight in his mind. Conversely, when 
something is salient in one’s mind, this tends to result in one making that thing salient in 
language. Charlotte’s cognitive salience perspective on Jane will indeed make it likely that, 
when talking to Bill and others, she mentions Jane’s weight before her other attributes.  
 
3.2.2.1. Dispositional Nature:  
What exactly does having something relatively more salient in one’s mind amount to? 
When we make something salient in our minds, we are disposed better to notice it, 
remember it, and find it more cognitively accessible. As for Charlotte’s acquaintance Jane, she 																																																								
8 Camp (2017: 77). Camp is primarily interested in how perspectives relate to our 
imaginative engagement with fiction, hence the emphasis on imagination in this quote. She 
also thinks that they capture how we engage with (subjects in) the real world, too, 
however. 
9 In this last chapter, (§2.4.2) I clarified this notion of relative salience by contrasting it with 
another everyday usage of salience that I stipulated is not relevant to this thesis: namely, 
making x (e.g. Jane’s fatness) salient in a way that involves ignoring y (e.g. Jane’s charity 
work).  
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might better notice instances of others discussing Jane’s fatness than instances of others 
discussing her charity efforts. Because she has noticed these instances, she better 
remembers them. 10  This means that Jane’s fatness is more cognitively accessible to 
Charlotte; it takes less cognitive labour to think of than her charitable side.11  
Even if we do not change our propositional attitudes (such as beliefs or desires) 
regarding a subject, a shift in cognitive salience perspective can affect our explanations of 
and behavioural responses to that subject. When Jane’s fatness is particularly salient to 
Charlotte, it is what pops into her mind first when asked to explain why Jane acts as she 
does, such as why she rarely attends social events. This can mean Charlotte is more likely 
to invoke Jane’s weight than her charity commitments in her explanations of Jane’s 
behaviour. Indeed, psychologists Larisa Hussak and Andrei Cimpian argue that where x 
is more retrievable in our memory than y, the accessibility of x can indirectly affect the 
content of our explanations. In their words, “[certain] entities are in the focus of 
attention when the search for an explanation is triggered, so they are likely to serve as the 
first, and perhaps only, retrieval cues”.12 This “attentional spotlight”, they say, can 
simultaneously prevent other relevant contents from coming to mind, which lowers the 
probability of citing these other contents in explanations.13 This is one way in which 
cognitive salience perspectives have epistemic significance: by indirectly influencing our 
explanations.  
The fact that a salience perspective can impact how one explains information 
about a subject does not mean that salience perspectives are smuggling in implicit beliefs 
about how explanatory, or specifically how causal, a subject’s properties are. When a 
property is more cognitively accessible, it is simply more likely to get invoked in 
explanations. 14 It is here that we can see one of the more significant ways in which my 																																																								
10  See Chaffee & Schleuder (1986) for a study confirming this link between attention and 
memory. 
11 The notion of cognitive accessibility was discussed in §3.1.1 of the previous chapter. 
12 Hussak and Cimpian (2017: 70). 
13 Ibid. Siegel, who discusses the epistemic side of attentional dispositions, also confirms 
the epistemic significance of attention. For instance, she suggests that, “Which evidence 
one ends up with is a function of what one pays attention to” (Siegel, 2017: 159).  
14 It should be noted that repeatedly retrieving certain properties instead of others when 
explaining a subject’s traits, can eventually lead to one forming a belief about that property’s 
explanatory, or specifically causal, nature; as we will hear in the next section, merely 
having something salient in one’s mind can have plenty of significant effects, such as the 
triggering of a truth-conditional belief about that property. Crucially, however, having a 
property cognitively accessible does not in itself need to involve a belief about that 
property’s explanatory, or specifically causal, nature. 
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account of salience perspectives departs from Camp’s notion of perspectives. Camp talks 
about certain properties being more central than others in someone’s mind, where they 
are considered to cause, or otherwise explain, many of the subject’s other features.15 This 
gives the impression that there is a (perhaps implicit) belief about the property’s causal 
profile—a belief that would clearly take us beyond the bounds of salience. (If this is not 
what Camp means, then she could afford to be clearer about her notion of centrality).  
Similar things can be said about how cognitive salience perspectives relate to our 
behavioural responses to a subject. With Jane’s weight most salient in her mind, 
Charlotte might be less likely to invite Jane on a charity run than if Jane’s charity-giving 
had loomed larger in her mind. As with the point above, this does not demonstrate that 
cognitive salience perspectives are partially constituted by codes of interaction, such as 
was the case with ideologies, as discussed in the previous chapter. Instead, when Jane’s 
weight is more cognitively accessible, it is simply more likely to influence Charlotte’s 
decisions about how to act around Jane. What we attend to can indirectly influence our 
behaviour. 
  
3.2.2.2. Scope and duration 
Charlotte’s salience perspective on Jane might pertain only to Jane. Or, as per our 
example in the introduction, Charlotte might apply this salience perspective to all fat 
people, not just Jane. These two cognitive salience perspectives represent different levels 
of subject-specific salience perspectives—where the specific subject shifts from a single 
person to a single social group. We can envisage a generic salience perspective, though, 
that is less confined. Perhaps Imran’s cognitive salience perspective that induces him to 
focus on his failures is symptomatic of a broader cognitive salience perspective 
characterised by pessimism. This broader perspective might dispose him to better attend 
to negatives generally speaking, whether he is considering his own life, the economy, or 
the future of humankind. 16  (This distinction is not confined to cognitive salience 
perspectives only; a linguistic salience perspective can also either be subject-specific or 
																																																								
15 Camp (2017: 80). 
16 The distinction between generic and subject-specific cognitive salience perspectives is 
not entirely clear-cut. Consider a cognitive salience perspective that gives relative salience 
to cynical motivations over altruistic ones. Some might want to refer to this perspective 
as generic, insofar as one can better attend to cynicism in multiple subjects (politics, 
personal interactions, media, etc.). Others, however, might consider it to be subject-
specific, insofar as it pertains to the specific subject of human motivation.  
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generic. A generic linguistic salience perspective might reliably mention negatives before 
positives, for instance, whatever the subject under consideration.) 
 The duration with which we hold cognitive salience perspectives can also vary. 
Charlotte’s cognitive salience perspective on Jane might involve her reliably making 
Jane’s fatness her most salient feature. But, if, whilst they are out together, Jane spills her 
drink on herself, her clumsiness might be given relative salience over her weight in 
Charlotte’s mind, at least for a few minutes. All sorts of things might spark a temporary 
shift in a person’s cognitive salience perspective, such as desires. If I am thirsty and 
desire hydration, the beverages that I pass in shop windows will have relative salience for 
me over the foodstuffs. This cognitive salience perspective will likely dissipate upon 
fulfilling my desire. Further, reading an article with a particular linguistic salience 
perspective might succeed in temporarily changing a person’s cognitive salience patterns 
(linguistic salience perspectives, remember, tend to produce their counterpart cognitive 
salience perspectives in their audience’s minds). I might read an article targeted at food 
packaging businesses that gives relative salience to the harms that our everyday plastic 
consumption generates over the benefits and conveniences that plastic food packaging 
tends to give. As a result, I start giving these harms relative salience in my attention. This 
effect might only be short lived; a day after reading the article, I, like many others, 
continue finding the conveniences of using plastics more noticeable, memorable, and 
cognitively accessible than the harms. 
In what follows, I am interested primarily in cognitive salience perspectives that 
have a longer duration. More specifically, I am interested in those that have become 
habitual—where one reliably gives relative salience to one mental content over another.  
 
3.2.2.3. Automatic and intuitive nature 
Let’s say that I believe that I should find the harms associated with plastics more salient 
than the conveniences. Does my holding this belief mean that I have successfully 
adopted the relevant cognitive salience perspective? To answer this, consider the 
duck/rabbit illusion in Figure 1 below. I might look and know that the lines in this image 
can represent a duck without successfully seeing the image as (depicting) a duck. It just 
looks like a rabbit to me. I am aware that it can be seen as a duck, but, try as I might, my 
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imagination simply doesn’t arrange the image in the right way. Wittgenstein’s distinction 
between looking plus thinking and seeing-as helps to explain this phenomenon.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Elisabeth Camp uses examples such as these to suggest that an analogous phenomenon 
can occur in our attention. I might believe the proposition the harms of plastics should have 
relative salience over their conveniences – that I should find the harms more noticeable and 
memorable – but I can’t help finding their conveniences more attention-grabbing. Or, 
like Imran from §2.1, I might, after speaking to a counsellor, believe the proposition my 
achievements should be given relative salience over my failures, but nevertheless persist in 
automatically attending more to my worries and flaws. My achievements simply don’t 
intuitively leap out as salient in my own mind. As Elisabeth Camp phrases it, I don’t get 
that “click”. 18  This demonstrates the non-doxastic nature of cognitive salience 
perspectives; one does not hold a particular cognitive salience perspective in virtue of 
believing a particular proposition.19 The non-propositional nature of cognitive salience 
perspectives also demonstrates that they lack truth-conditions.20  
																																																								
17 Wittgenstein, in Camp (2017: 82). This argument – that salience perspectives are non-
propositional and intuitive – is borrowed from Camp. 
18 Camp (2017: 83). Sebastian Watzl (2017: 49) refers to attention that is unintentional – 
that is not controlled by one’s will – as arational. 
19 Indeed, Camp distinguishes her perspectives from belief (2017: 82), and Watzl (2011) 
distinguishes his account of attention from belief. One might wonder whether cognitive 
salience perspectives are instead equivalent to what Tamar Gendler (2008) calls aliefs. 
Indeed, aliefs are also distinguished from beliefs partly in virtue of their intuitive and 
automatic nature, as well as their tendency to come apart from one’s beliefs. For 
instance, one might believe that the characters in a film are fictional, but alieve that they 
are real, in the sense that one feels emotions about them, and one is disposed to cry 
about the bad things that happen to them. It is precisely these affective and behavioural 
dimensions to alief, however, that distinguish them from cognitive salience perspectives. 
Figure 1: Duck / Rabbit Illusion 
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Familiar examples of habit formation is one area where many of us experience a 
disconnect between our intellectual endorsement of a cognitive salience perspective and 
an ability to exercise it in an automatic and intuitive way. When we have developed a habit 
of focussing on particular contents – such as worries and flaws – it can take a lot of 
effort and practice to shift to focussing on others—such as opportunities and strengths. 
Those who have experience with Cognitive Behavioural Therapy can attest to how tricky this 
process of changing one’s automatic, intuitive attentional patterns can be;21 the challenge 
can be so hard that some of us never succeed in cultivating new attentional dispositions. 
Simply considering (or even endorsing) a salience perspective, then, is not the same as 
adopting a salience perspective (i.e. successfully cultivating the relevant attentional 
dispositions). I will consider the significance of this point in §4. 
Further, as is also a common experience in any sort of therapy (whether formal 
or informal),22 our existing habits of attention are not always transparent to us. It can 
often take another person, or a transformative personal experience, to make clear exactly 
what it is we seem to be noticing, remembering, and finding cognitively accessible. It is 
plausible that Charlotte is unaware, therefore, that she is reliably making fat people’s 
weight their most salient feature. In this way, cognitive salience perspectives often bypass 
our conscious reflection. This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to 
investigate such implicit cognitive salience perspectives. In addition to techniques used in 
therapy,23 other ways exist of ascertaining a person’s implicit attentional dispositions. For 
instance, eye tracking studies help to illuminate what is catching a person’s attention, and 																																																																																																																																																														
Cognitive salience perspectives are more minimal. Instead of encompassing these 
affective and behavioural dimensions, they simply involve the structuring of our 
attention so that we find certain content more noticeable, memorable, and cognitively 
accessible, than other content. 
20 Camp (2017: 79) agrees that a [cognitive salience] perspective “determines no truth-
conditions of its own”. 
21 Part of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is about noticing and then changing 
what one focuses on and remembers. Padesky (1994: 268), for instance, talks about CBT 
changing “what we notice, attend to, and remember of our experiences”. He suggests, 
for instance, that someone with what he calls a negative self-schema “will focus on personal 
defects, flaws, and errors, noticing and remembering these more than strengths, positive 
gains, and successes” (ibid.). This way of talking is strikingly similar to the language that I 
use in this chapter. 
22 Formal therapy might involve counselling, whilst informal therapy might involve 
chatting with a friend, or reading a lifestyle magazine.  
23 Cognitive behavioural therapy, for instance, has developed techniques of making a 
person conscious of their unconscious habits, including habits of attention. Many of 
these involve worksheets that get an individual to record their thoughts and feelings 
(Padesky, 1994).    
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therefore what is likely getting logged in their memory. More academic studies are 
making use of eye tracking technology, using it to ascertain, for instance, which parts of a 
person’s body someone is paying more attention to,24 or which sentences in a story one’s 
eyes linger on.25 Memory tests can also help to reveal which implicit cognitive salience 
perspective one has.26 Generally, as is the case with cognition that is unconsciously 
processed, implicit measures (i.e. those that do not rely on an individual to report their 
attitudes and habits, but instead attempt directly to measure a person’s unconscious 
responses) may be better at uncovering cognitive salience perspectives that we are not 
conscious of having.27  
 
3.3. Ways of evaluating cognitive salience perspectives 
 
Can we evaluate a person’s private attentional patterns as good or bad? For some, it 
seems that we cannot. As Susanna Siegel reflects, “Some patterns of attention seem 
palpably insignificant. Strolling in a meadow, one can [give relative salience to] the sky or 
the trees [in one’s attention].”28 The example of Chun listening to music might also fit 
this description; unless there are extenuating circumstances (such as it being part of an 
exam designed to test her ability to evaluate the drums, or that she is at the gig 
specifically to support her drummer friend perhaps), it does not seem to matter 
epistemically or morally whether Chun pays more attention to the synth or the drums. 
For other attentional dispositions, though, I think that we can more easily make sense of 
the idea one is treating the wrong things as salient in their attention. How?  
 
3.3.1. Instrumental critique  
Siegel suggests that we are already used to evaluating attention according to its upshots. 
She cites a legal decision to condemn a driver’s attentional dispositions where they 
involve not noticing a mule that had walked onto the highway, and where this lack of 
																																																								
24 See Karsay et al. (2017), and Gervais et al. (2013).  
25 Frisson & Wakefield (2012). 
26 See, for instance, Gaither et al.’s (2014) study into whether children better remember 
faces racially ambiguous or racially non-ambiguous faces. 
27 See, for instance, the measures developed to detect our implicit biases, such as the 
Implicit Association Test. There is a great range of implicit measures that have been 
developed in psychology (Rudman, 2011). 
28 Siegel (2017: 159). 
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attention led to a car accident.29 This represents an instrumental critique of attention; the 
demerits of the driver’s attention were derivative on the demerits of its effects. The form 
of attention that Siegel considers however, does not represent a cognitive salience 
perspective; the driver is not giving relatively less salience to the mule (than to something 
else), rather she is not attending to the mule at all. (This is what I have called a sin of 
omission.)30 How can we evaluate cognitive salience perspectives in particular? 
In the previous chapter, I suggested judging as instrumentally problematic 
linguistic salience perspectives that activate inferences to epistemically and/or morally 
problematic biases of ours. As we have already mentioned, linguistic salience 
perspectives function by first inculcating their counterpart cognitive salience perspective 
in their audience’s mind. This means that it is actually cognitive salience perspectives that 
are more directly responsible for activating the biases discussed in the previous chapter. 
Following the logic in that chapter, then, we can judge as instrumentally problematic 
cognitive salience perspectives that activate inferences to epistemically and/or morally 
problematic associations, beliefs, or ideologies.31  
This goes for cognitive salience perspectives whether they have been inspired by 
a linguistic salience perspective or otherwise. For instance, whether or not a linguistic 
salience perspective has inspired it, we might criticise Charlotte’s cognitive salience 
perspective on fat people if it is activating oppressive beliefs and ideologies about fat 
people. These might include, for instance, beliefs that fat people are lazy and 
unintelligent, associations between fatness and greed, feelings of disgust, and codes of 
interaction that involve avoiding sitting next to a fat person on public transport.32 It has 
been argued that what might be called fatist beliefs and ideologies are cognitively 
accessible and socially licensed.33 If they are, according to the conclusions reached in the 
previous chapter, Charlotte, simply through reliably making fat people’s weight more 
salient than their other features, might activate those beliefs and ideologies in her mind. 
Where we want to condemn these beliefs and ideologies as false, unwarranted, and/or 
harmful, we can take issue with the attentional dispositions that led to them.  																																																								
29 Ibid. (160).  
30 Chapter 2 (§2.4.2).  
31 Indeed, Watzl (forthcoming) suggests that we can evaluate attention (specifically 
attention that takes on the form of a cognitive salience perspective, i.e. where one gives 
relative attention to one thing over another) on instrumental grounds—according to its 
results.  
32 Some of these features of fatist ideologies are described in Eaton’s (2016) paper. 
33 See, for instance, Eaton (ibid.). Eaton cites various terms that refer to fat oppression, 
including fatism (ibid. 38).  
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Where Charlotte’s cognitive salience perspective is activating these biases, it is 
likely to be doing so in a way that bypasses Charlotte’s conscious awareness. I suggested 
in the previous chapter that patterns of salience activate biases in an implicit manner. Far 
from explicitly stating a belief, for instance, salience perspectives (whether linguistic or 
cognitive) rely on an implicit inferential process whereby we subconsciously 
pragmatically infer that belief. This, I suggested, can make patterns of salience especially 
effective in activating that belief in our mind, meaning that they are even more likely to 
influence our thought and behaviour in ways congruent with our accepting that belief. 
This is because their under-the-radar nature means that they do not give the individual 
chance consciously to reflect on whether they do indeed wish to endorse that belief that 
is activated in their minds.34 This means that, whilst Charlotte might be disposed to reject 
an inference to a fatist belief if such a belief is explicitly articulated (if, say, an 
acquaintance says Jane is fat and therefore unattractive), she might be disposed to think and 
act in ways that demonstrate an endorsement of fatist beliefs if those beliefs are implicitly 
activated by her cognitive salience perspective.  
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, it is this instrumental critique of salience 
perspectives that concerns me in the next two chapters. Below, however, I offer some 
contrasting non-instrumental ways of critiquing cognitive salience perspectives. Whilst I do 
not return to non-instrumental critiques until chapter 6, discussing them here will be 
helpful. My aim in these first two (substantive) chapters is to give a broad overview of 
salience perspectives. This allows the reader to have all the moving parts relating to 
salience perspectives in place before considering how they function in practice. 
 
3.3.2. Non-instrumental critique 
I briefly discussed in the previous chapter two ways in which a linguistic salience 
perspective might constitute, as opposed to cause, epistemic bias, and harm. One 
involved the normative concept of licensing. Licensing is a normative, as opposed to 
causal notion, meaning that where a cognitive salience perspective licenses problematic 
beliefs or ideologies, it bears a constitutive relationship to their problems. If we can show 
that Charlotte’s cognitive salience perspective licenses fatist beliefs and ideologies, then, 
we can say that her perspective constitutes their epistemic and moral flaws. We can 
briefly sketch how this argument might look. In the previous chapter, we suggested that 
use of a given salience perspective can license beliefs and ideologies associated with that 																																																								
34 See Chapter 2 (§2.2.1 and §2.3.1). 
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perspective. 35 Applied to cognitive salience perspectives, we can say that, when Charlotte 
employs her cognitive salience perspective, she implies that this way of attending to fat people 
is acceptable (in other words, she licenses her cognitive salience perspective). There is an 
ideology associated with that way of attending to fat people, namely, fatism. Fatism also 
makes fat people’s weight their most salient feature; amongst other things, fatism 
suggests that fat people’s weight should be salient because fatness is a grave social 
problem that requires fixing, and that it is important to shame and stigmatise fat 
individuals. 36  Following the logic of the discussion in the previous chapter, for 
Charlotte’s way of attending to fat people to be acceptable, the ideology associated with 
that way of attending to fat people would also have to be acceptable. After all, it is this 
ideology that explains why it is appropriate to make fat people’s weight their most salient 
feature (fatism suggests that fatness is and should be attention-grabbing, for the reasons 
above). In this way, simply by employing her cognitive salience perspective on fat people, 
Charlotte might be licensing fatist ideologies. Where these ideologies are intrinsically 
problematic, this would mean that, given its normative as opposed to causal relationship 
to those ideologies, so too is Charlotte’s cognitive salience perspective.  
I also introduced a different way in which certain patterns of salience in language 
might be problematic on non-instrumental grounds in the previous chapter, namely, 
where they themselves count as a way of being biased. Making the wrong facts salient, I 
suggested, might count as an epistemic flaw, independently of any additional negative 
epistemic consequences this pattern of salience might have. We can extend this thought 
to patterns of salience in our attention. Indeed, Camp suggests something along these 
lines. For her, cognitive salience perspectives, whilst non-propositional and thus lacking 
in truth-conditions might be judged on the epistemic ground of warrant. 37 In particular, 
she says that a subject-specific cognitive salience perspective is (un)warranted where its 
assignments of salience are (in)consistent with the objective distribution of properties in 
the world. In her words: “features [i.e. properties in the world] that are in fact more 
intense [i.e. that stick out relative to the background] should be assigned higher 
prominence”.38 So, blonde hair in a room full of brunettes might warrant being made 																																																								
35 Chapter 3 (§3.3). This argument was inspired by Swanson (forthcoming: §1). 
36 Eaton (2016). 
37 This adds to the growing literature in epistemology highlighting the myriad ways beyond 
falsehood that our cognition can be critiqued. See fn. 55 in the previous chapter.  
38 Camp (2017: 83). Given that Camp’s notion of a perspective is broader than mine, she 
also details other criteria for judging perspectives, which are not relevant to my more 
minimalist account (ibid.).  
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salient because of what Camp refers to as the “broad statistical [distribution] of 
properties” in that room.39 Camp does suggest that other considerations mean that 
multiple different cognitive salience perspectives will usually be warranted for a given 
subject. 40 For instance, our human interests and aims (which themselves, she suggests, 
can be driven by practical, moral, and/or aesthetic values) can legitimately shape what we 
decide to make salient. For instance, I might be studying the science of brunette hair, and 
this interest of mine justifies my giving relative salience to the brunettes in the room. 
Further, the fact that the statistical structures in the world are complex and multi-
dimensional, mean that we are often justified in choosing different salience perspectives 
for one and the same subject. Considering why Britain voted to leave the EU, for 
instance, the same data legitimates making both the influence of key figureheads salient 
(such as Boris Johnson), as well as the social characteristics of individual voters (i.e. their 
occupational status and educational backgrounds). Different levels – from individual 
voter, to individual politicians, to political parties – play a causal role in political decision 
making. These qualifications notwithstanding, Camp suggests that a cognitive salience 
perspective can itself count as unwarranted if it makes salient the wrong feature, meaning 
that she offers a non-instrumental way of critiquing cognitive salience perspectives.  
Watzl and Siegel adopt a similar, if slightly different strategy. For them, 
attentional dispositions might partially constitute an epistemic bias. Their example is as 
follows: Sara is evaluating CVs in order to hire a person. She systematically attends more 
to the good parts of CVs coming from White individuals, whilst systematically attending 
more to the bad parts of CVs coming from BME (black and minority ethnic) individuals. 
Sara has no evidence that BME individuals, on average, have more negative traits that 
make them ill-suited to the job than White people. Against the evidence, then, Sara takes 
BME individuals to be generally less qualified. We can say, then, that Sara has an 
irrational outlook. The suggestion that Watzl and Siegel make is that a tendency to have 
certain attentional dispositions might be constitutive of this irrational outlook. In other 
words, it is part of what it is to harbour this irrational outlook to, for no principled 
reason, pay more attention to the negatives of one social group than the negatives of 
another social group. If the irrational outlook is non-instrumentally problematic, they 
suggest, then so too is the cognitive salience perspective that partially constitutes it.41  																																																								
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid. (83-4). 
41 Watzl (forthcoming). Siegel did not co-author this paper, but Watzl cites their joint 
research.   
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Camp, Watzl, and Siegel have identified interesting ways of epistemically 
evaluating attentional dispositions. In Watzl and Siegel’s case, Sara’s attentional 
dispositions also look to be problematic for moral reasons.42 Whilst it might be irrational 
to pay more attention to the negatives of one group than the negatives of another, it also 
seems immoral. Sara is treating people of BME individuals unfairly, by presuming them to 
have more negative traits than White people. We might say that she has a morally 
prejudiced outlook, and that her cognitive salience perspective partially constitutes that 
morally prejudiced outlook. Perhaps part of what it is to treat people unfairly is to attend 
to one social group’s negatives more than the negatives of another social group.  
Indeed, when it comes to evaluating Charlotte’s salience perspective, it is this 
moral dimension that seems better to capture what feels wrong about her attentional 
dispositions. At least to my intuition, it is not so much that Charlotte’s way of attending 
to fat people falls short of some epistemic criteria (though it may well do this)43 but 
rather that it falls short of some moral criteria. Inspired by Camp, Watzl, and Siegel’s 
suggestions above, then, the proposal that I would like to make is this: cognitive salience 
perspectives can constitute harm. This may be surprising. Whilst a great many factors, 
from physical and psychological violence, to false beliefs and credibility deficits, have 
already been identified as potentially harming an individual or group, facts about salience 
have not seemed particularly relevant to harm. In what follows, I will sketch an argument 
that certain patterns of salience can be intrinsically harmful. I will expand on these ideas 
in Chapter 6.  
Think back to Jane. It is not hard to imagine that Jane might not want Charlotte 
to attend to her such that her weight is her most salient feature. She might instead prefer 
for her charity work to be what Charlotte and others most notice and remember about 
her. How can we understand her desire? Jane’s charity work is something that she has 
chosen, that she values, that she works hard at, and so on. In particular, her charity work 
demonstrates her rationality. Jane has decided that charity work is valuable, and is 
rationally setting and pursuing her own charity-related goals. It demonstrates her 																																																								
42 Whilst Siegel and Watzl (Watzl, forthcoming) do consider how attentional dispositions 
might partially constitute a moral state, such as a virtue (such as gratitude), they do not 
expand on how a constitutive moral critique might be applied to the case of the 
prejudiced evaluator. (This might simply be because the focus in Watzl’s paper is on 
epistemic evaluations of attention.) Further, they do not consider the broader point that I 
make below, namely, that certain attentional dispositions might count as a way of 
harming someone. 
43 Perhaps Charlotte’s surplus of attention to fat people’s weight, in contrast with her lack 
of attention to thin people’s weight, partially constitutes an irrational outlook. 
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autonomy—her capacity to determine what she pursues in life. Jane has freely chosen to 
pursue charity work. It also showcases her personality. Through her charity work, Jane can 
demonstrate her distinctive, caring personality.  
All of these traits have been associated with what is sometimes called one’s 
humanity or personhood (I will henceforth use the latter term).44 Personhood is a concept 
that plays a significant role in ethical thought; it is often cited as what gives humans a 
special moral status, or what represents, in Immanuel Kant’s words, our “inner worth”.45 
In fact, it is disrespect of one’s personhood that is regularly cited as being what makes 
various phenomena harmful. Consider, for instance, sexual objectification, which 
involves treating a person as a thing in some way.46 When explaining why sexual 
objectification can be harmful, feminists regularly cite the disrespect that it can constitute 
to the personhood of the one who is objectified.47  
Jane’s fatness, on the other hand, does not demonstrate her personhood. It is a 
superficial appearance that does not demonstrate her rationality, autonomy, or 
personality, in the way that her charity work does. In fact, feminists researching 
objectification have often suggested that the body, whether fat or thin, is commonly 
understood as lacking personhood-related qualities. Sandra Bartky, for instance, says that, 
historically and culturally, the body has “been regarded as less intrinsically valuable, 
indeed, as less inherently human, than the mind or personality”.48 This has led to a focus 
in feminist research on women being objectified, in a way that disrespects their 
personhood, specifically through a reduction of women to their body.49 (I return to, and expand 
upon, these feminist ideas in chapter 6.)  
How does this discussion help with arriving at a non-instrumental evaluation of 
cognitive salience perspectives? Just as our earlier discussion mentioned a way in which 
certain cognitive salience perspectives might constitute epistemic bias, the suggestion here 
is that certain attentional dispositions might constitute harm, in virtue of counting as a way of 
disrespecting an individual’s personhood. It is already a common thought in feminist 
writings that one can disrespect an individual’s personhood by reducing them to their 
																																																								
44 See, for instance, Kant (Lectures on Ethics), Dworkin (2000: 30-1) and Bartky (1990: 
130).  
45 Kant (1785).  
46 Nussbaum (1995: 257).  
47 Bartky (1990), Dworkin (2000).   
48 Bartky (1990: 35). 
49 See, for instance, Langton (2005: 246-7).  
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body. The suggestion here is for a more minimal reading of this thought.50 Simply giving 
relative salience to an individual’s body over other identities of theirs that better reflect their 
personhood, can count as a way of disrespecting their personhood. Crucially, disrespect 
of an individual’s personhood is treated as harmful in and of itself. This would mean that 
any cognitive salience perspectives that count as ways of disrespecting an individual’s 
personhood would themselves also be non-instrumentally harmful. Charlotte’s cognitive 
salience perspective on Jane, then, might count as a way of disrespecting Jane’s 
personhood. This would mean that it constitutes an important harm in itself, 
independently of any additional harmful effects this cognitive salience perspective might 
have.  
 
3.4. Changing cognitive salience perspectives 
 
I have suggested above some ways to evaluate our cognitive salience perspectives. When 
we have identified a problematic cognitive salience perspective, though, how do we go 
about changing it? Things were relatively simple in the previous chapter. When we have 
identified a problematic linguistic salience perspective, the suggested solution was 
practicable. For instance, if one had identified a particular pattern of salience in language 
that was liable to activate a particular bias of ours, the advice might simply be to reorder 
linguistic content. If one was writing an article, for instance, one might change the order 
in which one discusses information, or change which information one headlines. Or, as 
per the Genetics Pedagogies Project discussed in the previous chapter, one could swap around 
the chronology of chapters in a textbook. 
In the context of cognitive salience perspectives, however, things are a little 
trickier. Suppose we have identified an epistemically and/or morally problematic bias, 
and we have identified a cognitive salience perspective that we ought to avoid given that 
it likely plays into this bias. Consider Charlotte again. Let’s suppose that our investigation 
has indeed identified an accessible and licensed false and harmful bias that treats fat 
people as lazy, disgusting, less intelligent, and so on. Further, suppose that we have 
proved that reliably attending to fat people so that their weight is their most salient 
feature risks activating that bias. How, precisely, is Charlotte supposed to shift her 
attentional dispositions? How is she supposed to change how she intuitively and 																																																								
50 Whilst the notion of reduction to one’s body is a common formulation in feminist 
writings on this subject, we will hear some feminist precedents for more minimal 
readings, more like the one that I mention here, in chapter 6. 
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automatically attends to the world, so that fat people’s weight no longer catches her 
attention, and sticks in her memory?  
As I suggested earlier, certain habits of attention can be particularly hard to 
change. Simply telling ourselves that something should (not) be salient does not 
necessarily result in those attentional dispositions clicking in our mind—in them 
becoming intuitive and automatic. Generally, we should remember that adopting a new 
perspective is not a question of endorsing it intellectually, but rather of that perspective 
playing a functional role in one’s actual attentional patterns. Charlotte, then, might 
intellectually endorse a cognitive salience perspective that mirrors how she tends to 
attend to slender people—namely, where she reliably makes a given individual’s 
personality more salient than their weight. Try as she might, though, she just can’t help 
but find fat people’s weight their most noticeable and memorable property. What should 
she do? 
 
3.4.1. Individualist approach  
Even when something has become so habitual that it is largely subconscious and 
automatic, we can often still have some control over it. In the context of our automatic 
and unconsciously processed implicit biases, for instance, Jules Holroyd suggests that, 
whilst we may not be able to control for our attitudes and behaviours in and of the 
moment, we nevertheless have what she calls “long-range” control, which refers to our 
control over which skills, habits, and biases we cultivate over time.51 
There is a wealth of advice, as well as consumer products, out there to help 
someone to stop themselves from habitually reaching for a cigarette, or unconsciously 
biting their nails, for instance. Even an incredibly stubborn and long-term disposition to 
think pessimistically can eventually be changed through following things like self help 
books and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy courses, for instance. Most discussions of 
habit change make clear that there is no quick fix, and that a lot of effort and time is 
required to successfully break a habit.52 We heard some suggestions from Jennifer Saul in 
the previous chapter regarding changing out automatic, unconscious implicit biases. 
Saul’s suggestions required something beyond telling oneself to change one’s ways—it 
																																																								
51 Holroyd (2012: 284). 
52 The effort and perseverance required in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy attests to this 
(Robertson, 2010: 66). 
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involved implicit tactics that engaged one’s unconscious responses. It involved spending 
time imagining counter-stereotypic individuals, for instance.53 
Camp also suggests that the fact that our (cognitive salience) perspectives are 
habits that are, in her words, “only partly under voluntary control” means that we must 
be “trained into them” through methods that do not involve standard rational 
deliberation.54 Specifically, she recommends that reading narrative might be a useful tool 
in training oneself to adopt alternative (cognitive salience) perspectives.55 She discusses 
the openness that we bring to fiction reading. Partially due to our relative freedom from 
practical needs and desires when reading fictions, we intentionally allow our attention to 
be guided by the author, and are open to cultivating a wide range of intuitive associations 
and attentional dispositions in order to experience aesthetic enjoyment. Reading fiction 
to alter one’s cognitive salience perspective, then, also looks to be a way of taking 
advantage of one’s unconscious responses. Instead of reading a reasoned, logical 
argument for changing one’s attentional dispositions, one instead relinquishes one’s 
conscious control to one’s intuitive responses to a fictional story. Interestingly, Sally 
Haslanger makes similar suggestions when it comes to changing a person’s intuitive 
perceptual, thought, and behavioural patterns more generally (to which we might add 
attentional patterns); narrative, she thinks, is better than standard forms of cognitive 
engagement (such as argument) at successfully altering these things. 56  
Using these sorts of techniques, then, Charlotte might try various things. She 
might apply methods associated with Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. She might, for 																																																								
53 Interestingly, though Saul (2012) suggested that individuals might be able to control 
their implicit biases through these individualist approaches, she suggests that the 
automatic and unconscious nature of implicit bias means that individuals are not 
blameworthy for them. Holroyd (2012) disagrees with Saul, suggesting that, where certain 
conditions are met (including, for instance, the existence of long-range control, 
mentioned above), we can hold blame agents for being influenced by implicit biases. I do 
not discuss the issue of whether we are blameworthy for our cognitive salience 
perspectives, but what I say here is compatible with either of Saul’s or Holroyd’s 
accounts. 
54 Camp (2017: 92).  
55 Ibid. (92-3).  
56 Haslanger (2011). Further, whilst not talking about attention per se, Eaton says 
something similar in connection with the cultural distaste in fat bodies. We cannot 
overcome our bias against fat bodies through standard forms of education, such as 
through providing correct information about fatness (I take this to constitute the sort of 
standard cognitive engagement that Haslanger dismisses). Instead, Eaton suggests that we 
must change our sentiments towards fat bodies. Interestingly, it has been suggested that 
reading narratives can be an effective way of changing our sentiments (see Coplan, 2004, 
and Gernsbacher et al., 1992).  
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instance, start to write down personality quirks of the larger people that she meets, as a 
way of making these traits more memorable, ultimately training herself to better notice 
them the next time that she meets a larger person. She might try some of the techniques 
suggested by Saul’s discussion of implicit bias re-training in the previous chapter. She 
might, for instance, repeat intentions such as when I see a fat body I will think ‘intelligent’, in 
the hope of better attending to the personhood-related traits of the next fat person that 
she meets. Alternatively, she might seek out fictions that involve main characters who are 
fat, as an effort to cultivate new associations with fatness and more substantive, 
personhood-related traits, such as autonomy and personality.57 These new associations 
might help her to reduce how much attention she pays to a fat person’s weight, and to 
instead pay more attention to their individuality.   
  
3.4.2. Structural approach  
Are these individual corrective measures going to be enough? In the context of our 
implicit biases, Saul ultimately concludes that the individual-focussed corrective measures 
she discusses have significant limitations. In her words: 
 
“To fully combat the influence of implicit biases, what we really need to do is to 
re-shape our social world. The stereotypes underlying implicit biases can only 
fully be broken down by creating more integrated neighborhoods and 
workplaces; by having women, people of colour and disabled people in positions 
of power; by having men in nurturing roles; and so on. The only way to be fully 
freed from the grip of bias-related doubt is to create a social world where the 
stereotypes that now warp our judgments no longer hold sway over us.”58 
 
Saul here is building on a point that has long been a key theme of social epistemology. A 
large part of our cognition is inherited from the society in which we live. This means that 
it may turn out that we need material changes in the society around us for us, as 
individuals, to successfully cultivate different associations, beliefs, ideologies, and, 
arguably, cognitive salience perspectives.59  																																																								
57 For instance, Dumplin is a recent film portraying the life of a woman who is fat, which 
has been praised (see Tonic, 2018) for having a fat person as a protagonist, and whose 
storyline doesn’t involve weight loss. 
58 Saul (2012: 260-1). 
59 See Haslanger (2015) for a similar point on how to change our implicit biases. 
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For Charlotte to change her attentional dispositions on fat people, for instance, 
we might need to increase the visibility of fat people in mainstream society. Given that, 
as Anne Eaton notes, “Fat bodies are rarely represented in mainstream forms of 
entertainment and advertising”, fatness becomes attention-grabbing—it has become 
noticeable for many in virtue of being unusual and striking. 60 Further, Eaton notes that 
the ways in which fat bodies are portrayed in our culture are usually quite extreme; they 
are depicted “as unattractive, ridiculous, contemptible, and even gross and disgusting”.61 
Where something is associated with such extreme sentiments, beliefs and ideologies, it is 
likely to be attention-grabbing. In addition to needing more fat bodies in mainstream 
culture, then, we might also need cultural shifts in the types of narratives concerning fat 
bodies (i.e. to less extreme ones). For Charlotte to find fatness less salient, then, perhaps 
part of the change needs to come from culture.62   
I raise these issues here because they may well be at the back of the reader’s mind 
during the next few chapters. In particular, many of the cognitive salience perspectives 
that I will examine appear to be ones reinforced by the culture around us, and are 
therefore likely to be difficult to shift through individual measures alone. Given that my 
focus in this thesis is to demonstrate the problems that mere patterns of salience can 
cause and constitute, as opposed to the methods for changing our salience perspectives, 
however, I will not be exploring the suggestions in this section further. I will, however, 
flag where these issues are most relevant for the reader that wishes to consider them in 
more depth.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have introduced the cognitive counterpart to the linguistic salience 
perspective of the previous chapter. In the introduction, I set out to answer three 
questions. Firstly, what does it mean for something to be more salient in a person’s 
cognition? Something is salient in a person’s cognition, in the sense that interests me, 																																																								
60 Eaton (2016: 38).  
61 Ibid.  
62 One might wonder whether there will be some attentional dispositions that cannot be 
shifted either through individual corrective measures or societal change. It is not 
uncommon to hear claims that evolution has instilled in us certain ways of thinking 
about, perceiving, and attending to the world. Perhaps one might think that, thanks to 
evolutionary forces beyond our control, we simply cannot make anything about a spider 
more salient than its creepy run.  
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when we attend to it more. We attend more to one mental state over another (whether 
those states are beliefs, for instance, or experiences of a properties in the world) when we 
better notice, it, better remember it, and find it more cognitively accessible. These 
attentional dispositions are what constitute cognitive salience perspectives.  
Secondly, I asked whether and how we might evaluate cognitive salience 
perspectives. Here, I suggested that we might evaluate cognitive salience perspectives on 
instrumental or non-instrumental grounds, as I did with the linguistic salience 
perspectives of the previous chapter. Where our attentional dispositions activate 
problematic biases, we can judge those dispositions as instrumentally problematic. Where 
our attentional dispositions license those biases, or where they constitute a way of being 
epistemically biased, or a way of being harmful, we can find those dispositions 
problematic in themselves.  
Finally, I asked how, if we do indeed judge that we are attending to the wrong 
thing, we are to change our cognitive salience perspectives. In the previous chapter, I 
suggested that where we judge a linguistic salience perspective to be liable to activate a 
problematic bias, we ought to adopt a counter-salience perspective that helps to avoid its 
activation. This might mean reversing the order in which we discuss some linguistic 
contents, for instance. Things are not as easy with cognitive salience perspectives. Our 
attentional dispositions, I suggested, are like habits, which cannot be changed at the click 
of a finger. Instead, certain habit-breaking interventions might be required to change 
those dispositions. I also suggested, however, that some attentional dispositions might be 
particularly resilient to these individual-focussed habit-breaking measures. In particular, 
this might occur where our attentional dispositions are reinforced by cultural narratives 
and practices. For individuals successfully to break with cognitive salience perspectives 
that are particularly culturally entrenched, I suggested that making changes to the culture 
itself might be necessary. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SALIENCE PERSPECTIVES AS  
INSTRUMENTAL HARMS: THE  
SUBSTANCE SALIENCE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Imagine walking down the street, and noticing a Pit Bull Terrier barking aggressively in a 
nearby garden. At the top of your mind are claims that you have heard that Pit Bulls have 
certain genes that dispose them to aggression. You have to think harder to remember 
claims about how breed reputation can be self-fulfilling—claims suggesting that people 
buy dogs of a certain breed for their reputation, and train them to behave in accordance 
with that reputation.1 Walking away, what stands out in your memory is the dog’s 
confrontational behaviour, which you have heard is generally taken to be distinctive of 
the breed. Examples of more amiable Pitt Bulls you have come across in your life, which 
highlight the potential for this dog’s behaviour to change with the right care and 
attention, aren’t as clear in your mind. In this chapter, I suggest that these attentional 
dispositions are symptomatic of a broad generic salience perspective2—one that tends to 
make salient the internal properties of a given subject (over features of the external 
context in which it exists), and the distinctive traits that it happens to be displaying (over 
the potential for those traits to change). For reasons that will become clear in due course, 
I call this the substance salience perspective. Further, I argue that this generic salience 
perspective, when applied to certain subject matter, is liable to lead us to a number of 
false and harmful beliefs. For instance, it is more likely to lead us to essentialise our subject 
matter—to believe that the subject in question has a deep, fixed essence that determines 
their identity, and causally determines their outer traits. As we will see, essentialist beliefs, 
especially about living organisms, are not only commonly dismissed as false; at least 
when applied to people from disadvantaged social groups, they are regularly criticised for 
helping to justify and maintain their disadvantage. 
The questions guiding this chapter are as follows. Firstly, what is the substance 
salience perspective? Secondly, is the content made salient by the substance salience 																																																								
1 Delise (2007). 
2 A generic salience perspective is one that can be applied to multiple subjects (see 
chapter 3, §3.2.2.2).  
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perspective central to any cognitively accessible and socially licensed biases, and, if so, 
does this matter? Finally, which generic salience perspective ought we to adopt on this 
basis of this assessment? The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the breadth of impact 
that a generic salience perspective can have. One and the same pattern of salience, I will 
argue, has the capacity causally to activate multiple biases. 
 The specific plan for this chapter is as follows. I introduce the substance salience 
perspective in §4.2, suggesting that we can in fact see it at work in the traditional genetics 
textbook discussed in the second chapter. With this generic salience perspective on the 
table, I then look for resonances it might have with existing biases in Western cultures. 
In §4.3, I survey three prevalent biases that focus on the same contents as the substance 
salience perspective: the correspondence bias; psychological essentialism; and the fixed mindset bias. 
Where these biases differ with the substance salience perspective, however, is in their 
doxastic nature; at least according to a common way of talking about them, these biases 
do not just involve a focus on internal properties and the distinctive traits a subject 
happens to be exhibiting, but are constituted by substantive beliefs about these contents. 
Many have found these beliefs to be seriously harmful when applied to certain subject 
matter. In §4.4, I argue that the substance salience perspective is liable causally to activate 
these three biases. Here, I add to existing literatures on these biases by suggesting one, 
particularly subtle trigger for them. If these biases are indeed harmful, then this gives us 
grounds for an instrumental critique of the substance salience perspective (indeed, my 
focus in this chapter and the next is on such instrumental critiques of salience). Finally, I 
suggest in §4.5 what to do on the basis of this finding. Adopting what I call the process 
salience perspective, in one’s cognition and language, looks to avoid activating the various 
problematic folk psychological biases discussed above. In contrast to the substance 
salience perspective, this perspective makes salient a given subject’s external context, and 
the potential for change from whichever traits that subject currently exhibits.  
In this chapter, then, I follow the epistemically naturalised methodology laid out 
in chapter 2. Because I have already identified a potentially problematic salience 
perspective (namely, that which was identified in the traditional genetics textbook 
discussed in chapter 2), however, I begin not with a survey of existing problematic biases, 
as was the suggested first step of this methodology, but with the salience perspective 
itself. With this perspective on the table, I then carry out the methodology as detailed in 
chapter 2: taking stock of existing problematic biases, before consulting empirical studies 
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that indicate which salience perspectives are likely to be effective in preventing the 
activation of these biases. 
 
4.2. Introducing the substance salience perspective 
 
Think back to Annie Jamieson and Gregory Radick’s Genetics Pedagogies Project discussed in 
chapter 2 (§2.3.3). Jamieson and Radick analysed a traditional undergraduate genetics 
textbook, finding that how this textbook ordered genetics information helped students to 
develop deterministic views of genes—to develop false and harmful beliefs that genes are 
the super-causers of most if not all of an organism’s traits, in the sense that the 
environment plays little to no role. The environment is also believed to be unable to 
affect genetic function, meaning that, for the genetic determinist, genetic processes, and 
the traits to which they give rise, are fixed. Let’s remind ourselves of this case study. 
The traditional textbook started with, and therefore made most salient, simple 
cases of particular genes being for certain traits, such as being for a particular pea texture. 
The function of these genes was relatively unaffected by environmental changes; these 
genes would reliably correlate with a given pea texture across differences in the cellular 
environment around the gene, as well as differences in the environments in which the 
organism found itself. Interactionist research, which demonstrated how many of our genes 
can instead function in a (sometimes unexpected) variety of ways depending on their 
interaction with different (cellular and organismal) environments, was discussed much 
later, and was therefore given less salience. The revised textbook reversed this pattern of 
salience, beginning instead with these interactionist findings.  
Can we be more specific about the different patterns of salience in these 
textbooks? In what follows, I suggest that these textbooks can be interpreted as 
emphasising two different things.  
Firstly, the focus in the traditional textbook is on internal properties relevant to 
trait development—on identifying how a given gene inside the plant plays a role in the 
development of the plant’s smooth seeds, for instance. This is contrasted with a focus on 
external environments in the revised textbook. We hear how non-social environments 
(e.g. climate and altitude) as well as social environments (e.g. social norms on diet and 
exercise) play a role in the development of an organism’s traits, as well as in how a given 
gene functions.3  																																																								
3 Jamieson & Radick (2013: 591). 
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Secondly, the traditional textbook focussed on the distinctive traits that the 
organisms in question happen to be displaying. More specifically, the Mendelian research 
made salient by this textbook focuses on contrasting the plants with smooth seeds, as 
distinct from those with wrinkly seeds. Finding genes that then helped to explain those 
distinctive traits was the focus: namely, Mendelian genetics identifies what it calls the gene 
for smooth peas, explaining the distinctive smooth seeds of the former plant, as well as 
the gene for wrinkly peas, explaining the distinctiveness of the wrinkly seed plant. Instead, 
the interactionist research made salient by the revised textbook focuses on what 
Jamieson and Radick call “the contingent nature of development”, and the potential that 
this contingency brings for a change in an organism’s traits, away from those it currently 
displays.4 In other words, the revised textbook makes clear early on that there are 
innumerable untested environments that could change genetic function in surprising, as 
yet unknown, ways.5 Plants that are currently displaying smooth seeds might instead 
develop wrinkly seeds if they develop in different environmental conditions (such as 
altitude, climate, and so on).  
The traditional textbook is a subject-specific instantiation of the generic 
substance salience perspective, as I introduced it in the introduction. By discussing 
Mendelian genetics first, it makes salient the internal properties of a subject (i.e. its genes), 
and the distinctive traits the subject happens to display (i.e. its wrinkled or smooth 
seeds). Why did the substance salience perspective, as adopted by the traditional 
textbook, result in more students endorsing genetically determinist beliefs? Well, for the 
reason that I have suggested in previous chapters: where a bias is cognitively accessible 
and socially licensed, simply making salient content central to that bias is liable to activate 
it. We have already argued in chapter 2 (§2.3.3) that genetic determinism is cognitively 
accessible and socially licensed. Further, our discussion here clarifies the ways in which 
the substance salience perspective makes salient content central to this bias. Firstly, 
internal properties are central to the genetically determinist belief that an organism’s 
traits are caused by internal properties, namely, its genes. The actual distinctive traits that a 
given subject displays are central to the genetically determinist belief that our traits, and 
the genetic processes that cause them, are fixed. In other words, central to the belief that 
our genes and traits are fixed is the idea that one need only ever consult the distinctive 
traits that a given subject happens to be displaying, such as its wrinkly seeds, as these are 																																																								
4 Ibid. (594). 
5 Ibid. (589).  
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all it ever will display. (There’s no potential for it to develop different, smooth seeds, because its seed 
type is determined by its distinctive ‘wrinkly seed’ genes—genes whose function is also fixed.) 
The traditional textbook, then, whilst differing with the revised textbook only in 
virtue of the salience perspective that it employed, increased student endorsement of 
genetically determinist beliefs because it made salient content that is central to those 
beliefs.  
The questions that I would like to address in the next section are as follows. 
Firstly, is the content made salient by the substance salience perspective central to any 
other cognitively accessible and socially licensed biases, outside of genetic determinism? 
Secondly, if it is, is this content associated with deterministic thinking elsewhere?  
 
4.3. Resonances with psychological biases 
 
Before I go about answering these questions, it is important to make something clear. In 
what follows, I draw from research into psychological bias. In this literature, the biases 
that I discuss below are regularly described in ways that imply that they are universal and 
even innate, meaning that they exist in humans from birth as opposed to having been 
caused by cultural environments. 6  For instance, one of the biases that I discuss, 
psychological essentialism, has been referred to as a “basic cognitive predisposition”7, a “basic 
feature of the human mind”,8 as something that is not taught and is not a cultural 
artefact,9 and so on. Research is growing, however, into the cultural variability of these 
biases. For instance, Christopher Olivola and Edouard Machery cite evidence that 
susceptibility to psychological essentialism can vary wildly across cultures, from as little 
as 10% of people in one culture holding essentialist intuitions, compared to 70% in 
another country.10 As for another bias discussed below, the correspondence bias, research 
suggests that Japanese people are far less likely to display this bias than American 
people.11 In an effort to acknowledge this cultural variability in what follows, I will make 																																																								
6 For examples of this tendency, see Gelman, (2003), Gelman & Taylor (2000), Demoulin 
et al. (2006: 26), Cimpian & Saloman (2014), and Dar-Nimrod & Heine (2011). For a 
critical discussion of this tendency in the literature, see Olivola & Machery (2014: 499) 
and Nisbett & Norenzayan (2002).  
7 Gelman & Wellman (1991: 243). 
8 Cimpian & Saloman (2014: 473).  
9 Leslie (2013: 115). 
10 Olivola & Machery (2014: 499). 
11 Miyamoto & Kitayama (2002). Miller (1984) also suggests that Hindu people are far 
less susceptible to the bias than American people.  
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clear which populations the research into these biases has been drawn from. Pointing out 
that there is cultural variability in terms of susceptibility to these biases should not, 
however, lead us to conclude that they are therefore easy to shift. Within a particular 
culture, the cultural institutions, practices and narratives that support a given bias can 
themselves be very difficult to change; feminists and race equality activists fighting 
centuries of sexism and racism can attest to this. 12 Even when not innate, then, changing 
the psychological biases within a given culture can be easier said than done. 
 With these qualifications in mind, let’s move on to consider which biases, if any, 
resonate with the substance salience perspective.  
 
4.3.1. The correspondence bias13 
Imagine meeting a new colleague in the staff office at work. Whilst talking to them, they 
drop their mug of tea, which smashes on the ground. Studies on American adults – the 
demographic that most psychological bias research has been tested on – show that study 
participants are far more likely to infer that this new acquaintance has a clumsy character, 
than to infer that features of the situation caused her action, such as the mug handle 
being unexpectedly slippery, or her being in a rush. This tendency is said to reflect a 
belief that individuals’ characters causally determine the distinctive traits and behaviours 
that they display, so that features of the external situation play little to no role. 14 The 
correspondence bias refers to this belief—a belief that Yuri Miyamoto and Shinobu Kitayama 
describe as “extremely robust in North America”.15  
This bias is so pronounced that people in this population tend to prefer 
explanations of an individual’s behaviour that cite their unique character even when 
logical reflection suggests that they should not. In one study, subjects were shown essays 
either supporting or opposing Fidel Castro. When they were told that the essayist had not 
been free to determine which side of that issue they would argue for, subjects nevertheless inferred 
strong pro- and anti-Castro attitudes respectively from the essayist’s paper. Reflecting on 
this evidence, Daniel Gilbert and Patrick Malone concluded: “Here were perfectly 																																																								
12 Hood-Williams (1997: 43), for instance, talks about the “longue durée” of social relations. 
13 The correspondence bias is regularly discussed as equivalent to what others call the 
fundamental attribution error (Harman, 1999). In what follows, I also take them to be 
equivalent. Some do suggest that there are differences (see e.g. Gawronski, 2004), but, 
for my purposes here, I need only a coarse-grained analysis and so do not engage with 
these finer details.  
14 Gilbert & Malone (1995: 21).  
15 Miyamoto & Kitayama (2002: 1239).  
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intelligent college students who, when exposed to the coerced political statement of 
another student, seemed to be saying, “Well, yes, I know he was merely completing the 
assignment given him by his debate coach, but to some degree I think he personally 
believes what he wrote”. 16  
 Does the correspondence bias reflect the hallmarks of the substance salience 
perspective? Well, the bias’s focus on an individual’s inner character dispositions, instead 
of the situation that they are in, echoes the substance salience perspective’s emphasis on 
internal properties. Secondly, the bias involves focussing on however an individual 
happens to be behaving (whether it’s breaking a mug, or reading a pro-Castro paper), 
instead of considering how they might act differently in alternative situations and times. 
This reflects the substance salience perspective’s emphasis on the distinctive traits a 
subject happens to exhibit.  
What we can say, though, is that the correspondence bias goes beyond merely 
focussing on these contents. Unlike the substance salience perspective, it makes 
substantive claims about these contents. In particular, it involves believing that looking 
to internal, character-based explanations offers most if not all of the explanatory insights 
into the subject in question’s traits and behaviour. These internal traits are believed 
causally to determine the subject’s behaviour, so that situational factors play little to no 
role. Instead of simply focussing on the distinctive traits the individual happens to be 
manifesting, the correspondence bias involves believing that these traits are 
representative of how that individual normally acts, across circumstance and time. 17 
These traits are fixed, so the belief goes, because the internal character traits causally 
determining those outer traits are themselves fixed. In particular, then, the 
correspondence bias offers explanatory beliefs about the contents made salient by the 
substance salience perspective. 
The reader at this point might wonder whether I am right to explicate the 
correspondence bias as being doxastic—as consisting in beliefs. I take for granted this 
formulation of our psychological biases (I do briefly consider an alternative reading in 
chapter 6). There is certainly a precedent for this way of talking about our biases; they are 
regularly referred to as implicit theories, for instance, which are further cashed out as 
comprising (also often implicit) lay beliefs.18 The implicit nature of these beliefs is worth 																																																								
16 Gilbert & Malone (1995: 24). 
17 Harman (1999: 317). 
18 Haslam et al. (2000: 114) refer to a “growing recognition that [folk psychological] 
concepts are embedded in theories rather than simply being clusters of covarying 
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emphasising; an individual who holds the various beliefs discussed in this chapter is often 
not conscious of holding them. This means that, instead of directly asking a person if 
they are biased in the ways detailed in this chapter, indirect measures are often required.19 
The reader might also wonder whether the beliefs of the correspondence bias are 
partially constituted by the substance salience perspective in its cognitive form. Part of what 
it is to believe that a person’s character determines their behaviour, one might think, is to 
find the internal properties of a subject more salient in one’s attention than features of 
their external situation. Indeed, Gilbert and Malone sometimes refer to the 
correspondence bias as partially involving a “tendency to overlook or ignore situational 
forces”, which sounds like a claim about attention.20 Whether one does want to say that 
the correspondence bias is partially constituted by the substance salience perspective 
depends on how one cashes out the type of attention characteristic of the 
correspondence bias. Cognitive salience perspectives, remember, are constituted by 
dispositions to give relative salience to x over y; both x and y exist in one’s attention, but x 
is foregrounded and y backgrounded. Attending to x so that one ignores y, however, does 
not count as employing a cognitive salience perspective. Here, I will take at face value 
Gilbert and Malone’s phraseology of ignoring situational factors, and presume that the 
correspondence bias is not partially constituted by the substance salience perspective.21  
For the purposes of this chapter, then, I am taking the correspondence bias to be 
constituted by beliefs. Further, I am presuming that the correspondence bias is not 
partially constituted by the substance salience perspective, but simply that this 																																																																																																																																																														
properties”. For instance, they discuss “laypeople hold[ing]essentialist theories” (ibid.), 
consisting of “essentialist beliefs” (ibid. 116). For others who fit this trend, see Heyman 
& Giles (2006) Haslam et al. (2006), Gelman (2005), Stanley & Blanchard-Fields (2011), 
Dweck (2000), Medin & Ortony (1989), and Wilson & English (2017). In chapter 1, I 
flagged that some do not consider implicit beliefs really to be beliefs. Instead, it has been 
proposed that they are, for instance, non-propositional things like associations (Kihlstrom, 
2004). In this thesis, I take the use of the phrase implicit belief, used by the theorists that I 
cite here and elsewhere, on face value. Implicit beliefs, I presume in this thesis, really are 
beliefs. 
19 Given that many of the beliefs that interest psychologists are held implicitly, there is a 
great range of techniques to measure them that have been developed (Rudman, 2011). 
20 Gilbert & Malone (1995: 27). 
21 If the correspondence bias (and the other biases discussed in this chapter) was (were) 
partially constituted by the substance salience perspective, then we might be able to 
develop a non-instrumental critique of the substance salience perspective. If we can 
show that these biases are intrinsically (epistemically and/or ethically) problematic, then, 
insofar as the substance salience partially constitutes them, it inherits their intrinsic 
problems. See this method for evaluating salience perspectives on non-instrumental 
grounds discussed in chapter 3 (§3.2.2). 
		 71	
perspective makes salient content central to the constituent beliefs of this bias. (Further, 
I apply these assumptions to the other biases discussed in this chapter.) With this in 
mind, I can move onto the next question. 
 Are there problems associated with the correspondence bias? There certainly 
seem to be epistemic costs, according to many who discuss this bias. Generally speaking, 
the belief that our behaviour is mostly accounted for by character traits is considered to 
be false, meaning that the correspondence bias leads us, in Betram Gawronski’s words, 
“to systematic errors in first impressions of other individuals”.22 The Castro example 
gave a clear example of how illogical the bias can be.  
Given that this thesis is focussed on harm, however, we can instead turn to a 
different question: do the false beliefs of the correspondence bias have ethical 
significance? Many suggest that they do. For instance, thanks to the false belief that a 
person’s behaviour is almost entirely caused by their internal character, the 
correspondence bias is often criticised for leading one wrongly to blame a person for 
their behaviour when in fact they were constrained by external factors outside of their 
control.23 This might involve unfairly believing that a person’s poverty, for instance, is 
down to faults in their character, instead of recognising the social situations, structures 
and practices that have constrained them. These latter factors might include the relative 
lack of opportunities that they had growing up in a deprived area, the racism that they 
experience when looking for jobs, the lack of role models in positions of power with 
their skin colour, gender, accent, and so on. Or, it might involve unfairly believing that a 
person’s success, such as their confidence and powerful job, is down to merits in their 
character, instead of down to the social factors, such as their wealth and the plenitude of 
positive role models with their social attributes, that have unfairly privileged them.24  
Generally, feminists and other social theorists have pointed to the harms that can 
be generated by believing situational factors to play little role in shaping an individual.25 																																																								
22 Gawronski (2007: 194). Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzay, (1999: 47) also emphasise that 
the core belief behind the correspondence bias is “One of the greatest and most 
remarkable misunderstandings we have about people”. Gilbert and Malone (1995: 21) 
concur, referring to the correspondence bias as a “mistake”. Further, there are many 
studies documenting how our behaviours are highly responsive to the situations in which 
we find ourselves, meaning that the correspondence bias involves us regularly making 
mistaken predictions about the consistency of an individual’s behaviour. See, for 
instance, Isen & Levin (1972). 
23 Gilovich & Eibach (2001: 25-6). 
24 Scopelliti et al. (2017: 27).  
25 See Willett (2016) and the references therein.  
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As indicated above, the concern is that explaining people’s traits in terms of internal 
dispositions means dismissing the broader structures and practices of power that in fact 
oppress, or privilege certain individuals qua their social group. (Very broadly, we can say 
that oppression refers to the unjust social institutions and practices that disadvantage 
certain social groups, and advantage others, in a variety of ways.)26 This in turn means 
that the oppression can continue; why change social structures and practices (and 
therefore the oppression that they in fact cause and constitute) when they have nothing 
to do with why an individual has ended up the way that they have? Only that individual is 
to be blamed (or praised) for their undesirable (or desirable) traits and behaviour.27 The 
correspondence bias, then, is criticised for justifying unjust inequalities, including those 
connected with oppression.  
 
4.3.2. Psychological essentialism 
A. A woman receiving a heart transplant from a man will gain some male energy.  
B. The scarcity of women in science is down to male-female differences in intrinsic 
aptitude. 
C. Evolutionary theory is false, because one species cannot transform into another. 28 
These are examples of psychologically essentialist claims that feel intuitively true 
to many of us, particularly in Western cultures.29 Psychological essentialism, another 
widespread and compelling psychological bias in these cultures, represents a tendency to 
ascribe deep, intrinsic and fixed essences to certain categories, both social and natural.30  
Essences are believed to be substances, such as genes or souls, which give 
individuals their category identity, and generate any outward similarities between 
members of the same category..31 XX chromosomes might be thought of as the essence 
of being a woman for instance. They purportedly give relevant individuals their identity 
as women, and are causally responsible for the various traits women supposedly share, 																																																								
26 This is influenced by Bohmer & Briggs’ definition of oppression (1991: 155)  
27 For these reasons and others, Harman (1999: 330) goes as far as to suggest that the 
correspondence bias “has deplorable results, leading to massive misunderstanding of 
other people, promoting unnecessary hostility between individuals and groups, distorting 
discussions of law and public policy, and preventing the implementation of situational 
changes that could have been useful”. 
28 These examples are borrowed from Gelman (2005). 
29 See Olivola and Machery’s (2014) study mentioned at the beginning of §4.3, regarding 
cultural variability in susceptibility to psychological essentialism. See also O’Connor & 
Joffe (2014: 498).  
30 Medin and Ortony (1989), Gelman (2005). 
31 Gelman, (2003: 61). 
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such as being nurturing, and being underrepresented in STEM fields. Essences are 
conceived as existing inside individuals from birth, and are considered to be largely 
unaffected by any environmental changes the organism goes through. This means that 
the traits that essences give rise to are largely fixed from birth.32  
This does not mean that the individual in which the essence resides must also not 
change, but rather that any changes that the individual goes through, such as developing 
and aging, come pre-specified by the essence. In this sense, the essence prescribes what 
Susan Gelman calls the “innate potential” of the individual.33 It is this innate potential 
that is believed to be unalterable by the environment. For example, studies show that 
American children who learn that a baby rabbit was raised by goats or monkeys since 
birth predict that its upbringing will have no impact on its developmental stages and 
behaviour; when it is old enough, the belief is that it will grow up acting like a rabbit, 
hopping and eating carrots.34 Similar views have been found in Menominee Indian 
children, Yucatec Mayan children, and urban Brazillian children.35 As children get older, 
more concessions to the role of the environment are made, but internal properties are 
still favoured in explanations. As Sarah Jane Leslie suggests, these essentialist beliefs 
become more implicit; whilst adults become less inclined to state them explicitly (though, 
many essentialist claims are explicitly stated by adults),36 measures that aim to uncover 
our implicitly held beliefs indicate that essentialism is alive and well into adulthood.37 
(These issues and others will be considered in more depth in the next chapter, where I 
discuss psychological essentialism about sex/gender.) 
Of particular interest to me are the resonances between psychological 
essentialism and the substance salience perspective. The focus on genes or immaterial 
souls echoes the substance salience perspective’s focus on internal properties. The focus 
on (what are judged to be) the distinctive traits that particular gender or race groups 
																																																								
32 See Gelman (2005). 
33 Ibid.  
34 Gelman & Hirschfeld (1999). When the rabbit is old enough to eat carrots, American 
children believe, in Gelman’s (2005) words, that “this property [of carrot-eating] will 
eventually be expressed”, even if the rabbit’s adoptive goat parents never eat carrots. See 
also Gelman & Wellman (1991) for similar findings.  
35 See Leslie (2013: 117) and the references therein.  
36 Gelman (2005) makes this point. Consider, for instance, how common it is to find 
newspaper (and academic) articles suggesting that complex traits from male aggression to 
homosexuality are in the genes (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011). 
37 Leslie (2013). 
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exhibit, for instance, resonates with the substance salience perspective’s emphasis on a 
subject’s distinctive, actual traits.  
As with the correspondence bias, however, psychological essentialism does not 
just involve a focus on these things. It is also constituted by truth-conditional, 
explanatory beliefs about them. It involves a belief that there are internal properties, namely, 
essences, that give individuals their identities. There is a belief that these internal properties 
causally determine the innate potential of an organism. One need only look inside an 
individual, so goes the thought, to find out about how an organism will develop—the 
external environment is believed to tell you little to nothing about an organism’s 
development. There is also a belief that the distinctive traits and behaviours that certain 
categories tend to exhibit are indicative of the category’s essence, and that, thanks to the 
unchanging nature of this essence, these traits and behaviours will reliably be manifested 
across time and circumstance. The essentialist might propose that there will always be 
more men in science, for instance, given their intrinsic aptitude for the subject. Even the 
concept of innate potential, which describes developmental change, is believed to be fixed; 
potential for variation from this developmental path is considered largely impossible.  
As with the correspondence bias, there are multiple problems with psychological 
essentialism. Epistemically speaking, there is overwhelming consensus that essentialism is 
false both as a metaphysical38 and biological39 doctrine. There are no essences, as the 
psychological essentialist conceives them. Again, though, my focus is on the ethical side 
of things. 
False essentialist beliefs are associated with a great deal of harm. For instance, 
psychological essentialism comes with a higher endorsement of stereotypes. 40  One 
problem associated with stereotypes is stereotype threat; as mentioned in chapter 2 (§2.3.1), 
stereotypes can have a self-fulfilling potential, meaning that individuals either are, or feel 
at risk of, conforming to stereotypes about their social group. Stereotypes that build on 
essentialist premises are certainly effective in shaping an individual’s behaviour; for 
instance, women who read an essay saying that men are better at maths due to an innate 
biological difference (read: essence) then perform worse in a maths test than women who 
																																																								
38 Mayr (1991), Medin & Ortney (1989). 
39 Dupré (1993).  
40 See Haslam et al. (2006) and Cimpain & Salomon (2014: 1298). The discussion above 
discusses the harms of stereotypes, but they are also plagued by epistemic problems 
(Puddifoot, 2017). 
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had read an essay saying that men’s increased ability is due to their increased effort.41 
There are significant social and economic implications that come with any group, 
especially one that already suffers structurally systemic disadvantage, performing under 
their potential. 42  
Further, psychological essentialism receives criticism for helping to foster a 
greater psychological and moral acceptance of racial and gender inequalities. 43  For 
instance, if one believes that the differences between white and black people are deep 
and immutable, then one is likely to see any racial inequalities in education, wealth, 
employment, and so on, as natural and insurmountable—that they’re simply the 
inevitable outcome of different racial essences. The problems for such a belief deepen 
when one considers research demonstrating that many of us are quick to move from 
descriptive premises concerning the inevitability of a given phenomenon, to normative 
premises concerning the justifiability of that phenomenon. In other words, where one 
believes that an inequality is the result of natural differences between races, one is liable 
to infer that those inequalities are therefore morally acceptable.44 We mentioned in 
chapter 2 how reports of racial differences in IQ tests have been used in arguments that 
attempt to justify removing educational resources for black people, for instance. 45 
Psychologically essentialist beliefs are regularly used in arguments aiming to justify this 
unjust disadvantaging of certain social groups. They are, in other words, often used to 
justify relations of oppression.  
 
4.3.3. The fixed mindset bias 
Alvin takes a physics test at school. He feels relatively confident, but when he gets his 
results back, he finds that he has failed. He concludes that he is obviously not good at 
physics, and decides not to pursue that subject the next year; no point putting in more 
																																																								
41 Dar-Nimrod & Heine (2006).  
42 Walton & Cohen (2007). There many also be epistemic issues that are generated here, 
insofar as these essentialist beliefs end up with the wrong direction of fit with the world (see 
the brief mention of this in chapter 2 §2.3.1). 
43 Heyman & Giles (2006), Williams & Eberhardt (2008). 
44 See Williams & Eberhardt (2008) for a study confirming that the inference from 
natural-to-justifiable (or good) is a common one for people who have essentialist beliefs 
about race. Generally, the appeal to nature fallacy, in which something is considered good 
if it is natural, or bad because it is unnatural, is particularly common in human thought 
(Tworek & Cimpian, 2016). These authors also explain the epistemic and ethical 
problems with this type of inference. 
45 Chapter 2 (§2.4.1). See Jensen (1969) for an example of this argument.  
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effort, he thinks, if he just doesn’t have the brain for the subject. Alvin’s mindset can be 
characterised as fixed; he presumes that his abilities are not changeable.  
According to Carol Dweck, I have a fixed mindset when I see my ability (e.g. 
intelligence) as “an entity that dwells within [me] and that [I] can’t change”.46 I might be 
able to learn new things, but I can’t change how intelligent I am. With this mindset, I 
would only seek opportunities to confirm my intelligence, instead of trying to develop it 
through work and effort. If I fail a test, I take this to indicate that I simply do not have 
the relevant ability. Even if there are clear situational factors that have contributed to my 
failure (such as an illness, or family grievance), I nevertheless prefer to put my result 
down to my intrinsic aptitude. My belief that personal abilities are fixed corroborates this 
interpretation of my failure; I need only one example of my failure to feel justified in 
predicting great cross-situational consistency of my failing behaviour. 47  Research 
indicates that many of us, especially in America and Europe, have this fixed mindset 
about our abilities. Dweck argues, for instance, that school cultures in many parts of 
Europe and America are premised on fixed mindset beliefs and values.48  
The fixed mindset has crossovers with the correspondence bias and 
psychological essentialism. All suggest that our inner traits are fixed, and determine our 
(fixed) outer traits. Unlike the wider scope of the correspondence bias, however, the 
fixed mindset focuses on traits associated with intelligence, and ability more generally.49 
Further, a fixed mindset is concerned with interpretations of one’s own abilities, whereas 
the correspondence bias looks only at the traits of others. As for psychological 
essentialism, the essentialist posits inner entities (read: essences) that individuals possess 
in virtue of being members of a particular category (such as the category women), whereas 
someone with a fixed mindset will tend to postulate inner entities that are idiosyncratic to 
oneself, qua individual. The fixed mindset, like the correspondence bias, also comes with 
less metaphysical baggage than psychological essentialism; unlike for the essentialist, 
there is no specific claim that one’s inner traits determine one’s identity.  
																																																								
46 Dweck (2000: 2). 
47 Dweck, Chiu & Hong (1995: 277). 
48 Dweck, (2006a). As we will hear in §4.5 below, this does not tend to extend to East 
Asian cultures. 
49 The fixed mindset bias is overwhelmingly discussed in relation to the trait of 
intelligence in particular, but Dweck has also considered fixed mindsets in relation to 
moral character (Dweck, Chiu & Hong, 1995).  
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Whilst there are differences, then, there are certainly similarities between these 
three biases.50 Not least because of the parallels, finding the footprint of the substance 
salience perspective is not difficult. Demonstrating the substance salience perspective’s 
emphasis on internal properties, the fixed mindset focuses on entities that dwell within the 
individual. Further, having a fixed mindset involves focussing on whichever test results 
one happens to get, which echoes the substance salience perspective’s focus on the 
distinctive traits one happens to be displaying.  
The fixed mindset bias certainly goes beyond the substance salience perspective 
insofar as it also comprises explanatory beliefs about these two contents. Instead of 
simply focussing on internal properties, a fixed mindset involves believing that one’s 
intelligence is caused by an entity that is found inside of one—an entity that is believed 
impervious to outside influence (such as educational resources). Instead of simply 
emphasising the distinctive traits one happens to be displaying, a person with a fixed 
mindset believes that their actual performance (on, perhaps, a test) is evidence of an 
unchangeable level of ability; potential for a different level of ability simply doesn’t exist, 
so there is no need to consider the chance for one to change and develop one’s abilities.  
Does the fixed mindset come with problems? The accumulating evidence of 
brain plasticity, and the malleability of things like IQ results given educational 
opportunities and the level of wealth in one’s family, has led many to conclude that the 
fixed mindset is wrong about our abilities.51 
Unsurprisingly, the fixed mindset can be prudentially very costly; faced with 
failure, one does not engage in opportunities to learn and improve, and thus one’s 
personal development can become stunted.52 Evidence also suggests that those with 
fixed mindsets are particularly susceptible to conforming to stereotypes. I mentioned 
earlier that women who are reminded of the stereotype that men are better at maths 
underperform in a subsequent maths test. Research also shows that women who hear the 
fixed mindset message – namely, that maths ability is a fixed, inner trait – in conjunction 
with this stereotype are especially likely to underperform men. 53 Further, holding a fixed 
mindset makes it more likely that these women then go on to pull out of maths classes.54 																																																								
50 Dar-Nimrod & Heine (2011) and Norenzayan et al. (2002) have also noticed 
similarities between these biases. 
51 Fine et al. (2013); Ramsden et al. (2011) 
52 Good, Rattan & Dweck (2012: 701-2). 
53 Good, Rattan & Dweck (2007).  
54 Ibid. Again, similar epistemic issues concerning direction of fit apply here (see a brief 
discussion of these issues in chapter 2 §2.3.1). Dropping out of maths classes will end up 
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Research also shows that, where women read a company mission statement that 
endorses the fixed mindset approach to ability, those women perform worse in business-
related tasks, disengage more from those tasks, and worry more about being negatively 
stereotyped.55 Similar effects occur for Black and Latino individuals, upon reading that a 
given company endorses the fixed mindset.56 It is through these sorts of consequences 
that we can start to see how the false beliefs constituted by the fixed mindset have not 
just a moral dimension, but one related to oppression. A fixed mindset makes things 
worse for those from oppressed social groups, by compounding problems they already 
face, such as stereotype threat. Further, if one is already of an oppressed group, who 
suffers systematic disadvantages in society, then a fixed mindset will encourage one 
falsely to believe that the shortcomings in one’s abilities are inherent and fixed, as 
opposed to caused by oppressive features of one’s social context (such as a lack of 
resources for, or explicit and implicit biases against, one’s social group). This helps to 
protect those oppressive arrangements; indeed, it makes one less likely to call for the 
oppressive institutions and practices, which have in fact impeded the development of 
one’s abilities, to be changed.  
 
4.4. The substance salience perspective: instrumental harms 
 
Whilst the substance salience perspective simply involves giving relative salience in one’s 
attention to internal properties of a subject, and to whichever distinctive traits it happens 
to be displaying, then, we have seen that the three biases discussed here instead involve 
substantive beliefs about these contents.  
Further, the sorts of beliefs that comprise these biases are principally of an 
explanatory nature. They purport to explain an individual’s or group’s traits, by 
suggesting what has caused those traits. (Psychological essentialism also involves a 
metaphysical belief, insofar as it posits that essences are responsible for making 
individuals what they fundamentally are.) 
More specific still, the type of explanation that these biases engage in is 
deterministic. In chapter 2, I defined genetic determinism as the belief that genes are the 																																																																																																																																																														
affecting these women’s maths ability. The stagnation of their ability looks to these 
women like confirmation that their maths ability is unchangeable, which ultimately looks to 
confirm their fixed mindset. In fact, their belief might have the wrong direction of fit 
with the world. 
55 Emerson & Murphy (2015). 
56 Emerson & Murphy (2013). 
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super-causers of an organism’s traits, so that environmental factors play little to no role in 
that organism’s trait development. Instead of genes per se, the biases at hand treat a range 
of specifically internal properties as super-causers, whether these are character 
dispositions, essences, or internal abilities. These internal properties are thought to 
determine one’s behaviour and observable traits so fully that situational and environmental 
factors play little to no role.  
In addition to epistemic problems, we have seen that research indicates that this 
internal property determinism comes with a range of harms when applied to people. (I 
have said nothing here to indicate that internal-property determinism would have 
epistemic or ethical problems when applied to other subjects, such as mechanics or 
physical laws.) 57 More specific still, the potential for this internal-property determinism 
to cause harm in particular is most significant when the subject matter includes people 
from oppressed social groups. The harms associated with the correspondence bias were 
clearest when one made internal, dispositional attributions for behaviour and traits that 
were instead caused by inequalities in society. Those who condemn essentialist beliefs 
focus on how they are often used to justify societal inequalities that hurt women, ethnic 
minorities, homosexuals, those with mental disorders, and other oppressed groups the 
most.58 Research suggested that the fixed mindset disproportionately hurts individuals 
from groups who suffer from negative stereotypes about their ability, such as women in 
the context of maths (in other words, it tends to hurt individuals from oppressed 
groups). In chapter 2, we heard that genetic determinism has a long history of being used 
to justify societal conditions that hurt oppressed groups; Arthur Jensen, for instance, 
suggested curtailing educational resources for black people in the 1970s because their 
(purported) lower average intelligence levels were caused by fixed, genetic differences.59 
The internal property determinism in these folk psychological biases generates these 
harms for those in oppressed groups because it takes existing differences between social 
groups, including those caused by unjust social arrangements, and encourages us to 
explain those differences in terms of the fixed, internal properties of the individuals from 
those groups.  																																																								
57 There is reason, however, to think that internal property determinism might harbor 
epistemic (though perhaps not ethical) problems when applied to biology generally 
speaking; genetic determinism is considered to be an epistemically flawed way of 
approaching genetics generally, even for non-human organisms, such as plants 
(Lewontin, 2000). 
58 Haslam & Whelan (2008).  
59 Jensen (1969).  
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It is for this reason that we might in fact want to consider extending the harms of 
internal property determinism to certain other subjects. Think back to the dog 
mentioned in the introduction. Pit Bull Terriers are, due to the Dangerous Dogs Act, 
banned in the UK, as the breed is deemed to be aggressive. There are many vocal critics 
about this act. The sort of criticism levied against it tends to sound like the one we have 
just rehearsed against internal property determinism. For instance, The Kennel Club 
suggests that the act focuses only on (what they claim to be false) claims about the genetics 
of dog breeds, and, in their words, “ignores the most important factors that contribute to 
biting incidents – primarily anti-social behaviour by people who train their dogs to be 
aggressive and irresponsible dog ownership”.60 In addition to harming the public (by 
failing to prevent biting incidents), they suggest that the act also has costs for the dogs 
themselves, “[resulting] in the unnecessary euthanasia of dogs simply because of their 
breed or type”.61 Perhaps we can pursue an argument, then, that the Dangerous Dogs Act is 
an example of an internal property determinism that harms dogs, by unnecessarily 
euthanizing them. Existing trends of Pit Bulls acting aggressively are presumed to be 
caused entirely by the internal properties of those dogs (i.e. Pit Bull genetics), instead of 
by environment factors, such as irresponsible dog ownership. This might give us pause 
for reflection on whether to extend the harms of internal property determinism beyond 
groups of human people. I will not pursue this thought further here, however. 
What can all of this tell us about the substance salience perspective? We heard in 
the previous chapters that having some content salient in one’s mind (perhaps through 
first having it made salient in language, as with the traditional genetics textbook) can be 
sufficient to activate an inference to a (set of) substantive, belief(s) about that content. 
This occurs where a salience perspective makes salient content that is central to that (set 
of) belief(s), and where that (set of) belief(s) is cognitively accessible and socially licensed. 
Indeed, I have shown that the biases above share a focus on the same content as 
that made salient by the substance salience perspective. Further, as discussed, research 
demonstrates that these biases are cognitively accessible and socially licensed for many of 
us, at least in many Western cultures. This means that, in these cultures, use of the 
substance salience perspective risks activating those biases. Once activated, these biases 
go to work on interpreting the explanatory (and in certain cases the metaphysical) 
significance of the contents made salient by the substance salience perspective. The internal 																																																								
60 The Kennel Club (2019). 
61 Ibid. 
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properties of an individual might go from simply being salient, for instance, to being 
deemed entirely causally responsible for an individual’s outer traits.  
Where it does activate these biases, it would most likely do so in an under-the-
radar manner. We have already heard in previous chapters how patterns of salience 
subtly shape our cognition and action, mostly instigating inferential processes that bypass 
our conscious awareness. This, I suggested, can make an individual even more likely to 
think and act in ways that demonstrate an endorsement of that bias (unaware of that 
bias’s activation, they have not had chance consciously to reflect on whether they wish to 
reject inferences to that bias, and its associated influences on our behaviour). The implicit 
nature of how the substance salience perspective would activate the folk psychological 
biases discussed in this chapter, then, suggests that it might have a special power in 
successfully inculcating them in the individual in question.  
Indeed, there is already evidence that subtle triggers can activate these biases. For 
instance, the use of generics in language has been suggested as a trigger for psychological 
essentialism.62 A generic is a generalization that omits quantifiers such as some or most, 
such as the phrase girls like dolls. Simply omitting quantifiers in this way has been shown 
to lead to a higher endorsement of essentialist statements. The discussion in this chapter, 
then, adds to existing discussions concerning the activation of the three cognitive biases 
discussed in this chapter by identifying another, particularly subtle and insidious trigger 
for those biases: the substance salience perspective. 
If we can show both that the substance salience perspective does indeed help to 
activate the correspondence bias, psychological essentialism, and the fixed mindset bias, 
and that the existing critiques of these biases stand, we can criticise the substance salience 
perspective by criticising its effects: by pointing to the numerous problems that many 
have identified with these biases. Given that the problems with these biases look most 
serious when they are applied to the domain of people, qua social individuals, the 
instrumental critique of the substance salience perspective is similarly limited to this 
domain.  
Criticising the substance salience perspective in this way is not equivalent to 
suggesting that one can never employ it. There are many considerations to take into 
account when deciding which generic attentional dispositions to cultivate.63 Avoiding the 
																																																								
62 Leslie (2007). 
63 I mentioned in the previous chapter that the idea of deciding which generic attentional 
dispositions to cultivate is not an unfamiliar one. For instance, resolving to focus less on 
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risk of activating epistemically problematic and harmful biases is just one such 
consideration, and may be outweighed in favour of another.64 That these biases can, in 
addition to lead us to false beliefs, engender significant harm, however, should remind us 
to take the consideration noted here seriously. Further, the fact that this single salience 
perspective is liable to activate not one but three especially problematic biases, should give 
us serious pause for thought.  
 
4.5. The promise of the process salience perspective  
 
I suggested in chapter 2 that we adopt an epistemically naturalised methodology when 
deciding which salience perspectives to use. This involved first taking stock of which 
epistemically and morally problematic biases are particularly cognitively accessible and 
socially licensed. In this chapter, I identified the correspondence bias, psychological 
essentialism, and fixed mindsets as problematic biases, which take little to become 
activated, and which feel warranted to many of us. Secondly, I suggested that we 
empirically investigate which salience perspectives are effective in neutralising, or 
preventing the activation of, these existing biases. It is this second question to which I 
now turn my attention.  
 Fortunately, as discussed in chapter 2, we already have empirical evidence of a 
successful intervention, collected by Jamieson and Radick in their Genetics Pedagogies 
Project. In an attempt to prevent the activation of our genetic determinism biases, 
Jamieson and Radick reversed the order in which the traditional curriculum discussed 
information about genetics. In so doing, they therefore adopted the antithesis of the 
substance salience perspective. Instead of starting with Mendelian genetics, their revised 
pedagogy began with interactionist research. This, as I suggested in §4.2, meant making 
salient two key things: the external context in which the subject exists; and the potential 
for change from whichever traits it currently exhibits. It involved adopting something that 
I am calling the process salience perspective. 
As we heard in chapter 2, this counter-salience perspective came with epistemic 
and moral benefits, insofar as it reduced endorsement of genetic determinism among 
students. Jamieson and Radick’s research gives us reason to endorse the process salience 
perspective, then, at least in the context of genetics. Just as I criticised the substance 																																																																																																																																																														
the negatives, whether one is attending to one’s own life, another’s life, contemporary 
affairs, and so on, is an idea that many of us come across in daily life. 
64 I mentioned this point in relation to linguistic salience perspectives in chapter 2 (§2.5).  
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salience perspective on the basis of its negative upshots, then, we can praise the process 
salience perspective on the basis of its positive upshots.  
Is there any reason to think that these epistemic and moral successes of the 
process salience perspective might generalise out beyond the case of genetics textbooks? 
To see how they might, think back to Alvin. Imagine that, instead of a fixed mindset, 
Alvin has a growth mindset. He takes a maths test at school, and finds that he has failed. 
Instead of concluding that maths is simply not his strong suit, Alvin resolves to put in 
more effort. He asks for extra homework, and seeks out short tests on the internet so 
that he can get used to exam-style questions. He also reflects on how, unlike the situation 
for many other students in his class, the fact that his parents cannot afford private tuition 
might have negatively impacted his abilities. 
Alvin’s growth mindset is characterised by his belief that ability is, in Dweck and 
colleagues’ words, a “malleable quality that can be changed and developed”.65 Failure 
does not indicate to him that he lacks intelligence; it instead invites him to develop his 
abilities by studying harder, and by engaging in more educational opportunities. His 
belief in the incremental, contextual nature of his skill means that, in Dweck and 
colleagues’ words, at any given point he is “simply judging a momentary level of 
ability”.66 He cannot describe his personal qualities once and for all, since they are 
continuing processes whose potential he cannot prejudge. It is this belief that leads 
Dweck and colleagues to suggest that, for an individual with the growth mindset, “reality 
can never be known with any finality”. 67 
We can find clear parallels between this growth mindset and the process salience 
perspective. Firstly, instead of a focus on internal (perhaps genetic) determinants of one’s 
performance, the focus is much more on features of the external context—on 
educational resources, exam condition pressures, and so on. Secondly, the potential for 
change, specifically, for a different, hopefully improved, level of ability to what one 
currently exhibits, takes centre stage.  
Instead of just focussing on these things, however, the growth mindset makes 
substantive claims about these contents. Firstly, the growth mindset involves the belief 
that one’s performance is primarily caused by factors in one’s external context, such as 
one’s school teacher quality, how many revision sessions one attends, and which 
environmental stresses that one is under. Secondly, whatever level of ability one currently 																																																								
65 Dweck, Chiu & Hong (1995: 267). 
66 Dweck & Leggett (1988: 263). 
67 Dweck, Chiu & Hong (1995: 269). 
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exhibits is believed to be changeable; with more effort, there is a belief that one can 
improve one’s intelligence. Further, the extent to which one might be able to change 
one’s intelligence is unknown; perhaps, one day, one might be able to beat a previously 
unbeatable competitor.  
The difference between the beliefs constituted by the growth mindset and those 
constituted by the fixed mindset is that the former are better supported by the 
aforementioned empirical research into brain plasticity. There are also prudential 
advantages to the growth mindset. For instance, one can develop one’s skills further; 
unlike with a fixed mindset, the growth mindset encourages one to stick with studying 
after encountering setbacks and failures.68 Studies suggest that this translates into higher 
levels of achievement; for instance, having a growth mindset has been found to predict 
higher grades in university courses.69Research also demonstrates that levels of self-
esteem, as well as enjoyment of the subject under study, are higher with a growth 
mindset; the suggestion is that it is easier to enjoy learning when one’s anxieties about 
failure are lower.70 Further, instead of the social problems engendered by the fixed 
mindset, the growth mindset beliefs look to have social advantages. For instance, having a 
growth mindset has been shown to help protect negatively stereotyped individuals from 
stereotype threat.71 In sharp contrast to the negative consequences that a fixed mindset 
can incur when adopted by those from negatively stereotyped groups, research is 
building that American women and African American students obtain higher grades 
when they have been encouraged to see intelligence as malleable in the ways suggested by 
the growth mindset.72 Individuals from these groups with a growth mindset have also 
been found to be more likely to maintain their intention to pursue maths courses in the 
future. In other words, having a fixed mindset can, in Catherine Good and Carol Dweck 																																																								
68 There has been some very recent scepticism concerning the efficacy of the growth 
mindset in relation to student achievement (Sisk et al., 2018). Others, however, suggest 
that this scepticism is misplaced; according to Yeager et al. (2013), the only scenarios in 
which the growth mindset does not lead to the benefits above is when it is has been 
taught poorly or incorrectly. Even those who are skeptical about the benefits of the 
growth mindset, however, concede that students with low socioeconomic status, or who 
are academically at risk, benefit from its adoption (Sisk et al, 2018).  
69 Grant & Dweck (2003). See also Blackwell et al. (2007), who found that over two 
years, students who believed growth was possible reported higher math grades than 
students who believed that their abilities were fixed. 
70 Dweck (2006a: 48). 
71 Good, Rattan & Dweck (2007). 
72 Aronson, Fried & Good (2001), Good, Aronson & Inzlicht (2003), Good, Rattan & 
Dweck (2012). 
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words, “have real [and positive] consequences for [the] career aspirations and 
achievement” of members from oppressed social groups.73  
Research indicates that the growth mindset is cognitively accessible and socially 
licensed in certain other parts of the world, especially in East Asian cultures.74 Here, then, 
the process salience perspective would be well poised to activate this prevalent set of 
beliefs. Given the epistemic, prudential, and moral benefits of these beliefs, we can praise 
the process salience perspective, insofar as it is likely to activate inferences to those beliefs, 
for its good effects. 
The fact that the growth mindset has a purchase in this demographic is 
significant. Some have argued that humans may struggle to pay as much attention to 
contextual factors (such as social norms) as they do to persons and their internal 
properties. For instance, contextual factors are, according to Larisa Hussak and Andrei 
Cimpian, “seldom apparent to an observer”.75 We can’t, for instance, point to a social 
norm. Indeed, Gilbert and Malone suggest something similar, under the term the 
invisibility problem. They say: “Actors can be weighed and behaviours can be filmed, but 
when one tries to point to a situation, one often stabs empty air”.76 This would make the 
process salience perspective very difficult to adopt. Perhaps humans naturally don’t find 
contextual content more noticeable, memorable and cognitively accessible than intrinsic 
information! The fact that research suggests that referring to contextual information 
comes naturally in East Asian cultures suggests that humans can indeed find at least 
some of the properties made salient by the process salience perspective intuitively salient 
in their attention.77  
																																																								
73 Good, Rattan & Dweck (2012: 713). 
74 Chen & Wong (2015). Generally, East Asian countries place more emphasis on effort 
and the social factors that contribute to achievement (Yip, 2018; Heine et al, 1999; Uttal, 
1997). This coheres with other differences that I discussed in chapter 2 (§2.3). I cited 
research suggesting that cultural understandings of the self in Japan, for instance, tend to 
highlight one’s interdependence with one’s wider social networks, which also 
demonstrates a focus on external context instead of internal properties (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991: 227). Focussing more on external context is characteristic of the growth 
mindset.  
75 Hussak & Cimpian (2017: 70). 
76 Gilbert & Malone (1995: 25). 
77 The discussion concerning cognitive salience perspective change in §3.4 of the 
previous chapter is relevant here. If we find that the process salience perspective is 
proving difficult for those in Western countries to adopt, wider changes to Western 
culture might be necessary to allow those in this demographic successfully to shift their 
attentional dispositions. 
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As for Western cultures, there is reason to think that the prevalence and 
acceptability of the growth mindset is, to embrace the pun, growing. The growth mindset 
is being taught more and more in classrooms across America and the UK.78 Discussions 
of the growth mindset are receiving more airtime in newspapers and other news 
sources.79 This suggests that the growth mindset is becoming increasingly cognitively 
accessible and socially licensed in these parts of the world. It is therefore becoming more 
likely that simply making salient that which is central to the growth mindset – the 
external context in which the subject in question exists, and the potential for its traits to 
change – might be sufficient to activate the growth mindset in these demographics.  
Even where the process salience perspective fails to activate the growth mindset 
(perhaps in conditions where the growth mindset is insufficiently cognitively accessible 
and socially licensed) it is at least likely to decrease the chance of activating the false and 
harmful beliefs contained within the correspondence bias, psychological essentialism, and 
the fixed mindset. Indeed, it successfully decreased the activation of another bias relating 
to internal property determinism, namely, genetic determinism, in Jamieson and Radick’s 
study. 
 It is also worth noting that the growth mindset does not represent an obscure, 
one-off set of beliefs. The divide between the fixed and growth mindsets looks to be 
representative of a broader division in the way in which people conceptualise all sorts of 
phenomena. Carol Dweck and Ellen Legget refer to this as a difference between 
“thinking in terms of static, reified entities versus thinking in terms of dynamic, malleable 
processes”.80 They cite a wide range of philosophers, anthropologists, historians of 
science, linguists and psychologists, who document these different ways of thinking: 
Whitehead, observing the contrasting paradigms of static substances vs. dynamic 
processes in scientific and philosophical thought; Heller, contrasting the static, pre-
Renaissance conception of persons with the dynamic, developmental post-Renaissance 
conception; Bloom, analysing the linguistic divide between the English and Chinese 
languages, with only the former persistently entifying the properties of people and things, 
by turning adjectives and verbs into nouns; and Piaget, distinguishing static conceptions 
																																																								
78 Hennessey (2018), Busch (2018) 
79 See, for instance, Busch (2018) Kirp (2016). There are even resources on the BBC for 
parents to teach their children the growth mindset (BBC, 2019). 
80 Dweck and Leggett (1988: 267). 
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of the world in cognitive development from conceptions that emphasise process and 
becoming.81  
Within these contrasting paradigms, there is a focus on the internal and the actual 
on the one hand, and the external and the possible on the other. For instance, substance 
metaphysics focuses on substances, which are believed to be ontologically basic things, 
whose identities are internal to them (their identities do not depend on anything external 
to them).82 Process metaphysics instead focuses on processes, which are considered to be 
ontologically basic. Processes are taken to influence, and be influenced by, their 
surroundings, meaning that one must look at a process’s wider context to understand it.83 
Further, substance metaphysics is characterised as using what Johanna Seibt refers to as a 
“snapshot view of reality”, which captures an unchanging reality of static substances that 
”must be what they are at any instant in time”84. By contrast, process metaphysics is 
characterised as believing reality to be “continuously changing”.85 It is because of these 
resonances that I have chosen the terms substance and process to refer to the two salience 
perspectives in this chapter.  
It looks, then, that the substance vs. process division is a socio-historically 
important one. It might characterise substantive metaphysical commitments, such as in 
the substance and process metaphysics traditions mentioned above or, as I argue in this 
chapter, it can manifest itself in subtle shifts of salience, via the minimalist notion of a 
salience perspective. It is not just through the lens of the three folk psychological biases 
discussed in this chapter, then, that we should see the substance salience perspective. We 
may need to look to an even wider folk-cultural context to fully understand how the 
substance salience perspective is likely to function—to understand the various beliefs 
and ideologies it might be capable of activating. This demonstrates the potential breadth 
of the consequences that a single generic salience perspective can have.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
I started this chapter with three questions. Firstly, what is the substance salience 
perspective? The substance salience perspective is a generic salience perspective that 																																																								
81 Ibid.  
82 Robinson (2018). See in particular §1 and §2.5.2.  
83 Dupré & Nicholson (2018). 
84 Seibt (2018). 
85 Ibid.  
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emphasises the following two contents: a subject’s internal properties; and the distinctive 
behaviour that subject happens to be manifesting.  
Secondly, I asked if the content made salient by the substance salience 
perspective is central to any cognitively accessible and socially licensed biases, and, if it is, 
whether this matters. As for the first part of this question, I have demonstrated that it is. 
The correspondence bias, psychological essentialism, and the fixed mindset bias all make 
salient the same contents as the substance salience perspective. This means that use of 
the substance salience perspective, in linguistic and/or cognitive form, is liable to activate 
these biases. As for the second part of this question, I answered that this fact does 
indeed matter. All of these biases are associated with what I called internal property 
determinism which, at least when applied to people, can be particularly harmful. Ultimately, 
this led me to criticise the substance salience perspective on instrumental grounds—on 
the basis of its effects.  
Thirdly, I asked which salience perspective we ought to adopt in light of this 
discussion. It was here that I examined the promise of the process salience perspective. 
This perspective makes salient the opposite of that which the substance salience 
perspective emphasises, namely, the external context and the potential for change. It was 
the process salience perspective that was employed by the revised genetics textbook, and 
reduced student endorsement of false and harmful beliefs associated with genetic 
determinism. This provided empirical evidence that the process salience perspective is 
able to reduce support for internal property determinism. Further, the content made 
salient by the process salience perspective is central to the antithesis of the fixed mindset: 
the growth mindset. Where the growth mindset is cognitively accessible and socially 
licensed, using the process salience perspective might be liable to activate this mindset. 
Where it is, given that the growth mindset is associated with epistemic and moral 
advantages, we can judge the process salience perspective that activates this mindset to 
be instrumentally good. 
Generally, this chapter aimed to demonstrate the wide reach of generic salience 
perspectives. The fact that a single generic salience perspective is liable to activate a 
number of particularly troublesome biases reveals the potential power that generic 
patterns of salience can have.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SALIENCE PERSPECTIVES AS  
INSTRUMENTAL HARMS:  
SEX / GENDER 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Gender Similarities and Differences is a 2014 paper written by Janet Shibley Hyde. In it, Hyde 
consults meta-analyses to investigate whether the genders are more similar than they are 
different. Instead of discussing her findings, however, let’s consider her choice of title. 
There’s a chance it might strike us as unusual; we are so used to hearing about gender 
differences in our culture that hearing about gender similarities before differences (or 
indeed hearing the phrase gender similarities at all), might pique our curiosity. Does the 
relative salience that Hyde has given to gender similarities over differences, in virtue of 
mentioning them first, have any significant consequences for how her readers are likely 
to think about gender? In this chapter, I suggest that it does.  
In the previous chapter, I looked at one generic salience perspective, the substance 
salience perspective, which I said risked activating various problematic cognitive biases. This 
salience perspective, I suggested, is most likely to cause problems when applied to 
subject matter relating to social categories of people. In contrast to the breadth of focus 
in the previous chapter, I turn in this chapter to consider a specific subject, namely, the 
specific social category of sex/gender1  (though it should be kept in mind that what I say 
has implications for other topics, such as race). Narrowing the focus still, I examine a 
single cognitively accessible and socially licensed bias regarding this subject, namely, 
psychological essentialism about sex/gender.  
Three questions drive my investigation. Firstly, is there any empirical evidence 
from which I can draw demonstrating that a mere change of salience perspective can 
activate problematic biases for the specific subject of sex/gender? Secondly, what does a 
survey of the prevalent sex/gender essentialism bias tell us about which patterns of 																																																								
1 In what follows, I follow Rippon et al. (2014) in adopting the conjunction sex/gender. 
Briefly, it is to highlight how gender differences of socialisation can show up as sex 
differences in our biology, meaning that it is often not possible cleanly to separate the 
two. When discussing another person’s research, however, I stick with their terminology, 
hence my use of the singular word gender when discussing Hyde’s research above. 
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salience we ought to avoid for attending to, and communicating about, sex/gender? 
Finally, what can we hope to achieve by making salient content that is the opposite to that 
which is central to sex/gender essentialism? 
 To answer these questions, I begin in §5.2 by examining a case study of a framing 
effect in the context of sex/gender; this tells us that a mere change in the order in which 
content is discussed, without making any further changes to that content, can mean the 
difference between activating existing androcentric biases, and not. (Androcentrism is a 
bias that involves treating maleness and masculinity as the norm in various ways.) 
Demonstrating that we should indeed pay attention to how patterns of salience interact 
with prevalent biases concerning sex/gender, this case study hopefully motivates the 
reader to take seriously the particular project of this chapter. In §5.3, I begin this project, 
by surveying a different sex/gender bias—sex/gender psychological essentialism. Here, I follow 
the epistemologically naturalised methodology introduced in the second chapter, which 
suggests that our decisions about which salience perspective to adopt for a subject 
should first take account of which problematic biases are cognitively accessible and 
socially licensed for that subject. Having detailed the features of sex/gender 
psychological essentialism, I move in §5.4 to the second step of this naturalised 
methodology—suggesting, on the basis of this survey which patterns of salience we 
should and should not use for sex/gender. Whilst there is a not insubstantial feminist 
literature giving advice about how to avoid activating sex/gender essentialist beliefs, I 
make the novel proposal in this chapter that salience perspectives might count as a 
particularly subtle potential trigger for our essentialist beliefs—a trigger whose subtlety 
can make it powerful.  
 
5.2. Case study: A framing effect for sex/gender  
 
Given that I am looking into salience perspectives that engender instrumental harms in 
the context of sex/gender, it would be apt to begin with a sex/gender-specific framing 
effect. Whilst the effect described here does not demonstrate the involvement of 
psychological essentialism, it does provide evidence that a mere change in linguistic 
salience perspective can be sufficient to activate substantive cognitively accessible and 
socially licensed biases about sex/gender in particular.  
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5.2.1. Bruckmüller et al.’s Framing Gender Differences  
Do women lead differently than men in boardrooms? Various things might pop into our 
minds, concerning style, tone, and so on. What if we phrase the question slightly 
differently: do men lead differently than women in boardrooms? Surely this change in 
word order is too trivial to evoke a different response from us? 
 Interviewing 226 German university students, Susanne Bruckmüller and 
colleagues found that there was indeed a tendency to give different responses to these 
two questions.2 Firstly, those answering the first question – namely, how women differ 
from men – attributed a higher level of social status and power to men in society. For 
instance, they were more likely to agree to various statements indicating that men had 
more privileges and opportunities for achievement than women. Secondly, those 
answering the first question were more likely to agree that existing inequalities between 
women and men are justified. For instance, they were more likely to endorse statements 
claiming that men had qualities making them better suited for these privileges and 
opportunities, and that the wage gap is acceptable because women and men are doing 
different jobs. Thirdly, participants answering the question as to how women differ from 
men were more likely to endorse gender stereotypes.3 In particular, they were more likely 
to attribute a greater number of stereotypically masculine traits to men (such as self 
confidence, independence, and decisiveness), and a greater number of feminine 
stereotypic traits to women (such as being emotional, compassionate, and warm).  
All this, prompted by a simple swap of the words women and men? The authors 
suggest that an explanation lies in how linguistic norms intersect with background 
cultural associations and beliefs. By asking how x differs from y in respect of z, we 
invoke a linguistic norm that positions the former group (x) as, in Bruckmüller and 
colleagues’ words, “the effect to be explained”, with the latter (y) as “the implicit norm 
for the comparison”. 4  Which type of norm we end up invoking depends on the 
background cultural associations and beliefs that we have about the groups being 
compared. Asking how red squirrels differ from grey squirrels, for instance, might invoke 
a simple statistical norm; my limited background beliefs about squirrels tells me that grey 
																																																								
2 Bruckmüller et al. (2012). This was the total number of individuals interviewed across 
three separate studies that helped to deliver the conclusions detailed in this section.  
3 I remind the reader that, when referring to another’s research, I stick with their 
terminology, instead of using my preferred conjunction sex/gender. 
4 Bruckmüller et al. (2012: 210). 
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squirrels are more numerous in the UK, meaning that red squirrels are the group that 
needs explaining in virtue of their statistical abnormality.  
The sort of cultural associations and beliefs about gender in the context of 
leadership, however, are more complex. Men do indeed represent the statistical norm for 
leadership—there are, after all, more male CEOs named John than women CEOs.5 This 
might go some way to explaining why, in Bruckmüller et al.’s pre-test, men were called to 
mind much more easily when participants were asked to imagine a leader.6 Men also 
represent the social norm of a leader, in the sense that there is a cultural stereotype 
associating leadership with men and masculine traits. The stereotype of a manager, 
consultant, professor, and so on, is man. Research suggests that the qualities that we tend 
to associate with leaders, and/or believe that leaders possess, are stereotypically 
masculine traits—rationality, assertiveness, lack of emotion.7  
Crucially, stereotypes do not just describe—they commonly prescribe. Where one 
believes that the stereotype of a leader is a man, and specifically a man with masculine 
traits, this often goes hand in hand with believing that leaders should be men, and have 
masculine traits.8 This prescriptive side of male leader stereotypes goes some way to 
explaining various facts that I will return to in §5.2.2 below. For instance, studies show 
that good managers tend to get described largely by masculine attributes, and masculine 
attributes are often considered essential to be a successful leader.9 Feminine traits are 
considered a poor fit with leadership.10  This goes some way to explaining studies 
demonstrating that women who are leaders are often seen to be defective in some way; 
for instance, they tend to receive more negative evaluations of their performance than 
men who are leaders.11 This would suggest that men are also the normative norm in the 
context of leadership, in the sense that they, in Bruckmüller et al.’s words, “set the 
standard of culturally valued behaviour [in that domain]”.12 In other words, leadership 
represents an androcentric domain in our culture. Women are not just a statistical 
abnormality in the context of leadership, then, but a normative abnormality.  
																																																								
5 Miller et al. (2018). There are also many other top jobs where men named John (and 
sometimes David) outnumber women, as Miller et al.’s article discusses.  
6 Bruckmüller et al. (2012: 213).  
7 See ibid. (212) and the references therein. Also see Bruckmüller et al. (2013: 457). 
8 Burgess & Borgida (1999), Terborg (1977), and Heilman (2001, 2012).  
9 See Heilman (2001: 659-60) and the references therein. 
10 Ibid. (660-1).  
11 Brescoll et al. (2010). 
12 Bruckmüller et al. (2012: 211). 
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By linguistically positioning women as the effect and men as the norm, cultural 
associations and beliefs that resonate with this positioning – namely, which also position 
women as the effect (i.e. the statistical and/or normative abnormality) and men as the 
(statistical and/or normative) norm in our culture – are pragmatically inferred by the 
audience. This helps to explain the results that we began with. The bundle of associations 
and beliefs associated with men being the norm for leaders in our culture involves 
recognising that men do indeed have more power and status in society. In virtue of being 
statistically much more likely to be leaders than women, men are much more likely to 
have the power and social status that being a leader involves. This helps to explain the 
first result: namely, the tendency to attribute more status and power to men when men 
are linguistically positioned as the norm. The cultural norm of men leaders also suggests 
that any such gendered power and status imbalances are justified; the stereotype of a 
leader suggests that leaders should be men, and therefore that the power and status 
benefits that leadership brings to men are warranted. This helps to explain the second 
result: namely, the tendency to think that existing gendered inequalities in status and 
power are justified, when men are linguistically positioned as the norm. Finally, the 
cultural norm of men leaders involves identifying leadership traits with stereotypically 
masculine traits. Women are assumed to be a poor fit for leadership in large part because 
they are assumed to possess stereotypically feminine traits—traits that the ideal leader 
should not possess. The relevance of gender stereotypes to the cultural norm of men 
leaders helps to explain the higher endorsement of gender stereotypes, when men are 
linguistically positioned as the norm. 
Further, Bruckmüller and colleagues cite evidence that when we ourselves are the 
ones asking questions, or talking more generally, about contrasts between social groups, 
cultural associations and beliefs concerning those groups influence how we phrase our 
comparisons. 13  In the case at hand, this would mean that people are more likely 
spontaneously to phrase a question about gender and leadership as one about how women 
lead differently to men, as opposed to the other way around. This goes for academics as 
well as laypeople. Consider, for instance, another form of androcentrism. There is a 
cultural convention that presents the male body as the norm, something we see, for 
instance, in portrayals of the human body that overwhelmingly depict the male anatomy. 
(For instance, in popular Western anatomy texts used in pedagogical contexts, one study 
found that, where there were sections dealing with non-sex-specific anatomy, male 																																																								
13 See for instance, Miller et al. (1991), cited in Bruckmüller et al. (2012: 216).  
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subjects were depicted in 64% of illustrations in which a sex was discernable, whilst 
females appeared in only 11% of images.) 14 Research demonstrates that, consistent with 
this cultural trend of depicting the male body as the norm, scientific publications are 
more likely linguistically to position maleness as the implicit norm when asking questions 
about sex/gender differences in biology and psychology.15 One is more likely to hear 
contrasts, for instance, about how women differ from men in average body size, or in 
mental rotation ability.  
Other cultural associations and beliefs instead position women as the norm. The 
research cited here suggests that we would be more likely to ask how men differ from 
women when it comes to childcare, for instance. Partially, this tendency to choose 
linguistic framing that reflects cultural norms is down to our desire to facilitate easy 
communication. As Bruckmüller et al. put it, “Scientists [and others] usually strive to 
communicate findings in a way that is most easily understandable and relying on 
culturally shared habits of linguistic framing facilitates understanding”.16 The implications 
of choosing linguistic positioning of comparative terms that goes against the grain of 
cultural norms will be discussed in §5.4. 
 
5.2.2. Analysis 
The terminology from this thesis can be used to capture what is going on in Bruckmüller 
et al.’s study. The respective linguistic positioning of men and women counts as one of the 
presentational devices that constitute a linguistic salience perspective. Linguistic salience 
perspectives, remember, involved manipulating the presentation of linguistic contents in 
subtle ways so as to make certain features of that content more salient than others. This 
might involve changing the order in which that content is discussed, for instance. As for 
the two questions about gender and leadership, the only difference between them is 
indeed the order in which the words men and women appear in the sentence. The fact that 
this change in linguistic salience perspective produced different responses from study 
participants, then, demonstrates a framing effect. 
 This linguistic salience perspective led to a two-step (pragmatic) inferential 
process. Firstly, it activated a pragmatic inference to the linguistic norm suggesting that 
whichever group is positioned first in such a comparison is to be treated as the effect to 
																																																								
14 Giacomini et al. (1986). Sex-neutral representations made up the remaining 25%. 
15 See Hegarty & Buechel (2006), discussed in Bruckmüller et al. (2012: 210). 
16 Bruckmüller et al. (2012: 216). 
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be explained, and whichever group is last is the implicit norm for comparison.17 With this 
linguistic norm having been activated in the participants’ minds, and with it having 
rendered men the implicit norm for comparison, and women the effect to be explained, 
pragmatic inferences to cultural norms that resonate with this structure were activated. 
The cultural, androcentric norm that paints male leaders and masculine traits as the ideal 
(i.e. the normative norm), and women leaders and feminine traits as abnormal and deviant 
became activated in this process. Again, this norm was readily inferred given its 
cognitively accessible and socially licensed nature. If we find this cultural norm 
problematic, we can find the linguistic salience perspective that led to it problematic. In 
other words, we can judge the linguistic salience perspective that made women salient to 
be instrumentally problematic on the basis of its upshots.  
The inferential process described above did not occur on a conscious level; far 
from being explicitly described in the questions, these linguistic and cultural norms were 
communicated implicitly. 18 As we have learnt from previous chapters, the fact that this 
inferential process bypassed conscious awareness plausibly helps to explain why study 
participants answering the how do women differ from men? question so consistently ended up 
endorsing the cultural associations and beliefs described above. Unable to monitor their 
inferences, these participants were likely unable to supress those that they might, if given 
chance to deliberate, have rejected. 
What is the significance of Bruckmüller and colleagues’ study? In a rather general 
suggestion, the authors themselves warn, “the ways that we habitually frame group 
differences appear to be part of power processes that reproduce stereotypes about 
differences between real groups that differ in status”.19 What, though, is so bad about this 
stereotype reproduction? Whilst the authors do not go into detail, we can make some 
more specific suggestions on the basis of what we have already learnt about the action-
engendering nature of stereotypes.  
Activating inferences to stereotypes can mean also activating various forms of 
behaviour that are consistent with these stereotypes.20 For instance, research suggests 
that, thanks to the stereotype that leaders are men, we are more likely to hire a man as a 
																																																								
17 Bruckmüller et al. (2012). 
18 See in particular the discussion in chapter 2 (§2.3.1). 
19 Bruckmüller et al. (2012: 216). 
20 Tirrell (2013: 165). See also Wheeler & Petty (2001: 820) for a discussion of how 
stereotypes activate behavioural codes associated with them.  
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manager. 21 Research has shown that men are also more likely to get promoted over 
women, and receive larger bonuses and variable pay, even when their performance 
evaluations are identical.22  
Further, research demonstrates that where women display assertiveness, a trait 
stereotypically associated with leadership, and a trait that Laurie Rudman and Julie 
Phelan describe as “necessary for success in the business world”, they tend to get viewed 
and evaluated more negatively, and this comes with significant financial setbacks for 
women leaders.23 It has been suggested that these factors combine to explain why fewer 
women put in for leadership roles. 24 Not only do stereotypes tell women that they do not 
fit the bill of a leader, but the prescriptive side of these stereotypes means that they will 
likely be penalised if they do try to lead, which dissuades them from pursuing leadership 
roles. 25 Where women do pursue leadership roles, research suggests that negative women 
leader stereotypes can engender stereotype threat effects, affecting how well women 
leaders perform. For instance, research conducted on American adults found that when 
negative woman leader stereotypes are implicitly activated (i.e. where feminine-coded 
traits, such as empathy, are linked to poor negotiation outcomes), women tend to 
underperform men in leadership tasks.26   
This brief outline of some of the issues that women face due to gender 
stereotypes about leadership vividly demonstrate ways in which implicitly activating a 
bias, such as through using a certain linguistic salience perspective, can ultimately play a 
role in entrenching existing power and status inequalities between men and women. It is 
not just our conscious discounting of the bias itself that is precluded by the implicit 
nature of its activation. Its associated codes for behaviour are also not consciously 
interrogated, and therefore not supressed.  
The lesson to be taken from Bruckmüller et al.’s study is that we should pay 
careful attention to which linguistic salience perspectives we employ to discuss gender 
differences; making women salient in gender comparisons in androcentric domains, such 																																																								
21 Heilman (2012, 2001).  
22 Castilla (2008).  
23 See Rudman & Phelan (2008: 65-6) and the references therein. See also Heilman & 
Okimoto (2007), and Lyness & Heilman (2006). 
24 Hoyt & Murphy (2016).  
25 Ibid. (388).  
26 Kray et al. (2001). As mentioned in chapter 2 (§2.3.1), this can generate epistemic 
issues, insofar as the stereotype ends up with the wrong direction of fit with the world. 
The effect of stereotype threat here can look retroactively to confirm the stereotype that 
women are inferior leaders. 
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as those connected to leadership, can help to activate inferences to harmful, action-
engendering cultural associations and beliefs (and their associated behaviours). 27 
Bruckmüller et al.’s study gives us one reason to avoid employing salience perspectives 
that make women salient in the context of sex/gender comparisons in androcentric 
domains.  
 
5.3. Introducing sex/gender essentialism 
 
With this evidence in mind, of a mere salience perspective activating problematic 
androcentric biases about sex/gender, I turn to the particular project of this chapter. 
Instead of looking at androcentric biases, I will instead be focussing on a different 
sex/gender bias—psychological essentialism. The hope is that, just as Bruckmüller and 
colleagues examined cognitively accessible and socially licensed cultural norms and 
stereotypes about leaders in order to reach their conclusion about which salience 
perspectives to utilise for sex/gender comparisons (they suggested that our androcentric 
biases counsel against making women salient in gender comparisons for leadership), this 
survey of our essentialist bias will illuminate which salience perspectives for sex/gender are 
to be avoided. I will be relatively brief in my discussion of the sex/gender essentialist 
bias, but refer the reader to the references for a deeper examination of the (extensive) 
psychological evidence.  
 
5.3.1. Sex/gender essentialism: the beliefs  
The previous chapter suggested that psychological essentialism involves the belief that 
certain categories have an underlying, internal, and fixed nature – an essence – that gives 
category members their kind identity. Precisely how psychological essentialism functions 
when applied to different categories (such as race, class, and sexual orientation), 
however, varies. 28 When it comes to sex/gender, sexed/gendered categories tend to be 
seen as akin to natural kinds, in the sense that they are considered to be species-like—at 
least according to the folk understanding of species. This means thinking that there are 
different sexes/genders, and that their differences emanate from their distinct, fixed, 
																																																								
27 My focus on harm in this thesis means that I have not addressed how these cultural 
associations and beliefs might be flawed on epistemic grounds. See Blum (2004) and 
Puddifoot (2017) for general discussions of how stereotypes in particular can be critiqued 
on such grounds.  
28 Medin & Ortony (1989), Haslam and Whelan (2008).  
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biological natures.29 In fact, in a study on American adults’ representations of 40 social 
categories, it was found that sex/gender categories are the most robustly and potently 
essentialised in this way—more so than other social categories, such as race and sexual 
orientation.30 
Below, I discuss the various beliefs associated with sex/gender essentialism that 
have been proposed in psychological research, alongside the cultural narratives and 
practices, often also reflected in sex/gender science, that reinforce them. These are of 
course not the only cultural messages that exist about sex/gender. In addition to the 
essentialist messages detailed in what follows, we also come across some anti-essentialist 
messages in our culture, such as girls can do anything boys can do. Whilst these latter sorts of 
messages do exist, it is, as we will see, essentialist conceptions of sex/gender that are 
particularly prevalent and mainstream.  
Following Sarah-Jane Leslie, Susan Gelman and Marianne Taylor, I suggest that 
we treat essentialism as a cluster concept; one can be more or less essentialist depending 
on how many of the various beliefs, detailed below, that one holds.31 An individual who 
holds essentialist beliefs is not always conscious of holding them. Instead, these beliefs 
are often held only implicitly. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this means that, 
instead of directly asking a person if they hold a given essentialist belief, indirect 
measures can be required.32 
Further, it should be borne in mind in what follows that there is little research 
into the cultural variation of psychological essentialism about sex/gender in particular;33 
the vast majority of research discussed below has been carried out on North American 
and European populations. The cultural narratives that I discuss have therefore also been 
drawn from these Western demographics.  
 
5.3.1.1. Two opposing categories  
At least in Western cultures, we tend to think in terms of a woman/man binary. For 
reasons that will become clearer in §5.3.1.3, these gender terms are treated as 
synonymous with the sex terms of female and male, which are also treated as a binary. 
Further, the differences that these alternative kind essences give rise to are considered to 																																																								
29 Rothbart and Taylor (1992), Bastian and Haslam (2006: 229).  
30 Haslam et al. (2000). 
31 Leslie (2013: 116), Gelman & Taylor (2000). 
32 See back to chapter 4 (§4.3.1). 
33 A notable exception is Mahalingam (2003).  
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be extreme. For instance, Carol Martin and colleagues found that the American children 
they studied tended to use their knowledge about what girls do to predict the opposite for 
boys.34 This goes for adult folk theories, too; for instance, many comment on a tendency 
in scientific publications to exaggerate sex/gender differences, suggesting that this is 
symptomatic of how essentialist beliefs continue into adulthood.35 
Cultural narratives reinforce these messages. Infamous phrases, such as the opposite 
sex, and men are from Mars, women are from Venus, help us to think that there are just two 
genders, and that they are as different as chalk and cheese.36 These ideas are materially 
embodied around us, whether it is in toy shops that are separated into two aisles of pink 
vs. blue, or in different dress codes (dresses vs. trousers) and hairstyles (long flowing 
locks vs. short or shaved).37 When it comes to sex science, the trend to talk as though 
there are indeed just two sexes, which helps to make various intersex conditions invisible, 
is overwhelming.38 Further, in addition to the trend of exaggerating sex/gender differences 
mentioned above, Janet-Shibley Hyde has shown that sex/gender similarities are rarely 
investigated; psychological research has an obsession with documenting sex/gender 
differences.39 
 
5.3.1.2. Discrete categories, internally homogeneous  
Related to the binary above, the two categories of women and men are often treated as 
discrete—as having sharp category boundaries, with no overlap. Studies of American 
children indicate an assumption that a woman, for instance, cannot have gender roles 
stereotypically associated with two gender categories; she cannot, for example, be both a 
mother and doctor, or a woman and a firefighter.40 The normative counterpart of this 
belief tends to remain into adulthood—whilst adults tend to accept that some men and 																																																								
34 Martin et al. (1995).  
35 See, for instance, Hyde (2005), Hyde et al. (1990), Caplan, MacPherson & Tobin 
(1985).   
36 One of the best-selling nonfiction hard-back books of all time is called Men are from 
Mars, Women are from Venus  (Gray, 1992), which runs with spurious popular science 
claims that men and women are virtually different species. (One might also wonder 
whether this phrase plays into androcentric biases, in virtue of mentioning men before 
women.) 
37 Gelman & Taylor (2000). 
38 Fausto-Sterling (1993). 
39 Hyde (2005). See also Rippon et al. (2014).  
40 See the studies cited in Gelman & Taylor (2000). Some children deny that such 
individuals (e.g. a female firefighter) exist, whilst others misremember them (e.g. as a 
male firefighter). 
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women do have traits that overlap gender boundaries, there is a prevalent belief that this 
should not be the case. For instance, a recent UK study found that 49% of the men 
interviewed believed there was a social stigma associated with taking shared parental 
leave, given that childcare is considered a feminine job. 41  This normative belief in 
discreteness also applies to sexed biology; research tends to find that intersex individuals 
are highly stigmatised in society.42   
 When it comes to thinking about the members of a given sex/gender group, the 
sex/gender essentialist believes that within each sex/gender group, members are 
considered to be largely homogeneous. For instance, Martin and colleagues found that 
the American children in their study tend to presume that “what a person of one sex 
likes, other people of the same sex also will like”.43 The fact that Kiera likes dolls is taken 
as a good indicator that other girls will have the same preference, for instance. Research 
conducted on American undergraduate students indicates that this trend persists into 
adulthood; these students tended to presume that same-sex peers were much more likely 
than other-sex peers to share their own liking of a given object, such as a sculpture.44  
 The idea that women/females and men/males form two internally homogeneous 
but discrete categories is particularly strong in commercial culture. It is hard to find a 
shop online or on the high street that doesn’t have a gifts for her vs. gifts for him section, for 
instance—a practice that presumes men generally like the same things as other men, that 
women like the same things as other women, and that these preferences are non-
overlapping. Men are from Mars, and women are from Venus, after all! Sex/gender science has 
also been criticised for neglecting both within-sex variability, and between-sex overlap.45  
 
5.3.1.3. Biological determinism   
Studies indicate that the influence of the environment on sex/gender development is 
often either downplayed or disregarded altogether by the sex/gender essentialist. 
Marianne Taylor’s study on American children under the age of nine demonstrated that 
these children “viewed gender-stereotyped properties as relatively impervious to 
environmental influences”.46 For instance, many of her participants thought that a boy 																																																								
41 TSB (2018). For other examples of this trend, see Brescoll et al. (2010), as well as 
Bruckmüller et al.’s (2012) study, mentioned earlier. 
42 Fausto-Sterling (2000: 8), Preves (1999).  
43 Martin, Eisenbud & Rose (1995: 1468). 
44 Ibid (1460). 
45 Nelson (2016), Vanwesenbeeck (2009), Hyde (2005). 
46 Taylor (1996: 1568).  
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raised only with girls and women, surrounded by feminine-stereotyped games of dolls 
and princesses, will inevitably end up developing masculine-stereotyped properties such 
as an interest in football. When asked to explain why a boy raised with girls would 
nevertheless develop masculine stereotyped properties, these children tend to refer to 
biological properties, such as brains and instinct.47 This reflects the idea of innate potential 
discussed in the previous chapter, which referred to the idea that an organism’s 
development is entirely pre-specified by the organism’s in-born (in this case, biological) 
essence. Studies suggest that similar beliefs have been found alive and well in adults. In 
one study of American young adults, for instance, it was found that study participants 
more frequently suggested that a boy raised by women would nevertheless develop 
masculine-stereotyped behavioural traits.48  
 Turning to popular culture in Western countries, we see a clear emphasis on 
biological properties when explaining sexed/gendered traits. 49 It is not uncommon in 
newspapers and magazines to hear the claim that men’s brains are hardwired differently 
to women, a finding that explains why men are more logical, better at reading maps, 
unempathetic, and so on. 50 Pick up a self-professed women’s magazine like Cosmopolitan, and 
find the claim that men are messy and unempathetic because it’s been written in their 
genes since they were cavemen.51 These ideas are not confined to popular culture. It is 
common to find scientific studies discussing hardwired brain differences between the 
sexes/genders, as well as fixed differences in genetic code, and for these differences to be 
understood as causing sexed/gendered differences in behaviour. 52 
 
 
 																																																								
47 Taylor & Gelman (1999).  
48 Eidson & Coley (2014). Some earlier studies had suggested that adults instead consider 
environmental properties as having more causal power over our sexed/gendered traits 
(Taylor, 1996). Eidson and Coley, however, have found these studies to be flawed, given 
their use of explicit self-report measures. I mentioned earlier that many of our essentialist 
beliefs are implicit (i.e. the individual with them is unconscious of having them), meaning 
that implicit measures are required to uncover them.  
49 See, for instance, Arthurs & Zacharias (2006), and O’Connor & Joffe (2014). 
50 See, for instance, The Guardian’s 2013 article Male and Female Brains Wired Differently, 
Scans Reveal (Sample, 2013), and Langton and Dupré’s (2013) response. 
51 Hasinoff (2009).  
52 For critical discussions of such studies, see e.g. Rippon et al. (2014), Fine (2010), and 
Dupré (2001). Rippon et al. (2014: 2), for instance, talk about a trend in sex science to 
take “a person’s biological sex [to be] a good proxy for gendered behavior”.  
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5.3.1.4. Immutability 
The results of the study mentioned earlier, where children judged that a boy’s masculine 
traits would remain constant over significant changes in his environment (such as where 
he is brought up exclusively with women and girls), led Taylor to suggest that American 
children “view gender categories as relatively immutable”.53 Whilst it is hard to find 
research explicitly testing for beliefs that gender categories are immutable in adults, the 
fact that it is so common to come across narratives of hardwired brains and fixed genetic 
coding in Western cultures and in scientific studies of sex/gender (see §5.3.1.3 above) 
suggests that sex/gender is regularly interpreted as fixed by this demographic.  
Generally, where a sex/gender essence is presumed to be biological (as it regularly 
is, according to the discussion in §5.3.1.3), ideas of immutability follow close behind. 
Western cultural conceptions of biology tend to treat it as fixed and isolated from social 
influence.54 This idea can also be seen in countless cultural artefacts around us. Consider, 
for instance, the women’s magazines mentioned earlier. After suggesting that men’s 
behaviour is down to their genetics, one representative article of Cosmopolitan implores 
“Look, the dude’s not going to change his weirdo ways, but at least now you have a 
clue”. 55 We also see the ideas of fixity in social responses to trans identities. Rachel 
McKinnon notes how trans women regularly come up against the sex/gender essentialist 
trope that they “are still, and forever will be, men, no matter how indistinguishable they 
may be from cisgender women”.56  
 
5.3.1.5. High inductive potential 
Because of this causally potent essence, sex/gender categories are treated as having high 
inductive potential, in the sense that once you learn a person’s sex/gender, you can infer 
a great many other facts about them.57 On their study on American children, Thomas 
Berndt and Kirby Heller found that those who had learnt gender stereotypes (i.e., above 
kindergarten age) tended happily to infer a person’s toy preferences solely on the basis of 																																																								
53 Taylor (1996: 1568). See Bem (1989) for similar results. Some studies have suggested 
that children do not consider sex/gender identity to be stable. American preschool 
children, for instance, have been found to assume that a boy who wears a dress will 
become a girl, for instance (Marcus & Overton, 1978). Other studies have questioned 
results such as these, however, finding flaws in their methodology (Ruble & Martin, 
1998).   
54 Keller (2005), Fine (2010), Jordan-Young (2010).  
55 Bodnar, in Hasinoff (2009).  
56 McKinnon (2014: 859).  
57 Gelman and Taylor (2000), Gelman (2003), Rothbart and Taylor (1992). 
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their perceived gender category.58 For instance, they tended consistently to suggest that a 
boy, of whom they know nothing other than that he is a boy, would rather fix a bicycle 
than bake brownies. Kay Deaux and Laurie Lewis found that similar results extend to 
American adults.59 When no other information about a person is given beyond whether 
they are female or male, these adult participants nevertheless tended to make a wide 
range of gender-stereotypical inferences about that person’s physical characteristics (e.g. 
strong vs. slender), role behaviours (e.g. head of household, vs. child-carer), occupations 
(e.g. doctor vs. nurse), and sexual orientation (e.g. heterosexual, homosexual).  
The sheer salience of sex/gender in our culture reinforces the impression that it 
is indeed a treasure trove of inductive inferences.60 Whether it is the centrality that 
gendered personal pronouns (e.g. he/she) play in our language, 61 administrative forms 
requiring knowledge of our sex/gender, the reliability with which new parents are asked 
whether they are having a boy or a girl before anything else, the regularity that shop 
assistants ask whether one is buying for a boy or a girl when their advice is solicited on 
gift purchases, Western societies, in McKinnon’s words, “are structured such that one’s 
gender identity is always relevant”.62 This gives the impression that sex/gender is a deeply 
important cultural vector—one from which we should be making lots of inferences. The 
fact that the variable of sex/gender is so regularly tested in science without a good 
rationale as to whether it is indeed relevant, suggests that the belief that gender has high 
inductive potential seeps into science.63 
 
5.3.2. Sex/Gender Essentialism: Harms 
Sex/gender essentialism has grave problems from an epistemic standpoint. Generally, the 
belief that there are biological gendered essences is largely rejected by contemporary 																																																								
58 Berndt and Heller (1986).  
59 Deaux & Lewis (1984). See Prentice & Miller (2006) for similar findings. 
60 Gelman & Taylor (2000: 186), Bem (1993), Freed (1996). 
61 Frye (1983) famously draws attention to this issue, referring to this grammatical 
phenomenon as sex marking.  
62 McKinnon (2014: 865-6). 
63 For instance, the research from Hyde (2005) that was mentioned above, which 
suggested that psychological research is obsessed with documenting sex/gender 
differences in human psychology, even when the evidence is that these differences are 
usually either non-existent or small, speaks to this point. Scientists so regularly test for 
differences in psychological traits using the variable of gender, whether or not there is 
good reason to do so, and whether or not there is good reason to test for this variable in 
particular over others (such as race, class, occupation, and so on). It is important to flag 
that an androcentric bias also pulls the other way, however, insofar as sex/gender 
differences are not investigated where they should be (Heidari et al., 2016). 
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science.64 In fact, contemporary science shows how each constituent belief of sex/gender 
essentialism, as detailed above, has serious problems from an epistemic standpoint.65 
Given that the focus in this thesis is on harm, however, I concentrate in what follows on 
the ethical repercussions of these false beliefs. 
A whole host of harms associated with sex/gender essentialist beliefs has been 
found. For instance, these beliefs have been shown to generate stereotype threat for 
disadvantaged sex/gender groups, such as women and trans men and women. 66 Trans 
men and women also face a range of other harms due to sex/gender essentialist beliefs, 
including social stigmatisation. We heard earlier that the line between a descriptive and 
normative belief is blurred for many of the components of sex/gender essentialism. 
Sometimes, the belief that there is a binary of women/females and men/males becomes 
a normative belief that everyone should fit into this binary. This is associated with a belief 
that trans identities are deviant and punishable. It is this essentialist belief that has been 
suggested to help account for the terrible statistic that more than a third of trans people 
in the UK suffered hate crimes in 2017, for instance.67  
Here, though, I will focus on just one harm of sex/gender essentialism—one that 
I mentioned in the previous chapter, and that I will return to in chapter 6. There is an 
abundance of research into how false sex/gender essentialist beliefs are regularly used to 
justify, and therefore maintain, the oppression of disadvantaged sex/gender groups.68 
Take women, for instance. The thought goes something like this: it is in women’s nature 
to be carers, and it goes against their nature to have power and authority; what is natural 
is good; therefore, women should stay at home and be discouraged from holding 
positions of power. Studies have found that essentialist explanations that follow this 
structure are often given by couples to justify a sexist division of labour in the household. 																																																								
64 See, for instance, Fine (2010), Leslie (2013), Dupré (1986), Jordan-Young (2010), 
Richardson (2013), and Rippon et al. (2014). For more general criticisms of the folk 
understanding of biology, see Griffiths (2002) and Medin & Atran (1990). 
65 In addition to the references in the footnote above, see Hyde (2005), Fausto-Sterling 
(2000), O’Connor (2010), Richards, Bouman & Barker (2017), Hyde & Mezulis (2002: 
556), Mikkola (2017), Feng et al. (2007), and Haier et al. (2009). 
66 See Heyman & Giles (2006), who detail some of the issues for girls and cis-women 
(namely, women who have female genitalia and whose chosen social identity is woman). 
See McKinnon (2014) for examples of the problems of sex/gender essentialist stereotype 
threat for trans women.  
67 Butcher (2018). See Fausto-Sterling (2000) and Minto et al. (2003) for a discussion of 
how these normative beliefs have negatively affected intersexuals. 
68 Skewes et al. (2018), Bem (1993), Fausto-Sterling (1985), Fuss (1989), Eagly et al. 
(2000), Hoffman & Hurst (1990), Yzerbyt et al. (1998). 
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For instance, in his interviews with 20 American dual earner couples, Scott Coltrane 
found that couples for whom the woman was primarily responsible for the household 
and childcare were likely to invoke the essentialist belief that “maternal instincts”, and 
natural differences between the sexes/genders (citing, for instance, the mother’s genes 
setting her up to be nurturing) justified their domestic arrangement.69 By contrast, 
couples who adopted a more equal division of household labour and childcare tended to 
cite a belief that the sexes/genders were similar. Other studies corroborate these 
findings. Ruth Gaunt interviewed 209 Israeli couples, finding that “the more the father 
believed that women have an essence that makes them more suitable for child care, the 
more hours the mother spent as the sole care provider for the child”.70  
This arguably oppresses women in at least two ways. (Here, I borrow from Iris 
Marion Young’s influential account of oppression, in which she takes it to include “five 
faces”: exploitation, powerlessness, marginalization, cultural domination, and violence.) 71 
Firstly, it can be said to exploit them, insofar as women unfairly perform the majority of 
domestic labour and childcare.72 This is widely recognised to be culturally undervalued 
work, for which they are not remunerated, and from which men benefit. 73 Secondly, it 
arguably helps to make women powerless. Essentialist beliefs often trap women in 
domestic roles, the burdens of which restrict their options regarding jobs and activities 
outside of the home. This limiting of options is itself a form of powerlessness, but it also 
has knock on effects in terms of women’s ability to get positions of power in society (such 
as leadership positions); the burdens of domestic activities affect their ability to progress 
in the workplace.  
Essentialist beliefs have been found to justify oppression outside of the home, 
too. In Thomas Morton and colleagues’ study involving 552 adults across the globe, half 
of study participants read an article arguing that sex/gender differences in thought and 
behaviour were down to biological differences (read: essences) between females and 
males, whilst the other half read the same article alongside another that refuted each of 
																																																								
69 Coltrane (1989). 
70 Gaunt (2006: 532).  
71 Young (1990). 
72 A 2016 ONS (cited in Burkeman, 2018) study found that UK women do 60% more of 
the housework than men. 
73 For an argument that domestic work is culturally undervalued, see NWLC (2017). 
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the first paper’s arguments.74 Men reading the first paper only were more likely to agree 
to various statements saying that they would support discriminatory practices that 
disadvantaged women (such as If I would work in a company where my manager preferred hiring 
men to women, I would privately support him, and If I were a manager, I would believe that more often 
than not, promoting men is a better investment in the future of the company than promoting women). 
These examples suggest that gender essentialist beliefs move beyond an intellectual 
justification of sex/gender inequalities in the status quo; the action-engendering 
consequences of these beliefs mean that they, in Haslam’s words, “promote the 
maintenance of current social divisions” [my emphasis]. 75  These social divisions are 
oppressive to women in various ways, not least insofar as they help to make women 
powerless; in addition to restricting their options more generally, they also restrict their 
access to positions of power in particular. 
Essentialist beliefs have also been said to oppress other disadvantaged 
sex/gender groups, namely, those that are non-binary. The belief that there is, or should 
be, a sex/gender binary is oppressive to non-binary groups in virtue of marginalising 
them.76 (Marginalisation, as we noted above, is one face of oppression, according to 
Young.) The descriptive counterpart of this belief can help to make non-binary groups 
invisible, by denying their existence. The normative counterpart of this belief accepts these 
groups’ existences, but stigmatises them as deviant. Both beliefs help to relegate non-
binary groups to the edges of society. This is marginalising, in the sense that these groups 
are less heard, less represented, less respected, less able to influence decision-making, and 
so on. 77  
It is widely recognised, then, that false essentialist beliefs are regularly used to 
justify various practices that oppress disadvantaged sex/gender groups. 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
74 Morton et al. (2009). See Kray et al. (2017) for a similar study, instead showing how 
exposure to essentialist ideas that gender roles are fixed increases support for gendered 
inequalities society. 
75 Haslam (2011). Also see Keller (2005), Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron (1997) and Fuss 
(1989). 
76 Bettcher (2016), Preves (1999). 
77 Honneth (1995) for instance, talks about social recognition being a vital part of self-
respect, and therefore that social marginalisation constitutes a harm. See also Darwall 
(1977) and Bartky (1990).  
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5.4. Choosing Salience Perspectives for Sex/Gender 
 
5.4.1. Salience perspectives to avoid: Instrumental harms 
The discussion in §5.3.1 suggests that sex/gender essentialism is cognitively accessible 
and socially licensed, at least in Western cultures. This fact helps to explain research 
indicating that it takes very little for our existing essentialist biases to become activated. 
For instance, Rebecca Bigler’s study on American school children demonstrated that 
where teachers gave occasional instructions that mention gender, such as all the girls put 
their bubble makers in the air, the children in that classroom were more likely to endorse 
essentialist sex/gender stereotypes than those in classrooms without such gendered 
instructions.78  
More minimal still, Susan Gelman and Gail Heyman’s study of 115 American 
children found that simply conveying information in noun form could trigger their 
essentialist thinking. 79 These children were told about a hypothetical person, Rose, who 
liked carrots. When this information was conveyed in noun-form, i.e. Rose is a carrot-eater, 
it generated more essentialist thinking about Rose than when it was conveyed in verb-
form, i.e. Rose eats a lot of carrots when she can. In particular, hearing the information in 
noun-form led children to judge that Rose’s predilection for carrots would be 
significantly more stable over time and over different situations. There is evidence, then, 
that we are used to inferring substantive essentialist beliefs (i.e. that the genders are 
essentially different, or that our behaviours are immutable) from the subtlest of inputs. 
For instance, the fact that a change in the grammatical structure of a sentence would no 
doubt be something that bypasses an audience’s conscious awareness plausibly makes 
sense of the result above. We have already heard about how language that has an implicit, 
under-the-radar quality can be especially effective in shaping an audience’s response to 
the linguistic content in question. Where an inference is made below an individual’s 
conscious awareness, it is especially likely to go on to shape that individual’s thought and 
behavioural patterns. This is because the individual cannot consciously reflect on 
whether they do indeed wish to endorse that inference, which prevents them from 
blocking inferences that they might otherwise wish to reject. 
Salience perspectives count as another more minimal, implicit input from which 
we are liable to infer essentialist beliefs. As we have learnt from the previous chapter, as 																																																								
78 Bigler (1995).  
79 Gelman & Heyman (1999).  
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well as from Bruckmüller’s study from this chapter, we should be wary of using salience 
perspectives that make salient content that is central to our biases; these biases are 
already socially licensed and cognitively accessible, and so simply having contents central 
to them at the forefront of one’s mind (perhaps through first having them made salient 
in language) can be sufficient to activate inference to those biases’ beliefs about those 
contents. Further, the activation of these biases would most likely occur in an under-the-
radar manner, which can give salience perspectives the sort of special power mentioned 
above.80  
This chapter suggests that, simply by making the following contents salient, we 
risk activating our sex/gender essentialist beliefs, and their associated practices of 
oppression.   
Firstly, differences between women/females and men/males over their similarities: this 
mere pattern of salience might result in activating problematic essentialist beliefs, such as 
that women/females and males/men are overwhelmingly different on most dimensions. 
It might also generate an inference to a different essentialist belief. We heard in the 
previous chapter that an emphasis on the distinctive traits a given subject happens to be 
manifesting can activate the essentialist belief that those traits are fixed (this essentialist 
belief was discussed in §5.3.1.4). We can arguably see this inferential pattern in cultural 
discussions of sex/gender differences. Consider, for instance, how media reports that 
women/females and men/males have distinctive brains, or even simply distinctive 
behavioural traits, regularly elicits the conclusion that those differences are hardwired, or 
otherwise immutable.81  We might wonder, then, whether giving relative salience to 
descriptions of the distinctive traits that women/females and men/males happen to 
exhibit, over the potential for their sexed/gendered traits to change, might elicit inferences 
to sex/gender essentialist beliefs that any existing differences are fixed.  
Secondly, the sex/gender binary over the larger sex/gender space: this salience 
pattern risks activating the belief that the sex/gender binary either does or should exhaust 
the sex/gender space, so that alternative categories (such as intersex, queer) are rendered 
either invisible or deviant.  																																																								
80 See chapter 2 (§2.2.2 and §2.3.1), and chapter 3 (§3.3.1) for a discussion of the under-
the-radar nature of salience perspectives and their activation of biases. 
81 See, for instance, Maney’s (2016) paper reviewing the Perils and Pitfalls of Reporting Sex 
Differences. See Sample (2013) for an example of this poor reporting. Also see Greenberg 
et al (2018) for an example of the inference from finding distinctive behavioural traits 
(e.g. empathy vs. an interest in systems) in women/ females and men/males in particular 
to the conclusion that those differences are fixed.  
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Thirdly, ways in which the sex/gender categories are discrete over ways in which 
they overlap: giving relative salience to the former over the latter risks activating the 
problematic belief that an individual either cannot or should not have a combination of 
female(/feminine) and male(/masculine) traits.  
Fourthly, ways in which members of the same sex/gender category are similar 
over ways in which they are diverse: this pattern of salience might activate problematic 
beliefs, including that there either is or should be little diversity within each sex/gender 
category. 
Fifthly, biological insides of sexed/gendered individuals over their social 
environments: this salience pattern may help us to infer biologically determinist beliefs 
that treat our behaviour and traits qua sexed/gendered individuals as entirely caused by 
sexed/gendered biological essences (such as genes, hormones, or brains).  
 Finally, we should be aware of the fact that simply making sex/gender salient in 
contexts where it is not strictly relevant can activate essentialist beliefs about 
sex/gender.82 This issue is connected less to cognitive salience perspectives, and more to 
a different type of salience. Instead of giving relatively less salience to some contents over 
another, the suggestion here is that we should omit mention of sex/gender where its 
mention is not strictly relevant. This is because our essentialist biases mean that we tend 
to imbue sex/gender categories with great inductive potential, and that mere mention of 
a person’s sex/gender can activate a great host of essentialist inferences about them.  
The research so far suggests that emphasising any one of these contents 
(differences, binaries, and so on) may be sufficient to activate an essentialist belief about 
that content. Further, epistemic and social problems have been identified with each 
component belief.83 This means that it is not just when a salience perspective activates all 
five beliefs that problems can occur. Remember, however, that essentialism is best 
thought of a cluster concept; one is more or less essentialist depending on how many of 
essentialism’s constituent beliefs one holds. A text, or set of attentional dispositions, 
then, that makes all of these contents salient risks activating the strongest form of 
sex/gender essentialism, by activating inferences to all of its component beliefs. Where a 																																																								
82 What counts as relevant will of course be quite a task to cash out. We can think of 
examples that lend sense to this idea, however. For instance, it could be helpful to 
remove sex/gender boxes for application forms for jobs that do not require a particular 
sex/gender; removing a person’s sex/gender would help to prevent the assessor making 
lots of implicit inferences about their skills and traits, for instance. (See the related advice 
on guarding against implicit bias, such as that discussed in Chapter 1 §4.)  
83 The references in §5.3.1 demonstrate this.  
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salience perspective is likely to activate these beliefs, we can deem it instrumentally 
problematic—on the basis of the epistemic and/or moral problems with its upshots. 
This point, namely, that different salience perspectives might activate varying 
degrees of sex/gender essentialism, helps us to see how the substance salience 
perspective fits into the discussion. We heard in the previous chapter that the substance 
salience perspective involved making salient the internal properties of a subject, and the 
distinctive traits it happens to be displaying. These contents are indeed central to the 
constituent beliefs of sex/gender essentialism. There is a focus on internal (specifically 
biological) properties of women/females and men/males, which were considered to be 
relatively impervious from environmental influence, as well as on the distinctive traits 
that different sexes/genders happen to display (there is a focus on the actual traits that 
make women/females and men/males different). This gives us reason to suspect that 
where we use a substance salience perspective in either our writing about sex/gender, or 
in our mind, we risk inducing a form (though not the strongest form) of sex/gender 
essentialism.  
The list above goes beyond the contents highlighted by the substance salience 
perspective, however. We are warned against making salient contents such as the binary 
categories of women/female vs. men/male, and the ways in which members of a given 
sex/gender group are similar. This demonstrates the importance of considering subject-
specific biases when making judgements about the likely impact of generic salience 
perspectives. The peculiarities of sex/gender essentialism mean that we must consider the 
impact of making a wider range of contents salient than those central to the substance 
salience perspective.  
Echoing qualifications made in previous chapters, the suggestion here is not that 
we are never permitted to make salient the contents listed above in the context of 
sex/gender. There might be occasions, perhaps in a discussion of how certain medicines 
tend to affect differently sexed/gendered bodies in different ways, that require giving 
relatively more salience to internal, biological differences between women/females and 
men/males.84 The point is rather that there is a risk that by doing so we activate our 
essentialist beliefs and their associated problems, and that this risk must be weighed into 
consideration. Is adopting this salience perspective worth the potential costs?  
 																																																								
84 Even here, though, there may sometimes be cases where giving relative salience to 
biological sex/gender differences over similarities is flawed and harmful (Risberg et al., 
2009). 
		 111	
5.4.2. The novelty of this proposal 
The suggestions discussed above might well sound familiar to some readers. Many 
feminist philosophers, especially those writing about sex/gender science, have given 
advice that sounds similar to that given here. Be wary of studies that only look for sex/gender 
differences; look out for research treating members of the same gender group as homogeneous; be sceptical 
of studies painting our biology as fixed: these are all lessons that someone acquainted with this 
literature has heard before.85 The novelty of the suggestion being made here is that 
salience perspectives give us a particularly subtle way in which the communication of 
linguistic content concerning sex/gender, or attentional dispositions for this content or 
for sexed/gendered persons, might perpetuate bias. It is not just language that avoids 
talking about sex/gender similarities,86 or language that uses terms like hardwired brains, 
that can lead the audience to essentialist conceptions of sex/gender. Language that 
explicitly discusses sex/gender similarities, or that explicitly mentions brain plasticity, can 
nevertheless activate problematic sex/gender biases. It can do this simply by giving less 
salience to these features of sex/gender. Bruckmüller et al.’s study should remind us to 
take the suggestion that mere salience can activate sex/gender biases seriously; this study 
has already demonstrated that where a cognitively accessible and socially licensed bias 
concerning sex/gender exists, it can take the subtlest patterns of salience, in language and 
attention, to activate it. Further, I have many times reiterated the point that subtle, and 
thus mostly unconsciously processed, mechanisms can have a special power in shaping 
our inferential patterns. 
 
5.4.3. Salience perspectives to choose: Instrumental benefits  
Do men lead differently than women in boardrooms? Bruckmüller and colleagues, in the paper 
mentioned at the beginning, refer to this as “an unconventional framing” (henceforth 
salience perspective) for a question about sex/gender and leadership.87 It sounds odd to us, 
in our culture, for the reasons expressed in §5.2; we are used to men being treated as the 
implicit norm for androcentric domains. Because of this, Bruckmüller et al. commented 
on our tendency spontaneously to phrase gender comparisons in androcentric domains 
by asking how women compare to men.  
																																																								
85 See, for instance, Rippon et al. (2014) and Maney (2016). 
86 This would instead count as a sin of omission (see the discussion of Anderson in chapter 
2, §2.4.2). 
87 Bruckmüller et al. (2012: 212). 
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What are of interest to us here, however, are the ethical (and epistemic) gains that 
can be made through selecting unconventional (linguistic and cognitive) salience 
perspectives for sex/gender. When Bruckmüller et al.’s question about gender and 
leadership was phrased as men differing from women, study participants attributed less 
status and power to men, perceived any gendered status and power inequalities as 
significantly less legitimate, and attributed fewer stereotypic traits to men and women. 
True, they did not find women to have more status and power than men, despite women 
being positioned as the linguistic norm; the strength of the cultural stereotype of men as 
leaders is too strong for that. Successfully lessening the degree of status and power 
attributed to men remains a noteworthy effect, however, especially considering that this 
is the result of a particularly small linguistic alteration.  
Why did this happen? We’ve heard in previous chapters that adopting salience 
perspectives that make salient the opposite content to that which is central to our biases 
often helps to prevent the activation of those biases. Bruckmüller and colleagues suggest 
a reason as to why this is the case. When it comes to linguistic salience perspectives, 
adopting those that are unconventional functions to impair communication, as the 
audience spends time trying to understand why the speaker used an unconventional 
salience perspective for their utterance. This can result in the arousal of the audience’s 
cognitive attention.88 The results of Bruckmüller et al.’s unconventional linguistic salience 
perspective for the leadership question demonstrate the benefits of this arousal. In their 
words, disrupting the usual conversational flow in this way was able to disrupt “the 
subtle reinforcement of beliefs about gendered status and power [and gender stereotypes] 
resonating with a conventional [salience perspective]”.89 They continue, suggesting “an 
unconventional [salience perspective] might lead participants to examine these status 
differences more critically and to question their legitimacy”. 90  
Whilst Bruckmüller et al.’s choice of words here might imply that unconventional 
salience perspectives move their audiences consciously critically to examine and question 
their dispositions to invoke prevalent cultural beliefs and stereotypes, other research that 
they cite suggests otherwise. The research into how unconventional linguistic salience 
perspectives arouse the audience’s cognitive attention tends to find that its effects occur 
below the audience’s conscious awareness. Consider, for instance, Allyson Holbrook et 
al.’s study, in which they asked participants a question with simple, dichotomous 																																																								
88 Holbrook et al. (2000), Roese et al. (1998).  
89 Bruckmüller et al. (2012: 212). 
90 Ibid.  
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answers. For instance, one question was: if you could vote on requiring all drivers to have accident 
insurance, would you vote for or against this? This question represents a conventional 
linguistic salience perspective; usually, we ask if someone is for or against something, in 
that order. Holbrook et al. found that study participants both took longer to respond, 
and gave unpredictable answers, when this question was phrased unconventionally—
namely, where participants were asked if they were against or for something. When asked 
to explain the thoughts that went through their mind whilst answering the 
unconventionally framed question, the fact that these participants never mentioned the 
unconventional order of response choices lead Holbrook et al. to conclude that an 
unconventional question order (or, what I would call salience perspective) “[has] its 
effects completely outside of consciousness”.91  
Bruckmüller et al.’s unconventional salience perspective likely engaged the study 
participants’ unconscious brain, then, when it helped them to, in the authors’ words, examine 
status differences more critically. This mirrors the discussion of effective implicit bias 
countering techniques mentioned in chapter 1; those that were successful used, in 
Jennifer Saul’s words, “counter-intuitive mechanical techniques that draw not upon our 
rational agency but upon automatic and unconscious responses”. 92 Just as the implicit, 
unconscious mental processing of stereotypes and biases can have a special power in 
shaping our mental and behavioural responses for the worse, then, the discussion here 
affirms that our implicit, unconscious processing can also shape our mental and 
behavioural responses for the better.  
With this in mind, we can suggest various ways to expand Bruckmüller and 
colleagues’ study in line with the discussion in this chapter. The conventional question 
posed to participants by Bruckmüller and colleagues was: do women lead differently than men 
in boardrooms? They played around with the order of women and men to elicit different 
responses from study participants, but the discussion in this chapter suggests that they 
might also play around with other aspects of the question. Firstly, given that a belief that 
the sexes/genders are overwhelmingly different to each other is a component of 
sex/gender essentialism, we might suggest adopting an unconventional linguistic salience 
perspective that instead asks about the similarities between the sexes/genders in their 
leadership style. What we have learnt about the impact of unconventional linguistic 
salience perspectives suggests that this small change might be sufficient to alter audience 																																																								
91 Holbrook et al. (2000: 484).  
92 Saul (2013: 260). 
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responses for the better—in other words, to reduce endorsements of essentialist beliefs 
about sex/gender difference. This brings us back to Hyde’s paper discussed at the very 
beginning of this chapter. Indeed, Hyde is concerned about sex/gender psychology 
research pandering to various problematic sex/gender biases, so it is no surprise that she 
has opted for the unconventional linguistic salience perspective Gender similarities and 
differences.93 We can conceive of a further study, along the lines of that by Bruckmüller and 
colleagues, which involves a control paper discussing the same linguistic content as 
Hyde’s paper, but with sex/gender differences mentioned before similarities.  
Secondly, we might also suggest playing around with which sex/gender 
categories are mentioned in Bruckmüller et al.’s study. The assessment of sex/gender 
essentialism in §5.3.1 revealed a belief that the sexes/genders form a binary, in the sense 
that either there are, or should be, only women/females and men/males (there are no 
intersex sexes or queer identities, or where they exist they are deviant). We might, then, 
ask something like this: how do the various sexes/genders lead in ways that are different (similar) to 
each other? Might this shift in linguistic salience perspective steer the audience to less 
essentialist responses? We might also consider going a little further than strictly what 
counts as a change in linguistic salience perspective, by introducing new content—
namely, by naming an example of a gender identity beyond the binary. We might ask, for 
instance: how do genderqueer individuals, women and men lead in ways that are different (similar) to 
each other? The research discussed here suggests that these unconventional salience 
perspectives and phrasings might be instrumentally beneficial, insofar as they reduce our 
essentialist beliefs about sex/gender binaries.  
Generally, this chapter suggests that making salient (in both our language and 
mind) the opposite to that which our sex/gender essentialist biases make salient, might 
help to avoid the activation of our sex/gender essentialist beliefs. Instead of binary 
categories and difference, we might consider giving relative salience to a wider range of 
sex/gender categories, as well as the similarities between them; instead of discreteness of 
sex/gender categories and the homogeneity within each category, we could give more 
attention to the overlap between categories, and the variability within a category; instead 
of internal biological properties, we might give relative salience to external properties 
such as social norms and stimuli; instead of actual distinctive traits of sex/gender groups, 
we could consider attending more to the potential for change in group attributes. (The 																																																								
93 See Hyde’s (2005) paper for a more explicit discussion about her concern about 
sex/gender psychology research playing into problematic sex/gender biases.  
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contents in this list overlap with what we introduced as the process salience perspective in the 
previous chapter. This perspective made salient the external context in which a subject 
exists, and the potential for change from whichever traits that subject exhibits. There is a 
case, then, that the process salience perspective could be of some help in avoiding the 
activation of sex/gender essentialism.) 
Just as with Bruckmüller et al.’s unconventional salience perspective for 
androcentric domains, the scope of the benefits to be gained from using a salience 
perspective that counters our sex/gender essentialist biases will likely be similarly 
circumscribed. Just like our androcentric biases, sex/gender essentialist beliefs are too 
strong (i.e. too cognitively accessible and socially licensed) to expect the use of a mere 
counter-salience perspective to be able to activate thorough-going anti-essentialist beliefs 
about sex/gender in its audience, such as that sex/gender is a continually evolving set of 
traits that might alter unrecognisably in the future. (Further, anti-essentialist conceptions 
of sex/gender are plausibly not cognitively accessible and socially licensed, which means 
that salience perspectives, given that they rely on a bias being so accessible and licensed, 
are unlikely to activate them.) Whilst we cannot expect our suggested counter-salience 
perspective for sex/gender to help us to conceptualise sex/gender in radically different, 
anti-essentialist ways, we can expect a lessening of the degree to which we endorse 
essentialist biases. Given that the suggestions made here are for particularly small, 
minimal-effort linguistic changes, the fact that we might achieve a lesser degree of 
sex/gender essentialism remains a significant result.94  
What about adopting this counter-salience perspective for sex/gender in our 
cognition? Changing patterns of salience in language is one thing, but how does one 
develop long-term habits of focussing on sex/gender categories beyond the binary, on 
the similarities between the sex/gender categories, on the potential for different 																																																								
94 One way in which this counter salience perspective might have benefits beyond the 
mere lessening of our essentialist biases is if it is able to activate a good bias. We heard in 
the previous chapter about the growth mindset, which involved a person believing their 
intelligence to be something that can develop over time in response to effort. I suggested 
that the growth mindset was becoming increasingly cognitively accessible and socially 
licensed in Western cultures. Now, the growth mindset is associated with benefits in the 
context of sex/gender. For instance, where one believes that maths ability grows with 
effort, grades improve and, in Fine’s (2010: 185) words, “gender gaps diminish”. It was 
also said better to protect women against essentialist stereotypes about maths ability 
(Dweck, 2006b). Given that this mindset makes salient at least two of the contents 
emphasised by our counter-salience perspective for sex/gender – external context and 
the potential for change – it might be liable to become activated through use of this 
perspective.  
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gendered traits in the future, and so on? Further, how do we do this when the society 
around us is functioning to make sex/gender binaries, sex/gender differences, and so on, 
attention grabbing, memorable, and cognitively accessible? In chapter 2, I suggested that 
individualist approaches to changing one’s cognitive salience perspective will often be 
insufficient in this sort of case. Instead, we need to make structural changes within the 
culture itself. For instance, we might want to look to changing the toyshops that divide 
gifts along stereotypically-gendered lines, the media reporting of hardwired brain 
differences between the sexes/genders, the administrative forms that require indicating 
one’s sex/gender where this is not strictly relevant, and so on.  
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
Bruckmüller and colleagues’ study gave us evidence of salience perspectives activating 
inferences to substantive, truth-conditional beliefs concerning sex/gender. These beliefs 
were inferred in part because they were particularly cognitively accessible and socially 
licensed. Finding these beliefs harmful, Bruckmüller et al. recommended that we adopt a 
linguistic salience perspective (or, linguistic framing in their words) that has a better chance 
at thwarting the easy retrieval of these beliefs. This answered the first question that we 
had at the beginning of this chapter; there is indeed empirical evidence that a mere 
change in salience perspective for the specific subject of sex/gender can mean the 
difference between activating problematic (androcentric) biases, and not.  
 At least in Western cultures, another set of particularly cognitively accessible and 
socially licensed beliefs in the context of sex/gender is sex/gender essentialism. This 
chapter has laid out the components of this bias, on the (common) assumption that it 
does indeed have a doxastic structure. These beliefs, I argued, are both false and harmful. 
I then suggested that linguistic and cognitive salience perspectives that simply made the 
contents central to these beliefs salient risked activating inferences to these beliefs. In 
particular, I said that, when talking about sex/gender, or attending to sexed/gendered 
subjects, this means being wary of making salient: sex/gender binaries; sex/gender 
differences (i.e. the idiosyncrasies sex/gender groups currently display); ways in which 
sex/gender categories are discrete; ways in which members of a given sex/gender 
category are similar; the biological insides of sexed/gendered persons. (Whilst not 
relevant to cognitive salience perspectives per se, I also suggested that we ought to think 
twice before mentioning a person’s sex/gender in situations where it is not strictly 
relevant.) This answered the second question posed in the introduction—namely, it 
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helped to answer which sex/gender contents we should avoid making salient in our 
language and thought. The substance salience perspective was identified as making 
salient many, though not all, of the contents central to sex/gender essentialism, and thus 
was considered liable to activate a form (though not the strongest form) of sex/gender 
essentialism.  
Finally, I asked what we can hope to achieve by making salient content that is the 
opposite to that which is central to sex/gender essentialism. Here, I suggested that the 
potency of the sex/gender essentialist bias in Western cultures means that the benefits of 
a counter-salience perspective will no doubt be limited. It is unlikely to help to activate 
radically anti-essentialist beliefs about sex/gender. The results from using unconventional 
salience perspectives in Bruckmüller et al.’s study, however, gives us hope that it will at 
least thwart the easy activation of sex/gender essentialist beliefs.  
The discussion in this chapter should make us all (from lay people, to journalists, 
to academics) carefully consider how we present information about sex/gender, and 
which salience perspectives we decide to cultivate. This is especially important given the 
implicit, under-the-radar way in which salience perspectives can activate inferences to our 
biases—this can give them more power to shape our cognitive and behavioural responses. 
The fact that these responses can help to oppress people from disadvantaged social 
groups, as was the case with sex/gender essentialism, further demonstrates the 
importance of employing the right salience perspective.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SALIENCE PERSPECTIVES AS  
CONSTITUTIVE HARMS:  
SEX / GENDER 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In previous chapters, I have spent most of the time focussing on the harms, as well as 
some of the epistemic faults, that salience perspectives can cause, through their activation 
of problematic biases. In this chapter, I expand upon one of the ways mentioned in 
chapter 3, in which we might offer a constitutive critique of salience. Here, I build upon the 
suggestion that salience can constitute harm in itself, independently of any harmful 
effects it may have. Focussing again on the topic of sex/gender, I argue that we can harm 
someone in this way simply by making certain things salient about them.1  
A woman can be harmed, for instance, when what she is wearing is more salient 
in her interlocutor’s mind than her conversational abilities. A philosopher can be harmed 
when what others find most salient about her is her identity as a woman, as opposed to 
her philosophical expertise. For an athlete who has been raped, it can be in her best 
interests for her athletic achievement to be her most salient feature, and not the fact that 
she was raped.  
My aim is to clarify and expand upon the suggestion made about Charlotte’s 
cognitive salience perspective on Jane, discussed in chapter 3. Namely, making the wrong 
thing salient about a person can harm them by constituting a way of disrespecting their 
personhood. The questions driving this chapter are three-fold. My primary question is as 
follows: is the idea that mere salience can constitute harm plausible? Secondly, if it is, 
what can the notion of salience as constitutive harm offer to the subject of sex/gender 																																																								
1 The type of harm being considered in this chapter is what Feinberg (1987: Ch. 1) calls 
“setbacks to interests”. I am asking, therefore, if patterns of salience can themselves 
hinder our interests. Our interests, Feinberg suggests, are those things in which we have 
a stake. They are components of our well-being, insofar as, in Feinberg’s words, one 
“flourishes or languishes as [one’s interests] flourish or languish” (ibid. 34). A person can 
set back that interest, and thus harm me, by making it difficult for me to achieve that 
fulfilment, for instance. Patterns of salience might count as harms in another sense 
identified by Feinberg, too. Making the wrong thing salient about a person might involve 
wronging them, in the sense of violating their rights (ibid. 34-5). Whilst this may be the case, 
it is not something that I consider in this chapter.  
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harm? Thirdly, what, if anything, makes the type of harm constituted by patterns of 
salience important to consider? 
 In what follows, I begin in §6.2 by consulting two case studies relating to the 
topic of sex/gender harms. These are designed to motivate and clarify the idea that 
certain patterns of salience can constitute harm. The first case study in §6.2.1 looks at 
salience-based harms in relation to women who have experienced rape. The second case 
study in §6.2.2 considers how making women’s bodies their most salient feature can 
harm them. In §6.3, I build upon this latter case study and suggest that attending 
primarily to a woman so that her body is her most salient feature counts as a form of 
sexual objectification—what I call perspectival objectification. In other words, salience 
perspectives count as one aspect of sex/gender harm. This perspectival sex/gender harm 
is important to address. Its subtlety, I suggest, gives it an insidious power. In particular, its 
subtlety makes it difficult to challenge, both because it makes it hard to notice, and 
because it makes it easy to dismiss as trivial where it is noticed. In §6.4, I consider the 
topic of the previous chapter, sex/gender essentialism, with the preceding discussion in 
mind. In particular, I suggest another way in which salience perspectives might count as 
an aspect this sex/gender harm. Certain attentional dispositions, I suggest, might 
themselves count as a form of sex/gender essentialism: perspectival essentialism. In §6.5, I 
clarify the ideas discussed so far by defending them against two objections.  
 
6.2. Case studies  
 
6.2.1. Rape victim-survivors2 
Consider a situation that too many women find themselves in, though it is a difficult one 
to talk about. Many women are survivors of rape: 85,000 women are raped in England 
and Wales alone every year.3 Whilst both men and women experience rape, it is women 
who disproportionately suffer from this terrible crime, and men who disproportionately 
																																																								
2 I use the term victim-survivor as the generic term for someone who has experienced rape. 
I have chosen this expression in an effort to acknowledge the issues that come with 
choosing one or other term (victim or survivor). According to Jean-Charles (2014: 39), 
victim-survivor better “grapples with the multiple responses to and experiences with rape, 
as well as the different ways they figure on cultural production”.  
3 ONS (2013: 6).  
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are the assailants.4 Further, research demonstrates how gendered norms and practices 
help to explain this gendered differential. For instance, many have argued that gender 
norms for men tend to encourage dominance and control, as well as the view that 
women are sexual conquests. 5 It is with this research in mind that I assume, in what 
follows, that rape is a sex/gender issue.  
 Despite the gravity of the crime, many rape cases are not brought to trial.6 There 
are multiple reasons why women who have been raped might want to avoid testifying in 
the courts. The exceedingly low conviction rate is one.7 The emotional distress of having 
to recount a horrific attack to a room full of people is another.8 A different reason, 
however, might be that these women do not want the fact that they were raped to 
become the most salient thing about them. They do not want it to be what others find 
most noticeable, memorable, and cognitively accessible.  
Part of their concern may well be about the harmful beliefs and ideologies that 
this cognitive salience perspective is liable to activate. The salience of their experience of 
rape might activate harmful victim-blaming beliefs and ideologies, in both the minds of 
others, as well as in these victim-survivors’ own minds. Victim-blaming beliefs and 
ideologies are arguably culturally pervasive and socially licensed.9  
There looks to be something more, however. To understand this, let’s look to 
rape victim-survivor statements. A common concern raised by those who have been 
raped is that one’s experience of rape ends up masking other aspects of one’s identity. 
Monika Korra, who was kidnapped and raped when she was out on a run, has said that 
she wants to be known as a runner, not a rape victim. Calling running her passion, Korra 
describes it as “the thing that gave me identity in life”, and that the fact that she was 
raped threatened the primacy of that identity.10 Similarly, Simone Biles, 4 times Olympic 																																																								
4 Over 2017-8, for instance, 93% of users of Rape Crisis Centres in England and Wales 
were women (Rape Crisis, 2019a). Perpetrators are predominantly male (see, for instance, 
Black et al, 2011: 3).  
5 See Brownmiller (1975), Edwards (1987), Cahill (2001), MacKinnon (2016) and Stotzer 
& MacCartney (2016) for further discussions of this point. 
6 For instance, the crime survey for England and Wales found that around 5 in every 6 
victims did not report their experiences to the police (ONS, 2018).  
7 It is estimated that only 5.7% of reported rape cases result in a conviction for the 
perpetrator (Kelly et al, 2005). 
8 See these and other issues eloquently discussed in an open letter by the victim in the 
Stanford University rape case (Anonymous, reprinted in Osborne, 2016).  
9 Suarez & Gadalla (2010), Whatley (1996). These authors also explain the harm of 
victim-blaming beliefs and ideologies. 
10 Korra, in Lopez (2016).  
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gymnastics champion, recently cited similar concerns when she announced that she had 
been sexually abused by her USA Olympic national team doctor. In a statement 
published on social media, Biles stressed that “this horrific experience does not define 
me. I am much more than this. I am unique, smart, talented, motivated, and passionate. I 
have promised myself that my story will be much greater than this…[emphasis in 
original]”.11 
Many complex issues around identity, and the victim status in particular,12 no 
doubt play a role in these women’s thoughts here. One way of thinking about their 
statements, though, is by invoking cognitive salience perspectives. Let’s think back to 
what cognitive salience perspectives entail. What would it mean for Korra, for instance, 
to have her experience of rape taken to be her most prominent feature? Amongst other 
things, this would involve people noticing properties connected to the fact that she was 
raped more than others; for instance, they might notice others discussing her experience 
of rape more than they would notice others discussing her other properties, such as her 
skills, her interests, and so on. Further, the fact that Korra was raped would be the most 
remembered feature of her life by others. It would involve the fact that she was raped 
being particularly cognitively accessible to people when they think about Korra’s other of 
traits.  
This is a problem when one benefits from having different features of one’s person 
most salient in the minds of others (and one’s own mind). Korra and Biles would do 
better having runner and Olympic gymnast respectively more salient than victim of rape in 
people’s minds. Firstly, it matters to us how we are attended to. Korra and Biles want to be 
known primarily as athletes: for their athletic successes to be noticed and remembered 
more easily than reports of their rape; for their determination and commitment to their 
sport to be at the top of people’s minds when they think of them, contemplate their 
behaviour, and act towards them. People can be harmed when they fail to be attended to 
in the way in which they wish.13  																																																								
11 Biles’ Twitter statement, reprinted in Lutz (2018). Other examples that echo Biles’ and 
Korra’s concern include Ashley MacDonald. MacDonald says “I definitely don’t want to 
be known as the rape victim. That’s not my goal in life”. She goes on: “I hope that other 
people will acknowledge that there is much more going on in my life than that” 
(MacDonald, in CBC News, 2017).  
12 See Jean-Charles (2014) and Kelly et al. (1996) for discussions of the issues 
surrounding both words, victim and survivor, in the context of rape.  
13 Many philosophers have made similar points. For instance, one might look to 
Korsgaard’s notion of practical identity to explain this type of harm. An agent’s practical 
identity is their sense of self or, in Korsgaard’s (1996: 101) words, “a description under 
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This idea is a familiar one. Artists from minority backgrounds commonly 
complain about being seen primarily in terms of their ethnicity; they might get referred to 
as (for example) an Indian artist, whilst another, (white) artist will simply be referred to as 
an artist. 14 Using the prefix Indian is one way of making these artists’ ethnicity their most 
salient feature. Further, women scientists not infrequently object to being seen first and 
foremost as a woman instead of as a scientist. Take, for instance, Monica Esopi, a 
doctoral candidate in chemical engineering, who talks about the relief that she felt 
moving into a department that openly and earnestly discussed diversity-related issues. 
She says “I no longer feel like I’m seen as a woman first [emphasis added]; I am just a 
researcher, a scientist, an engineer”. 15 The issue that these individuals raise is not (always) 
that others see them only as a minority ethnic group or woman. Rather, it is that their 
identity as a minority ethnic group or woman seems to take precedence over their other 
identities—identities that they wish for others to focus on.  
I want to consider another, stronger reason, however, for Korra and Biles having 
their identity as athlete more prominent than that of rape victim-survivor—a reason that does 
not depend on their particular desires. Consider sexual objectification, which involves 
treating a person as a thing in some way. (I return to this topic in §6.2.2 below.) A 
common feminist explanation as to why phenomena like objectification harms women, 
have referenced the idea that we deserve to be recognised as agents with personhood—
with, amongst other things, rationality, a capacity to set and pursue our own ends, 
integrity and personality.16 We heard about this briefly in chapter 2. Objectification is 
harmful because it involves disrespecting an individual’s personhood. Rachel Fraser has 
noted how this idea crops up in feminist writing on rape. She observes how, in order to 																																																																																																																																																														
which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living 
and your actions to be worth undertaking”. This can include one’s status as father, Brit, or 
indeed athlete. Others have a duty to respect our practical identity, according to 
Korsgaard. Honneth’s (1995) ideas on social recognition might also help. According to 
Honneth, we cannot experience self-realisation, or the development of our capabilities, 
unless the others around us respect our identity. One might be able to expand upon 
these philosophers’ ideas, then, to demonstrate that one way in which our chosen 
(practical) identities can harmfully be disrespected is by others not attending to that 
identity in the right way—namely, by failing to make our chosen identity our most salient 
one.  
14 Pollock & Parker (1981: xix).  
15 Esopi, in Science Careers Staff (2018).  
16 The first two features of this list are borrowed from Kant (Lectures on Ethics), who is 
cited by many theorists writing about objectification (see Papadaki, 2015: §1). The latter 
features come from Dworkin (2000: 30-1) and Bartky (1990:130), who expand upon 
Kant.  
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avoid this harm, “feminists have long argued for the importance of recognising the 
complex personhood and agency of those who have experienced rape”. 17  This is 
especially important given that, in our culture, rape victim-survivors are commonly 
understood and portrayed as passive and lifeless. In Susan Brison’s powerful 
philosophical paper detailing her experience of rape, she talks about how crime novels 
and detective films portray the rapist as agentic, whilst the victim is treated as “a merely 
passive pretext for our entertainment”.18 Fraser herself cites rape metaphors as evidence 
for this way of seeing rape victim-survivors. Metaphors such as Germany is raping Brazil in 
the football right now are so prevalent and successful in part because of how common it is to 
think of those who are raped as powerless and passive.19 In other words, rape victim-
survivors are commonly portrayed as lacking personhood, and this harms them. 
How can we apply the common thought that we can harm a person by 
disrespecting their personhood to the context of salience perspectives? Well, as was the 
brief suggestion in chapter 3, attending to a person so that their personhood-related traits 
are their most salient attribute looks to be one way of respecting their personhood. (A 
personhood-related trait is a trait reflecting one’s individuality, rationality, agency, and so 
on. For instance, it might be a trait over which one has been able to exercise some 
agency, whose cultivation involved exercising one’s rational faculties, and/or whose 
existence demonstrates one’s personality, and so on. Whilst this notion will need 
clarification, I think that we can make some good intuitive sense of it.) For instance, it 
seems clear that being a rape victim-survivor, on its own, is not a trait that one has 
exercised agency over, whereas being an athlete usually does require setting one’s own 
goals and pursuing them. Having athlete at the top of our minds when thinking about 
Korra and Biles helps us to notice and remember an identity that they have 
autonomously chosen, displays their individuality, reflects their ability to set their own 
goals (thereby reflecting their rationality and agency), and so on. It is in their interests for 
their personhood-related traits to be made most salient. Conversely, attending to a 
person so that their non-personhood-related traits are their most salient feature is a way 
of disrespecting their personhood—namely, of harming them.20 Having person who was 
raped most prominent in our minds directs our attention to a passive status as someone 																																																								
17 Fraser (2018: 747). 
18 Brison (1993: 11). 
19 Fraser (2018: 745). 
20 See back to fn. 1., where Feinberg suggests that we can be harmed when we experience 
a setback to our interests.  
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who has been attacked—a status that they did not choose, and so does not reflect their 
individuality, their agency, and so on. (I consider the case of the individual who finds 
their status as rape victim-survivor to be powerfully agentic, and wishes for others to 
attend primarily to that identity, in §6.5.) 
Disrespecting an individual’s personhood is harmful not just instrumentally, but 
in itself, independently of its further effects. This means that, where a cognitive salience 
perspective is a way of disrespecting someone’s personhood, it too can be considered 
non-instrumentally harmful. It can constitute, as opposed to cause, harm. (We might also 
suggest that a linguistic salience perspective can constitute harm in this way by making an 
individual’s non-personhood-related traits most salient, such as by mentioning Korra’s 
experience of rape before her athletic career.)  
This idea might helpfully be applied to the other examples that were mentioned 
earlier, namely, of the artist complaining that their ethnicity is given relative salience over 
their identity as an artist, and the scientist objecting to her sex/gender taking precedence 
over her identity as a scientist. Understanding that we can be harmed when a non-
personhood-related feature of ours is made our most salient attribute might help to 
identify one of the harms occurring in these cases. Indeed, the professional identity of 
these individuals (artist, scientist) seems a better candidate for a personhood-related trait 
than the ethnicities or genders of these individuals.21 
Before moving on, it may be helpful to note that the claim being made here – 
namely, that a given phenomenon might involve not just causal but also constitutive harms 
– is a familiar one. For instance, Rae Langton discusses how common this approach is in 
the context of pornography. She says [in-text citations are omitted for clarity of 
presentation]: 
 
“Considerable work has been done to unpack the idea that pornography might 
harm women in a constitutive manner: for example, the idea that it discriminates 
against women; it subordinates women; it enacts facts about what is permissible 
and not permissible; it alters conventions governing women’s speech acts; it is 
comparable to hate speech and group libel. Agreement might well be reached 
that certain forms of pornography—for example, an infamous Hustler image of 
a headless naked woman being fed into a meat grinder—harm women in the 																																																								
21 For those who do wish to have their ethnicity or sex/gender as their most salient 
feature, we may be able to give responses that parallel those in §6.5 below. 
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way that hate speech and racial insults are understood to be constitutively 
harming their targets.” 22 
 
As Langton suggests, then, there are a whole host of ways to argue that something, in 
this case pornography, might involve constitutive harms. Her own defence of this idea – 
or rather, her defence of the conceptual grounds of Catherine MacKinnon’s argument 
that pornography constitutes harm –23 borrows from speech act theory. This theory 
begins from the observation that, as J. L. Austin would put it, we use language to do 
things. For instance, saying I do in an official marriage ceremony does not just cause two 
people to become married: the utterance itself constitutes the act of marrying. Or, the 
utterance Run! There’s a fire! said by someone in a burning building, itself constitutes the act 
of warning.  
Sometimes, the act constituted by the utterance is harmful. Developing examples 
closer to the case of pornography, Langton gives the example of apartheid law. She says 
that the utterance Black people are not permitted to vote uttered in certain contexts, constitutes 
subordination.24 In particular, it constitutes the acts of (unfairly) ranking black people as 
inferior, (unjustly) depriving them of rights and powers, and legitimating discrimination 
against them.25 We might want to put it this way: even if (for some hard-to-fathom 
reason) this utterance didn’t have the pernicious effects we associate with apartheid law, it 
would nevertheless constitute harm, by itself counting as an act of subordination. (I take it 
for granted that Langton deems subordination to be a harm in itself.) In other words, 
even if there is a possible world in which this utterance does not lead to black people 
staying away from polling booths (and so on), we would nevertheless want to say that the 
utterance Black people are not permitted to vote is harmful. In particular, it would be harmful 
in this possible world because the utterance is, in and of itself, a way of enacting the 
subordination of black people.  
It is with these examples in mind, built on the scaffold of speech act theory, that 
Langton suggests understanding MacKinnon’s proposal that pornography constitutes 																																																								
22 Langton (2008: 1). 
23 MacKinnon (1987). 
24 Langton (1993b:  302). In this work, Langton (ibid. 304) argues that, for the utterance 
in question to count as a given act, the utterer must have authority in the relevant domain 
(in the Apartheid case, she suggests that the utterer might be a legislator in Pretoria). 
Many others since have questioned this condition, suggesting that, often, one does not 
require any special authority to nevertheless perform various acts through one’s 
utterances (see, for instance, Bauer, 2005).  
25 Langton (1993b: 303).  
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subordination. We can understand MacKinnon, according to Langton, to be suggesting 
that pornography is a speech act of subordination. In and of itself, pornography 
(unfairly) ranks women as inferior, (unjustly) deprives them of power, and legitimates sexual 
violence against women.26  
The point that I would like to dwell on from the preceding discussion is this: 
there is an important precedent for arguing that a phenomenon might not just cause 
harm, but also constitute an act of harm. Instead of suggesting that certain utterances might 
constitute harm, my claim is that certain patterns of attention might constitute harm. 
Further, instead of focussing on the specific harm of subordination, as per Langton’s 
argument above, the type of harm that I identify is disrespect for an individual’s personhood. 
Generally, though, I follow the spirit of these other arguments: just as pornography itself 
might constitute a way of subordinating women, I want to suggest that certain patterns of 
attention might constitute a way of disrespecting an individual’s personhood. 
 
6.2.2. Women and their bodies 
Let’s consider another case study that will help to clarify and expand upon this idea. 
Imagine a man, let’s call him Terry, who, when interacting with other men, tends to 
notice their voice and face more than their body. He easily remembers what they say, as 
well as their facial expressions. When he considers an individual man that he has met, he 
tends to find these aspects of them more cognitively accessible than memories of build 
or biceps. By contrast, when Terry interacts with other women, he often notices and 
remembers a woman’s figure or bust more than their face and voice, finding these 
attributes most accessible in his mind when he later reflects on what they were like. Now, 
Terry still notices and remembers other aspects of the women he meets, including their 
face and voice. He remembers and values their conversational contributions and 
personality quirks, but they are simply less prominent in his mind than these other 
features.  
Terry is systematically attending to women differently to men. Is this a problem? 
Well, you might think it is if Terry’s cognitive salience perspective on women is 
activating objectificatory beliefs and ideologies, and their associated behaviour. One type 
of sexual objectification involves reducing a person to their body, or body parts.27 
Indeed, many have suggested that our culture is saturated in objectificatory images and 																																																								
26 See Langton (ibid. 307) for these specific suggestions as to how pornography might 
subordinate women.	
27 Langton (2005: 246-7). 
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narratives that encourage us to think of women in particular as reducible to their bodies 
and appearance more generally. 28 This suggests that objectificatory beliefs and ideologies 
about women are plausibly cognitively accessible and socially licensed. Perhaps Terry’s 
cognitive salience perspective, by making women’s body parts their most salient feature, 
is helping to activate and license these beliefs and ideologies. It might be resulting in him 
thinking things like women are reducible to their bodies, or acting in objectifying ways, for 
example by touching women inappropriately.29 
 Is there a problem with Terry’s cognitive salience perspective independently of 
these effects, though? Let’s follow the logic of the previous section. How we 
communicate through speech is a paradigmatic way in which we express our agency, 
personality, rationality, and so on. In other words, it is a way in which we express and 
exercise our personhood. Attending to men so that their conversational contributions are 
their most salient feature, then, is a way in which Terry respects men’s personhood. By 
contrast, women’s bodies in particular have taken on an especially object-like quality in 
contemporary (at least Western) culture. For instance, it is particularly common in 
adverts to crop photos of women so that their body, but not head, is in the shot. 30 Men, 
on the other hand, are depicted with a greater focus on the face in the media generally 
speaking. 31 At least in Western cultures, the head and face is commonly associated with 
one’s personhood; we tend to think of the mind, with its thoughts, feelings, desires and 
so on, as located in the head. Our faces are where we usually express ourselves and 
communicate, through speech and facial expressions. Indeed, research finds that those 
depicted with greater focus on the face in media and advertising images are evaluated as 
more intelligent (i.e. rational), assertive, and ambitious (i.e. agentic, autonomous) than 
those depicted with emphasis on the body.32 In other words, they are evaluated as having 
more personhood. Removing the head from photos of women takes away these things, 
reducing a woman to a feeling-less, desire-less body—something more like an object 
than a person. Indeed, historically and culturally, Sandra Bartky suggests that the body 
has “been regarded as less intrinsically valuable, indeed, as less inherently human, than 
the mind or personality”.33 Attending to women so that their body parts are their most 																																																								
28 Goh-Mah (2013), Belsky (2019).  
29 Another form of objectification involves treating women as though they do not have 
boundary integrity (Nussbaum, 1995: 257). 
30 Belsky (2019).  
31 Archer et al (1983), Szillis & Stahlberg (2007).  
32 Archer et al (1983) and Szillis & Stahlberg (2007). 
33 Bartky (1990: 35). 
		 129	
salient feature, then, is one way in which Terry disrespects women’s personhood. This 
means that Terry’s cognitive salience perspective on women constitutes a way of harming 
them.34  
 
6.3. Perspectival objectification 
 
The particular type of harm that Terry seems to be responsible for looks to be connected 
even more intimately to objectification than our case of rape victim-survivors. The way 
in which Terry is attending to women looks not just to be a way of disrespecting their 
personhood (a notion that I have borrowed from the literature on objectification), but 
specifically to count as a way of disrespecting women’s personhood by treating them as a 
thing. Martha Nussbaum’s influential account of objectification details seven ways of 
treating a person as a thing, including, for instance, denying a person’s autonomy, and 
treating them as fungible.35 Other ways have been added since; Rae Langton has also 
suggested that silencing a person, as well as reducing them to their appearance or to their 
body count as ways in which we treat a person as a thing. 36 The suggestion being made 
here is that attending to a person so that their thing-like properties are their most salient 
feature is another way of treating them as a thing. In other words, it is itself a form of 
objectification. 
This idea is arguably in the background of some women’s complaints regarding 
how others, often men, look them at. The notorious quip I’m up here, said to a man who 
is looking more at his interlocutor’s chest than her face, could be construed as a claim 
about attention. It is not uncommon to come across personal stories from women on 
this theme.37 This complaint is not (always) about men entirely ignoring a woman’s face, 
speech, and other personhood-related traits, rather it is about eyes lingering on certain 
body parts more than one’s face, for instance. Studies indicate this sort of gaze can have 																																																								
34 The fact that Western culture is saturated in objectifying depictions of women such as 
those suggested above suggests that cultural factors may make it difficult for Terry to 
adopt attentional dispositions that do not involve giving relative salience to women’s 
bodies. As per my discussion about changing entrenched cognitive salience perspectives in 
chapter 3 (§3.4), we might find that cultural changes are necessary in order to allow 
individuals (such as Terry) to shift cognitive salience perspective—for individuals 
automatically and intuitively to find women’s faces and voices more salient than their 
bodies. 
35 Nussbaum (1995: 257). 
36 Langton (2005: 246-7).  
37 See, for instance, Adebisi (2018), Burriss (2017), Roberts (2002: 327).  
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pernicious effects. For instance, one Australian study suggests that adolescent girls’ 
feelings that they are stared at in public swimming pools inhibits the frequency and 
quality of their participation in physical activities.38 The suggestion here, though, is that 
these attentional dispositions can be harmful even notwithstanding these effects. One 
can harmfully objectify simply in virtue of attending primarily to a person’s thing-like 
traits. 
This idea is also implicit in existing feminist writings on objectification. Sandra 
Bartky, for instance, claims that women can be objectified in virtue of being “too closely 
identified with [their body]”.39 Paraphrasing Bartky’s words, Evangelina Papadaki writes 
in a way quite consonant with the proposal at hand: “All the focus is placed on a 
woman’s body, in a way that her mind or personality are not adequately acknowledged”.40 
We could read Papadaki here as suggesting that instead of requiring a wholesale reduction 
of a woman to her body to count as objectification (perhaps meaning that a woman is 
wholly identified with her body, so that her mind and personality is not even registered), 
objectification can be a matter of the degree of focus on a woman’s body.  
Despite these resonances, the particularly minimalist dimension of mere salience 
perspectives is never made entirely explicit. In addition, other aspects of Papadaki’s 
phrasing, such as where she states that all of the focus is placed on a woman’s body, could 
undermine my reading of focus coming in degrees. Further, Bartky herself goes on to 
expand her view in ways that indicate that something beyond mere salience is at issue. 
For instance, she uses words like infatuation synonymously with her idea of a focus on the 
body; 41  infatuation implies an intense and all-encompassing focus on something, as 
opposed to the subtler notion of giving relative salience to one thing over another in one’s 
attention. She also uses phrases such as “[being objectified] is to have one’s entire being 
identified with the body”.42 The sort of objectification that I suggest – let’s call it 
perspectival objectification – is not as strong as this. 43 Aspects of one’s person beyond one’s 
body (such as one’s personality and autonomy) are recognised by the objectifier; it is 
simply that the objectifier better attends to one’s body. They give it relative salience over 
one’s personality. They find it more noticeable, memorable, and cognitively accessible. 																																																								
38 James (2000). 
39 Bartky (1990: 130). 
40 Papadaki (2018: §3). 
41 Bartky (1990: 131-2). 
42 Ibid. (35). 
43 I introduce perspectival objectification, and the notion of perspectival harm more 
generally, in Whiteley (forthcoming). 
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(The example of Charlotte’s cognitive salience perspective on Jane, discussed in chapter 
3, looks like an instance of perspectival objectification. Charlotte is giving relative 
salience to Jane’s thing-like properties, namely, her fat body, over her personhood-related 
properties, namely, her charity work.) 
The concept of perspectival objectification can be clarified by contrasting it with 
what it is not. In particular, it can be contrasted with doxastic objectification, which 
involves objectificatory beliefs, such as that women are submissive and object-like. 
Philosophers such as Sally Haslanger and Rae Langton discuss this form of 
objectification. 44 A distinctive way in which these beliefs cause harm is in being false, or 
perhaps in being unjustified given their wrong direction-of-fit with the world—in this 
latter case, objectificatory beliefs are often true only in virtue of shaping women’s 
behaviour so that they become submissive and object-like.  
Perspectival objectification is non-doxastic; instead of being constituted by beliefs, 
it is constituted by attentional dispositions. Now, other forms of non-doxastic 
objectification have been proposed; Susan Bordo talks about objectifying associations 
(between women and bodies), for instance, and Alison Assiter discuss objectifying 
desires.45 Further, the language of treating a person as a thing, adopted by Nussbaum, 
suggests that objectification might also consist in behaviours.46 A distinctive way in which 
these non-doxastic forms of objectification are harmful is in their being unwarranted (they 
cannot be true or false, given their non-propositional nature).47 Indeed, we might want to 
argue that perspectival objectification constitutes harm through its attentional 
dispositions being unwarranted, perhaps by following the suggestions made by Elisabeth 
Camp, Sebastian Watzl and Susanna Siegel in chapter 3 (§3.3.2).  
What makes perspectival objectification unique, even from these other non-
doxastic forms of objectification, however, is its minimal nature. Perspectival 
objectification is a distinctively subtle way of disrespecting another’s personhood.  
Why offer this minimalist form of objectification to the table? Well, we often do 
not notice, let alone articulate the ways in which we attend to people and social groups. 																																																								
44 Haslanger (1993), Langton (1993a, 2004).  
45 Bordo (1993), Assiter (1988: 68). See also Langton (2000) and Kant (Lectures on Ethics: 
165) for discussions of objectifying desires.  
46 Nussbaum (1995: 257). See also Halwani (2010: 187) who defines objectification as 
comprising behaviours. Those who advance doxastic accounts of objectification also 
mention how those beliefs cause harmful behavior (see, for instance, MacKinnon, 1987: 
138).   
47 In chapter 2 (§2.4.1), I suggested that non-doxastic phenomena are commonly 
evaluated on epistemic grounds of warrant. 
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If our attentional dispositions really can harmfully objectify, then their subtle, rarely 
noticed or articulated nature gives them an insidious power, not least insofar as it makes 
them difficult to challenge. (Indeed, we cannot challenge a harm that we do not notice 
occurring, meaning that this harm can continue unchecked.)  
When we do notice and articulate our attentional dispositions, it is easy to dismiss 
them as trivial. What does it matter if someone notices one thing better than another! Shouldn’t we be 
focussing on what they believe, and how they act? These things have real consequences! Those who feel 
that they are being harmed by another’s attentional dispositions risk being told that they 
are overreacting if they express this concern. This functions to silence them.48  Either 
they pre-empt negative reactions and so silence themselves by not speaking, or they do 
articulate the harm that they have experienced, but are silenced insofar as their complaint 
is not respected.49 As for this latter form of silencing, a complaint about perspectival 
objectification risks being dismissed in the following way: Oh, come on, you’re being irrational! 
What does it matter if he found your figure especially memorable! It’s not like he ignored your face or 
what you said; you were listened to! This also contributes to the insidious power of cognitive 
salience perspectives; they remain effectively unchallengeable, even when they are noticed 
and articulated. 
 We see a similar type of harm in what are termed microaggressions, which are 
defined as subtle and often brief everyday events that denigrate individuals on the basis 
of their group membership.50 For instance, it is often suggested that a person of colour 
living in a primarily Caucasian country faces a microaggression when they are asked where 
are you (really) from? This is a subtle way of reinforcing the idea that this person is not 
really from that country—that they are a foreigner in their own land. Whilst different, 
harmful salience perspectives share with microaggressions a minimal nature, making 
them all too often overlooked or dismissed as trivial. This, according to Catherine Wells, 
creates a special type of harm. She says: “a microaggression does not just bring injury, 
but also brings the practical need to pretend that the aggression never happened. If one 																																																								
48 Wing Sue (2010: 66) makes this point in relation to microaggressions, which we will 
hear about briefly below.  
49 The former scenario counts as silencing in the sense of what Dotson (2011:244) refers 
to as testimonial smothering. Testimonial smothering is a kind of coerced self-silencing that 
occurs when, in Dotson’s words, “the speaker perceives one’s immediate audience as 
unwilling or unable to gain the appropriate uptake of proffered testimony” (ibid.). The 
latter scenario instead counts as what Langton (1993a) refers to as perlocutionary silencing. 
Here, one does speak, but one’s objection, whilst heard, does not have the intended effect; 
instead of being registered as a valid complaint, one’s complaint is dismissed. 
50 Wing Sue (2010: xvi). 
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is left angry, speechless, or hurt, one must hide that fact as best one can. Better to be 
seen as stumbling and inarticulate than to be seen as sensitive in irrational ways”.51 This, I 
suggest, also goes for harmful salience perspectives, such as perspectival objectification. 
The distinctiveness of perspectival harm, then, lies in its minimal nature; this gives it an 
insidious strength, insofar as it both difficult to notice and easy to dismiss as trivial.   
 
6.4. Perspectival sex/gender essentialism 
 
The discussion above tells us that simply making the wrong thing salient about a person 
can harm them. It can count as a way of disrespecting their personhood. It also tells us 
that salience perspectives might count as one aspect of sex/gender harm: making a 
woman’s thing-like properties more salient than her personhood-related properties can 
count as a form of objectification—perspectival objectification. Can these conclusions 
illuminate another way of approaching a different sex/gender harm discussed in this 
thesis, namely, sex/gender essentialism?  
As we saw in the previous chapter, psychological essentialism about sex/gender 
is the idea that men and women have different underlying biological essences that 
determine their respective traits, behaviours and identities. Sex/gender essentialism is 
regularly cashed out as a set of beliefs, most commonly implicit, which is how we treated it 
in the previous chapter. For instance, Lea Skewes, Cordelia Fine and Nick Haslam’s 
recent paper on the topic refer to sex/gender essentialism as involving beliefs, as does 
Gail Heyman and Jessica Giles’ influential article Gender and psychological essentialism.52 
The discussion in this chapter suggests that more subtle forms of psychological 
essentialism might also exist—namely, ones that involve attentional dispositions, instead 
of beliefs, and that these might involve constitutive harm. What would this look like? 
Consider Pedro, a sex/gender researcher. He believes that there are more than just two 
sexes/genders—namely, that intersex and genderqueer people, for instance, exist. He 
believes that social norms play an important causal role in many of our sexed/gendered 
traits and behaviours. He also believes that we do not know how sex/gender might 
change in the future, as environments, and our biologies, alter. And yet, when he comes 
across information about sex/gender – in academic papers, newspapers, his interaction 
with people in the world, and so on – it is females/women and males/men (or 																																																								
51 Wells (2013: 329). 
52 Skewes et al (2018), Heyman & Giles (2006). See further instances of essentialism 
being discussed as though it is comprised of beliefs in chapter 4 (fn. 18).  
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information about females/women and males/men) that better catch Paul’s attention. It’s 
their differences (or facts about their differences) that better stick in his memory. The 
information about their biology, as opposed to social environments, is what he finds most 
cognitively accessible when later thinking about sex/gender. Generally, then, his 
attentional dispositions track content central to sex/gender essentialism.  
We have already heard in chapter 5 that these sorts of attentional dispositions 
might be sufficient to activate sex/gender essentialist beliefs, making Pedro’s cognitive 
salience perspective instrumentally harmful (and instrumentally epistemically 
problematic).  
Brief discussions in previous chapters have also suggested some ways in which 
we might want to develop a constitutive critique of Pedro’s attentional dispositions. Firstly, 
we might want to go down the licensing route, and argue that Pedro’s cognitive salience 
perspective licenses psychological essentialism. The fact that licensing is a normative, as 
opposed to causal, notion would mean that Pedro’s cognitive salience perspective, 
insofar as it does license sex/gender essentialism, bears a constitutive relation to this 
bias’s harms (and epistemic faults).53 Secondly, we might want to suggest that Pedro’s 
attentional dispositions are partially constitutive of sex/gender essentialism. Perhaps 
partially constitutive of the belief that there is a sex/gender binary, for instance, is the 
attentional disposition better to notice, remember, and find more cognitively accessible 
binary sexes/genders over nonbinary sexes/genders. If we can show that sex/gender 
essentialism is non-instrumentally problematic, then, where Pedro’s cognitive salience 
perspective partially constitutes this bias, his attentional dispositions can also be deemed 
non-instrumentally problematic.54  
Instead of investigating these lines of thought, let us instead consider how the 
discussion in this chapter might shed light on another type of constitutive critique of 
Pedro’s cognitive salience perspective on sex/gender. Can his attentional dispositions 
themselves count as a way of harming sex/gender groups, such as women, or those who 
are non-binary?  
Consider the relative salience given to actual biological idiosyncracies between 
women/females and men/males in Pedro’s attention, over social context and the 																																																								
53 See the discussion in chapter 2 (§2.4.2). In particular, one might look to Tirrell (2012) 
and Swanson (forthcoming) for this approach.  
54 Perhaps, inspired by Watzl and Siegel’s (Watzl, unpublished) approach discussed in 
chapter 3 (§3.3.2), one might try to demonstrate that sex/gender essentialism is an 
irrational outlook, which is non-instrumentally problematic.  
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potential for change in sexed/gendered traits. Pedro makes current findings that there 
are average differences in brain structure between men and women, for instance, more 
salient than the social structures and practices that shape men and women’s traits. These 
attentional dispositions might be a problem if it is in the interests of women for these 
social features, and the potential for change in the sexed/gendered status quo, to be 
more noticeable, memorable, and salient. 55 Can we sketch an argument that it is?  
To be able to do this, it will be helpful to begin by returning to the harms of 
doxastic sex/gender essentialism. We heard in the previous chapter that, where 
sex/gender essentialist beliefs are condemned as harmful, the harm cited is often one 
connected to oppression—to unjust social relations that disadvantage disadvantaged 
sex/gender groups. 56  Consider, for instance, essentialist beliefs that women have a 
submissive and nurturing biological essence (which might be located in their brains) that 
makes women well suited for domestic work and childcare. This, I suggested, helps to 
further inequalities in the domestic sphere, which oppress women not least by exploiting 
them and rendering them powerless. Oppression, I take for granted, is a harm in and of 
itself.57  
Inspired by the ideas in §6.2 and §6.3, we might try to show that one way of 
oppressing women is by making the social structures and practices that contribute to their 
oppression, and the potential for change from the traits that they exhibit in the current 
(unequal) sexed/gendered status quo, less salient. We might argue, for instance, that 
making the distinctiveness of women’s brain structures and hormone levels more salient 
than patriarchal, capitalist institutions and practices that benefit from women doing most 
of the unpaid domestic labour, counts as a way of upholding those social institutions and 
practices that disadvantage women. Remembering that one form of oppression is 
powerlessness, we might also suggest that having these latter social features less 
noticeable, memorable and cognitively accessible is one way of limiting women’s power 
to change the conditions of their oppressed status.58 If oppression is a harm in itself, then 
																																																								
55 In fn. 1 of this chapter, I mentioned Feinberg’s account of harm as suggesting that one 
can harm a person by setting back their interests. If we can show that Pedro is setting 
back women’s interests through his attentional dispositions, we can have a reason to 
think that he is harming them. 
56 Chapter 5 (§5.3.2). 
57 Others also treat it as a harm as itself, such as Cudd (2005: 23). 
58 We heard in the previous chapter about Young’s (1990) influential account of 
oppression comprising of five faces: exploitation, powerlessness, marginalization, cultural 
domination, and violence.  
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so too are these attentional dispositions, insofar as they count as a way of oppressing 
women. 
This also demonstrates a way in which the substance salience perspective, 
discussed in chapter 4, is relevant to this discussion. The substance salience perspective 
was a generic salience perspective, which could be applied to multiple subjects (including 
but not limited to sex/gender). This generic perspective also involved making internal 
properties more salient than external context, and the actual traits a given subject exhibits 
more salient than the potential for those traits to change. Instead of simply activating 
beliefs associated with oppression, which is what we argued for in chapter 4, the 
suggestion here is that these attentional dispositions might, when applied to certain 
subject matter, constitute a form of oppression. One way of oppressing disadvantaged 
individuals (whether they are women, disadvantaged ethnic groups, disadvantaged social 
classes, and so on) is, arguably, by making the social factors that oppress them, and the 
potential for their traits to change, less salient. 
Returning to the example of Pedro the sex/gender researcher, though, we might 
examine another avenue for a constitutive critique. Consider the relative salience that 
Pedro gives to sex/gender binaries over non-binary groups, such as intersex and 
genderqueer. For Pedro, non-binary groups are less noticeable, memorable, and 
cognitively accessible to him than those falling within the sex/gender binary. This is a 
problem if it is in the interests of members of non-binary categories for those categories 
to be more salient in people’s minds. Can we show that this is the case? (Note that this is 
a slightly different issue to that discussed so far. Instead of harm occurring through a 
person or group having the wrong feature made salient about them, a members of a group 
are harmed in virtue of how salient that group is per se.) 
Again, let’s return to the doxastic counterpart to the attentional disposition to 
find sex/gender binaries more salient than non-binary groups. As we suggested in the 
previous chapter, an obvious way of explaining what is harmful about the essentialist 
belief that sex/gender is or should be a binary (of women/females and men/males), is by 
pointing to the marginalisation of non-binary groups that this belief entails. This 
essentialist belief makes those from non-binary groups less heard, less able to influence 
decision making, less respected, and so on. As we heard in the previous chapter, this 
counts as a way of oppressing non-binary groups (marginalisation, as we heard in the 
previous chapter, marginalisation is one form of oppression, according to Iris Marion 
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Young).59 Applying this thought to the context of Pedro’s salience perspective, we might 
want to suggest that one way of marginalising, and thus oppressing, members of non-binary groups is 
by making them less noticeable, memorable, and cognitively accessible than those from binary groups.60 If 
oppression is a non-instrumental harm, then so too are the attentional dispositions 
described above if they count as a way of oppressing members of non-binary groups.  
I have only very briefly sketched how an argument, that attentional dispositions 
like Pedro’s constitute harm, might proceed. If this argument can be defended, though, 
there would be grounds to suggest a new form of sex/gender essentialism. In parallel to 
the suggestion of perspectival objectification earlier, we might speculatively suggest 
another, particularly minimalist form of sex/gender essentialism—perspectival essentialism. 
Instead of being constituted by beliefs, one can be perspectivally essentialist in virtue of 
what one pays attention to, remembers, and finds cognitively accessible. (Indeed, whilst I 
will not consider this here, we might also pursue a similar avenue with the substance 
salience perspective. Instead simply of activating the correspondence bias, psychological 
essentialism, and the fixed mindset bias, the substance salience perspective might constitute 
particularly minimalist, perspectival versions of these biases. Perhaps one way of being 
subject to the correspondence bias, for instance, is by paying relatively more attention to 
the internal properties of a person, and the actual traits they happen to exhibit, than to 
the person’s situation, and the potential for their traits to change.)61 
Whilst there do not seem to be the same precedents for this minimalist, 
perspectival essentialism in that literature as there were for perspectival objectification in 
its respective literature, there are precedents for finding non-doxastic versions of 
essentialism. For instance, whilst Susan Gelman regularly talks about essentialist beliefs 
and theories, she at times adds ambiguity to this, saying at one point essentialism “can be 																																																								
59 Ibid. 
60 A critic might object to this, suggesting that we are not warranted in making non-
binary identities and conditions more salient than their binary counterparts because of 
what Camp would call the broad statistical distribution of properties in the world (see Chapter 
3, §3.3.2). Binary identities and conditions, this critic continues, are simply more 
numerous than their non-binary counterparts, which warrants them having relative 
salience! A possible response to this critic also makes use of Camp’s account. One of the 
considerations that shape what we legitimately can make salient, Camp suggested, 
includes our human interests and aims. She explicitly mentions our moral values as legitimately 
shaping these interests and aims. Perhaps the moral value relating to treating everyone 
equally, and giving all equal visibility and voice, is relevant here; it justifies our suggestion 
that no one sex/gender group should be given relative salience over any other. 
61 This perspectival version of the correspondence bias would involve constitutive harms 
if it counts as a way of oppressing members of disadvantaged social groups, as suggested 
above.  
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considered an unarticulated heuristic rather than a detailed, well-worked-out theory”,62 
and at another times that it is “a skeletal framework ... rather than a detailed set of 
beliefs, scientific or otherwise”.63 Adopting phraseology that sounds decidedly non-
doxastic, Frank Keil sometimes refers to essentialism as a “stance”, “construal” or 
“heuristic”.64. In a slightly different vein, Maykel Verkuyten suggests moving away from 
the idea that essentialism is about an individual’s inner cognitions, and instead embracing 
the idea that it is a social practice.65 These various ways of capturing essentialism, whilst 
not mentioning attentional dispositions per se, do capture the desire to widen what counts 
as essentialism from simply the domain of belief. Perspectival essentialism is offered in 
this spirit.  
Perspectival essentialism, then, is contrasted with the doxastic essentialism of the 
previous chapter. Overwhelmingly, sex/gender essentialism (and psychological 
essentialism more generally) is described as a set of beliefs. As mentioned above, Skewes 
and colleagues and Heyman and Giles talk of essentialist beliefs about sex/gender, as do 
Susan Gelman, and Sarah-Jane Leslie.66  The distinctive harm in doxastic sex/gender 
essentialism is to be found in falsehoods (falsehoods that, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, are used in arguments to justify various oppressive practices). The 
issues of stereotype threat in the previous chapter also suggest ways in which essentialist 
beliefs risk the wrong direction of fit with the world.67  
Perspectival essentialism is instead non-doxastic. Other forms of non-doxastic 
essentialism might exist; these might involve associations (such as between women, 
oestrogen, and nurturing personalities), or perhaps the social practices that are the focus 
of Verkuyten’s research, mentioned above (these might involve behavioural codes to treat 
women as domestic labourers). Whilst the non-propositional nature of these non-
doxastic phenomena would mean that they lack the truth-conditions, they might be 
criticised on grounds of warrant.  
What makes perspectival essentialism different even from these other non-
doxastic forms of essentialism, however, is its minimal nature. Perspectival essentialism is 
a distinctively subtle way of oppressing underprivileged sex/gender groups. As discussed 
in relation to perspectival objectification in §6.3, this subtlety gives it a special strength; 																																																								
62 Gelman (2003: 21).  
63 Gelman (2005:266). 
64 Keil (1995).  
65 Verkuten (2003) 
66 Skewes et al (2018), Heyman & Giles (2006), Gelman (2005), Leslie (2013). 
67 See chapter 5 (§5.3.2). 
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the rarely articulated nature of our attentional dispositions, and the fact that they are 
regularly dismissed as trivial where they are noticed, would give perspectival essentialism 
an insidious power. 
 
6.5. Addressing potential objections  
 
So far, then, I have introduced the general notion of perspectival harm, and suggested 
how it might relate to sex/gender harm. In particular, I have introduced perspectival 
versions of two familiar sex/gender harms: objectification, and essentialism. Here, I 
clarify these ideas by responding to two possible objections.  
 
6.5.1. Perspectival harm is too broad 
The notion of perspectival harm looks too broad. If one perspectivally harms someone 
by making their non-personhood-related traits more salient than their personhood-
related traits, then this seems to include a great many scenarios that, to many intuitions, 
are morally benign. A doctor, for instance, will no doubt pay more attention to a person’s 
body parts than their personality, as well as to their biological insides rather than their social 
context, but this hardly seems problematic. Far from subtly objectifying or essentialising 
the patient, the patient surely benefits from these attentional dispositions of the doctor’s.  
I agree. Indeed, this is a qualification that many philosophers make when talking 
about objectification in particular. Within this literature, diagnosing whether harm results 
from the various ways in which one can treat a person as a thing often requires 
examining the particular case and context.68 A doctor arguably reduces her patient to his 
body, but various considerations concerning the patient’s goal of health, and the role of a 
doctor, mean that harm does not occur.69 Conversely, as highlighted by Langton, one can 
harmfully objectify another in a way that does not involve denying their personhood; 
sadistic rape, for instance, can involve a recognition of someone’s personhood, with the 
aim of suppressing it.70  The same goes for cognitive salience perspectives. We need 																																																								
68 Nussbaum (1995), Langton (2005).  
69 Some ways in which a doctor treats her patient as an object, however, do seem to be 
harmful. It has been argued that patients can be harmfully objectified by their doctors 
when their emotions, and personal perspectives on their health, are ignored, for instance 
(see Berglund et al, 2012).   
70 Langton (2005: 249). Cases like this suggest that the manner with which one attends to a 
given property will also help to decide whether harm occurs (see Watzl, forthcoming, for 
a related point).  
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knowledge of the particular case and context to decide whether attending to a person in a 
way that makes their non-personhood-related traits (or their internal biological 
properties, for instance) their most salient feature does in fact harm them. My claim is 
simply that one can perspectivally harm someone in the ways that I have described. 
Whether one reserves the terms perspectival objectification or perspectival essentialism for 
instances where harm does occur, therefore defining these terms as inherently pejorative, 
depends on one’s project. Consider, for instance, the different approaches taken within 
the objectification literature. Nussbaum’s approach is to offer a cluster definition of 
objectification that aims to capture the varied ways in which the term is employed in 
ordinary usage, including what Nussbaum views as benign or even positive instances of 
the phenomenon. 71 By contrast, Catherine MacKinnon’s approach is to begin from the 
observation that there is a particular morally problematic phenomenon in the world, and 
to use the term objectification to refer to it.72 In what follows, I borrow MacKinnon’s 
approach, and define perspectival objectification and perspectival essentialism as necessarily 
morally bad, restricting their uses accordingly. Little of philosophical importance rides on 
this decision, however, and the reader can choose broader definitions, which will involve 
specifying which instances of perspectival objectification and essentialism in fact 
constitute harm.  
 
6.5.2. Clashing criteria for harm 
A second objection is as follows. Earlier, I suggested that people can be harmed when 
they are not attended to in the way in which they wish. I then proceeded to offer 
different, non-subjective criteria for harm, such as that individuals can be harmed when a 
non-personhood-related trait of theirs is made more salient than a personhood-related 
trait. These criteria might clash. For instance, a person might desire for a non-
personhood-related trait of theirs to be their most salient feature. Consider a woman, 
let’s call her Chun, who desires for her appearance to be her most salient feature. She 
might find others attending primarily to her figure to be empowering, and desires for her 
body to be given relative salience over her personality.73 In other words, Chun wishes for 
(what I am calling) a non-personhood-related trait of hers to be most salient in the minds 																																																								
71 Nussbuam (1995).  
72 MacKinnon (1987). The readings of both MacKinnon’s and Nussbaum’s projects here 
have been borrowed from Stock (2015).  
73 This is indeed the message that many so-called women’s magazines push. See Glamour 
magazine’s article on beauty products that supposedly empower women for an example 
of this (Kay, 2018). 
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of others. Although we are attending primarily to a non-personhood-related trait of 
Chun’s, does the fact that we are respecting her wishes mean that we avoid perspectivally 
objectifying, and therefore harming, her? My account, so goes this objection, looks 
incapable of adjudicating such clashes. 
Whilst my account needs clarifying to be able to resolve such cases, various 
options are, I contend, open to me. In particular, how one adjudicates these sorts of 
cases depends on to what extent one thinks that agents can be wrong about what 
contributes to their well-being.74 Can we say that Chun is wrong to say that having others 
attend to her body is empowering? An important point to note in this context is that a 
great many feminists have argued that our choices, preferences and desires are socially 
constructed, in the sense that society shapes them.75 Where society is sexist, women can 
internalise sexist ideologies and end up choosing and desiring things that are congruent 
with sexism. For instance, due to internalising sexist body ideals for women, many 
women desire to be so thin that a medical professional would consider them seriously 
underweight.76 Although these women’s weight is often a result of their choices and 
desires, we can see in this instance how society might have perniciously influenced these 
women, so that they end up choosing and desiring something unhealthy and harmful.  
We must be alive to the fact, then, that the woman who desires for her 
appearance to be her most salient attribute may not be aware of how society has 
perniciously shaped her desires in a way that harms her. Whilst an individual can arguably 
be harmed when she is not attended to in the way in which she wishes,77 we may do that 
individual greater harm by heeding her wish, if that wish is for us to attend to her in a way 
that disrespects her personhood—namely, if that wish is for us perspectivally to objectify 
her. This sort of conclusion is not an uncommon one. Many feminists recognise that a 
balancing act is necessary regarding respecting an agent’s desires, choices, and 
preferences on the one hand, whilst, on the other hand, being critical of what has caused 
those desires, choices, and preferences.78 Whilst being critical of a woman’s choice might 
																																																								
74 We might look to prevalent distinctions in contemporary ethics when deciding this 
issue, such as between objectivist, informed desire, and subjectivist accounts of well-being (see 
Crisp, 2017: §4).  
75 See, for example, Hirschmann (1996) and Hirshman (2006).  
76 McCarthy (1990). 
77 See the references in fn. 13.  
78 Thwaites (2017), for instance, thinks that we should not equally support all choices 
made by women. For her, those that act to extend inequality and maintain the patriarchal 
status quo deserve less support. Snyder-Hall (2010: 259) agrees, suggesting that we 
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look like a way of disrespecting her personhood – of disrespecting her ability to exercise 
her rationality, agency, and so on – the point here is that pernicious social forces might 
have already compromised these things, meaning that she has in fact exercised little 
rationality, autonomy, and so on.  
Similar things could be said for those who wish to be perspectivally essentialised. A 
woman, for instance, might wish for facts about her biology to be more salient than facts 
about the sexist social practices that influence her. In deciding whether to overrule these 
individuals’ desires, we might investigate whether there are social narratives that have 
malignly shaped these individuals’ choices. Perhaps, for instance, one might suggest that 
women can internalise essentialist social narratives that allegedly celebrate men and 
women’s biological differences—narratives that suggest that women are especially 
valuable in society because of how their distinctive hormones make them nurturing and 
empathetic. One might claim that these narratives are not in women’s interests.79  
Things are a little more complicated, I think, when it comes to applying this 
discussion to the first case study, involving rape victim-survivors. What are we to 
conclude about the rape victim-survivor who wishes for her experience of rape to be her 
most salient feature, finding her status as rape victim-survivor to be powerfully 
connected to her personhood? Should we respect her desire and make her experience of 
rape her most salient feature? Again, considering the specificities of each case will be 
important. 
Consider, for instance, the individual whose experience of rape has allowed her 
to create support networks for other victim-survivors, and to spread awareness of her 
experience as a victim-survivor. In this case, I would suggest that the apparent conflict 
between wanting to respect another’s personhood on the one hand, and respecting their 
desires on the other, might well be apparent instead of real. I wonder whether this 
individual is benefitting from others attending primarily to her status as an informed 
political activist, as opposed to rape victim-survivor. Making her experience of rape salient 
is simply instrumental in highlighting the political and/or social goals that she wishes to 
achieve, such as to improve the welfare of rape victim-survivors. Indeed, it is her 
informed activism oriented towards these goals that demonstrates her personhood. For 
instance, her activism is a career that, to a certain extent, she has chosen, demonstrating 																																																																																																																																																														
should not celebrate all women’s choices equally—only those made by women who 
recognise the politics of their choices.  
79 See, for instance, Giora (2002) for a discussion of these narratives, and for an 
argument that they are not in women’s interests.  
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her agency and rationality. 80 Through her deciding to talk about her experience, she has 
been able to showcase her activist interests and resilient and charitable personality. 
Considered by itself, the status of rape victim-survivor, does not demonstrate her 
personhood in these ways. In fact, it is an identity that these activists are working hard to 
erase from the world, precisely because of the harm it does to the personhood of the one 
who is raped.81 
As for the individual who wishes to make their experience of rape their most 
salient feature in the absence of these other factors, we might respond in different ways. 
We might, as with the example of Chun above, want to investigate whether there are 
exploitative ideologies that the individual might have internalised, meaning that her 
choice might not be a free one, made in her best interest. Perhaps we could envisage a 
scenario where a rape victim-survivor has internalised the messages about rape victim-
survivors given in the various crime television shows and films mentioned by Brison in 
§6.2.1. In these shows and films, rape victim-survivors tend to be portrayed not just as a 
passive pretext for our entertainment82 they are often depicted in troublingly sexualised ways.83 
Given the complexity of the rape victim-survivor experience, however, and the special 
importance of giving rape victim-survivors the chance, in the charity Rape Crisis’s words, 
to “feel in charge of their own lives again”, it is no doubt more important to take the 
rape victim-survivor’s choices and desires at face-value, and simply to support their 
decisions regarding how they wish to be attended to.84  
The account of perspectival harm that I have offered, then, leaves various 
options open regarding how to resolve clashes between one criterion of harm, namely, 
that an individual can be harmed when they are not attended to as they wish, and 
another—namely, the more objective criteria of harm offered above (which suggests that 
an individual can be harmed when a non-personhood-related trait of theirs is made more 
salient than one that does relate to their personhood, or that an individual can be harmed 
																																																								
80 I add the qualifier to a certain extent as this individual may never have considered the 
career unless she had experienced rape, and she certainly did not choose to experience 
rape.  
81 As we heard in §6.2.1, the harm in rape is regularly discussed in terms of the harm to 
an individual’s personhood. Cahill (2001: 13), for instance, says that a comprehensive 
account of the harm in rape must focus primarily on its attack of the “personhood of a 
woman”.  
82 Brison (1993: 11). 
83 Vanstone (2016).   
84 Rape Crisis (2019b). 
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when their internal properties are made more salient than external factors contributing to 
their oppression).  
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have expanded upon an idea that was first explored in chapter 3. This 
was that cognitive salience perspectives can constitute harm, in virtue of counting as a way 
of disrespecting an individual’s personhood. Given that disrespect of one’s personhood 
is a non-instrumental harm, attentional dispositions that count as a form of this harm can 
also be judged as non-instrumentally harmful. Harm can extend beyond the material, 
behavioural, or doxastic level, then, to include mere salience patterns in our attention.   
I began this chapter with three questions. Firstly, I asked if the idea that mere 
salience can constitute harm is plausible. Here, I have tried to show that it is, by 
considering in depth how this idea relates to two case studies. By consulting rape-victim 
statements, I have shown that there appears to be a common thread through certain rape 
victim-survivor responses to rape, which the notion of salience perspective as 
constitutive harm can help to explain. In particular, the concern that one’s experience of 
rape ends up masking other aspects of one’s identity can be understood as a claim about 
attention—about which aspects of one’s identity are most noticeable, memorable, and 
cognitively accessible to others. Further, by relating cognitive salience perspectives to the 
topic of objectification, I have highlighted that something like attention is already in the 
background of some women’s complaints about how they are attended to, as well as in 
feminist discussions of subtle types of objectification.  
Secondly, I asked what the notion of salience as constitutive harm offers to the 
subject of sex/gender harm. Here, I answered that salience perspectives might constitute 
one aspect of sex/gender harm. Firstly, certain attentional dispositions might count as a 
form of objectification. Simply making more salient a person’s thing-like properties (such 
as their body) over their personhood-related properties (such as their voice), can count as 
a form of harmful objectification. I called this perspectival objectification. Secondly, I 
suggested that attentional dispositions might count as a form of sex/gender essentialism. 
Simply making women’s biological features more salient than the social structures that 
oppress them, for instance, might count as a way of harmfully essentialising women. I 
called this perspectival essentialism.  
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Thirdly, I asked what, if anything, makes the notion of perspectival harm (and 
therefore these perspectival versions of sex/gender harms) important. The significance 
of perspectival harm, I answered, is in its minimalist nature. This makes it difficult to 
challenge, insofar as it is difficult to notice this harm occurring. Further, where it is 
noticed, the fact that it can be so easily dismissed as trivial gives it a further insidious 
power, insofar as it remains effectively unchallengeable.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
In this thesis, I have brought together psychological research into framing effects and 
philosophical research into the notion of salience in the mind to develop the concept of 
a salience perspective. This refers to the structuring and/or presentation of some linguistic or 
mental contents, so that some contents are more prominent than others. In order to 
demonstrate more concretely why salience matters, I have applied the notion of a salience 
perspective to research into various folk-cultural biases, as well as feminist research into 
topics such as sexual objectification. These latter discussions have shown the breadth and 
depth of the types of problems that mere patterns of salience can cause and constitute.  
 In this final chapter, I begin in §7.2 by discussing the key points that have been 
made in this thesis. I move in §7.3 to consider the wider implications of these points, 
looking in particular at the consequences for other topics in philosophy not so far 
discussed, as well as those for social policy. In §7.4, I discuss the limitations of this thesis, 
and avenues for future research. In particular, I address: the limitations to my own self-
reflection regarding the salience patterns used within this thesis; the possibility of future 
empirical studies testing the predictions that I have made; and the utility of future 
discussions that clarify the place that salience has in a broader movement for social 
justice. 
 
7.2. Key points 
 
This thesis can be understood as making seven key points.  
 
1. When we communicate some linguistic contents, or when we consider some 
mental contents in our minds, we inevitably employ patterns of salience for those 
contents. With regard to linguistic contents, we must, for instance, say one sentence 
before another. With regard to mental contents, we invariably find some mental states, 
such as beliefs or experiences of properties in the world, more attention-grabbing than 
others. To refer to these patterns of salience, I have introduced the concept of a salience 
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perspective. Linguistic salience perspectives relate to cognitive salience perspectives in 
different ways. Firstly, they are connected by the relation of similarity. They are similar 
insofar as the notion of relative salience applies to them both; both are constituted by 
patterns of salience that involve giving relative salience to some (either linguistic or 
mental) contents over others. Secondly, they are causally connected. Making something 
relatively more salient in language tends to make that thing relatively more salient in its 
audience’s minds. Conversely, having something salient in one’s mind tends to result in 
one making that thing salient in language.  
 
2. Merely changing the pattern of salience in some contents, without making any 
other changes to those contents, can result in the activation of a belief or ideology. This 
can occur, I argued, when one makes salient that which is central to that belief or 
ideology, and when that belief or ideology is cognitively accessible and socially licensed. 
This has epistemic repercussions when the belief is false, or the ideology unwarranted in 
some way. This also has ethical repercussions where the belief or ideology is harmful. 
Where a salience perspective is liable to lead to these negative consequences, we can 
criticise it on instrumental grounds.  
 
3. Sometimes, we must cast a wide net when considering which problematic 
cultural beliefs and ideologies risk being activated by a given salience perspective. Instead 
of activating just one belief or ideology, certain patterns of salience might be capable of 
activating multiple sets of biases. In particular, the substance salience perspective, which is a 
single generic salience perspective emphasising a subject’s internal properties, and the 
distinctive traits it happens to exhibit, is liable to activate at least three cognitively 
accessible and socially licensed problematic biases in Western cultures: the 
correspondence bias; psychological essentialism; and the fixed mindset. This adds to the 
literatures on these respective cognitive biases, by suggesting a new, subtle trigger for 
them. Taking a common reading of these biases, which suggests that they are composed 
of false and harmful beliefs, we can say that the substance salience perspective is 
instrumentally problematic on epistemic and ethical grounds.  
 
4.  Sometimes, it is instead helpful to take a narrower approach, and look in 
depth at a particular subject, and a specific cognitively accessible and socially licensed 
bias associated with it, when judging how to use salience for that subject. In particular, a 
		 149	
review of the particular topic of sex/gender, and the specific bias of sex/gender 
essentialism, suggests that giving relative salience to various contents, such as sex/gender 
binaries over non-binary conditions and identities, and sex/gender differences over 
similarities, can be sufficient to activate sex/gender essentialism. This proposal adds to 
existing literature on sex/gender essentialism by suggesting a new, subtle trigger for these 
beliefs. Using a common reading of this bias, which suggests that it is composed of false 
and harmful beliefs about sex/gender, we can judge that the salience perspective 
identified in this investigation is instrumentally problematic for epistemic and ethical 
reasons. 
 
5. Salience perspectives can have epistemic and ethical significance insofar as they 
constitute an epistemic flaw, or harm. This was the most controversial and novel claim in 
this thesis. Focussing on harm, I suggested that making the wrong thing relatively more 
salient about a person can, for instance, count as a way of disrespecting their 
personhood. Given that disrespecting someone’s personhood is usually considered to be 
a harm in itself, salience perspectives that count as a way of disrespecting someone’s 
personhood also count as intrinsically harmful.  
 
6. Perspectival versions of existing sex/gender harms might exist, such as 
perspectival objectification and perspectival essentialism. This suggestion marked a 
contrast with how these phenomena tend to be treated. Often, objectification is 
understood principally in terms of beliefs and behaviours (see, for instance, Sally 
Haslanger and Martha Nussbaum), or sometimes in terms of desires and associations 
(see, for example, Susan Bordo and Alison Assiter).1 Essentialism, on the other hand, is 
overwhelmingly discussed as comprising beliefs (see, for instance, Gail Heyman and 
Jessica Giles, and Susan Gelman).2 The findings here added to these existing accounts of 
objectification and essentialism, by suggesting new, particularly subtle and minimalist 
forms of these sex/gender harms. Objectification and sex/gender essentialism might 
instead consist, I contend, in certain patterns of salience, and these patterns can have 
intrinsic harms. 
 
																																																								
1 Haslanger (1993), Nussbaum (1995: 257), Bordo (1993), Assiter (1988: 68). 
2 Heyman & Giles (2006), Gelman (2005).  
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7. Salience perspectives are important not least because their minimalist nature 
gives them an insidious power. Firstly, where a salience perspective activates a belief or 
ideology, it likely does so in an under the radar manner. This means that an individual has 
less power to block inferences to beliefs and ideologies that they might, if conscious of 
those inferences, reject. This makes salience perspectives that activate beliefs and 
ideologies especially effective in doing so. Secondly, cognitive salience perspectives that 
constitute harm (which includes perspectival objectification and essentialism) have an 
insidious power insofar as they are difficult to challenge, both because they are difficult 
to notice, and because they are easy to dismiss as trivial, making them effectively 
unchallengeable.  
 
7.3. Wider implications of salience perspectives 
 
Salience is pervasive, insofar as it structures all of our language and mental content. If 
patterns of salience have the powers that I have suggested, then this has at least one 
general implication: it is important for all of us, whether philosophers or otherwise, to 
reflect on the salience patterns that we inevitably employ. Below, I suggest more specific 
implications that salience perspectives have: those for certain debates within philosophy 
so far not addressed in this thesis, and those for social policy. 
 
7.3.1. Race and hate speech  
Whilst the case studies in this thesis have largely focussed on sex/gender, we could 
examine other topics, such as race, class, sexuality, and disability, with the suggestion 
that salience can cause and constitute harm in mind. Take, for instance, the subject of 
race. I briefly suggested some examples of people in chapter 6 whose race was made 
more salient than their profession, which I suggested could harm them. We might take 
this idea further, and consider whether the phenomenon of racism involves not just 
things like false and harmful beliefs,3 unwarranted and harmful feelings and emotions,4 
and discriminatory behaviours,5 but wrongful salience patterns.   																																																								
3 For instance, Appiah (1990) suggests that racism is partially constituted by false beliefs 
about the science of race (combined with certain evaluative or moral beliefs about moral 
standing and status).  
4 For instance, Blum (2002) suggests that one form of racism is defined by feelings of 
antipathy, such as hostility and hatred.  
5 Flew (1990) argues that racism is a matter of racially discriminatory behavior, instead of 
belief. 
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The finding that salience can constitute harm in particular would also affect 
certain other debates in ethics. Consider, for example, the topic of hate speech, which I 
will consider in a little more depth. Hate speech tends to receive criticism on two 
grounds. One is its liability to inculcate false and harmful beliefs in its audience. Jeremy 
Waldron, for instance, suggests understanding hate speech as group libel, whose harm 
consists in defaming members of a group through making false statements about them.6  
Waldron considers a leaflet published in 1950s Chicago which urges people to protect 
the white race from being “mongrelized” and terrorised by the “rapes, robberies, guns, 
knives, and marijuana of the negro”.7 The harm of this hate speech, he suggests, is 
primarily in its falsity, and the damage that false assertion does to the reputation of black 
people. 
Alternatively, hate speech is often criticised on the basis of the violence that it 
causes and licenses (i.e. legitimises). Lynne Tirrell, for instance, focuses on how hate 
speech can “[open] the door to previously prohibited [and violent] actions”.8 Looking at 
the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Tirrell considers hate speech targeted at the Tutsi people. 
She notes that Tutsi people are regularly called inyenzi (Kinyarwanda for cockroach). Tirrell 
suggests that, partly because of the social meanings associated with the word cockroach 
(e.g. that they are dirty and disgusting), uses of this word ended up licensing actions 
consistent with the Tutsi people actually being cockroaches, such as the mutilation of their 
bodies. Tirrell locates one harm of hate speech, then, in its ability to license violent, even 
genocidal, actions. Hate speech, can, in an important sense, kill.9  
The discussion in chapter 6 suggests that we should consider the possibility of 
another harm. Hate speech might be harmful simply in virtue of inculcating the wrong 
pattern of attention in its audience. The Chicago leaflet, for instance, arguably helps its 
audience to find any instances of crimes committed by black people particularly 
cognitively accessible—more so than, say, any good deeds they might do. The Rwandan 
hate speech arguably helps its audience better to notice and remember traits associated 
with cockroaches in Tutsi people—more so than traits associated with their personhood. 
For instance, cockroaches are taken to be ubiquitous, dirty and disease-ridden. Calling 
Tutsi people cockroaches can serve simply to help one to notice crowds of Tutsi people, 																																																								
6 Waldron (2012: 48). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Tirrell (2012: 175).  
9 For this phraseology, see Tirrell’s participation in the podcast Can Speech Kill? 
(Philosophy Talk, 2017).  
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and to help one remember instances of unclean or unwell Tutsi people. In other words, 
hate speech might succeed simply in making certain traits of an individual, qua their 
group membership, particularly salient. This, as I have suggested, can constitute a way of 
harming them. It might, for instance, count as a way of disrespecting their personhood.  
 
7.3.2. Social policy 
Outside of philosophy, the ideas in this thesis also have implications for arenas like social 
policy. If mere changes in salience can both cause and constitute harm, then this is 
something that should influence how governments and corporations (for instance) 
communicate.  
 Fortunately, some organisations that aim to influence social policy have already 
picked up on the importance of salience. For instance, The FrameWorks Institute in 
Washington DC is a think tank that aims to improve the quality of communications in 
the non-profit sector, in a way that aims to “further public understanding of specific 
social issues”, such as mental health, climate change, and immigration.10 Their focus is on 
how, in their words, “the subtle selection of certain aspects of an issue [can] cue a 
specific response” in an audience.11  Researching how shifts in patterns of salience can 
generate framing effects is a part of their research programme.12 Further, as has been the 
focus in this thesis, The FrameWorks Institute examines how salience interacts with what 
they call “the public’s deeply held worldviews and widely held assumptions”, which 
might include the sort of cultural beliefs and ideologies mentioned in previous chapters.13 
Echoing my discussion of instrumental critiques of salience perspectives, The 
FrameWorks Institute says, for instance, “without knowing the existing contours of 
public thinking and how unproductive cultural models are activated, policy experts and 
advocates often inadvertently trigger them [such as by using the wrong pattern of 
salience] in their public education and messaging efforts”.14  
																																																								
10 FrameWorks Institute (2017). 
11 FrameWorks Institute (2019a). 
12 FrameWorks Institute (2019b).They also consider topics beyond salience, such as how 
certain metaphors, narratives, visuals, tones, and so on, shape audience responses to 
some content. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Manuel & Arvizu (2010: 6).  
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 The Behavioural Insights Team in the UK is a similar outfit.15 Part of their aim is 
to, in their words, “improve equality and tackle discrimination across 
society…[encouraging] change in workplaces, education establishments, households, 
public services and public spaces”.16 Like The FrameWorks Institute, the Behavioural 
Insights Team researches what it calls “simple changes to tackle major policy 
problems”.17 In other words, BIT markets itself as offering relatively minor, low-cost 
interventions that can nevertheless have powerful impacts.18 For instance, they look at 
the impact that making a retirement plan opt out instead of opt in has on participation 
rates, and what colour-coding nutritional information on food packets does to influence 
consumers to make healthier choices. 19  Shifts in the salience perspective used to 
communicate some contents counts as one of these minor, low-cost interventions.  
The research in this thesis adds to the call for more organisations like these. It 
also might add to these existing organisations, by clarifying which biases are likely to 
become triggered by making the wrong things salient. Consider, for instance, the 
suggestions in this thesis as to how the correspondence bias, psychological essentialism 
(including psychological essentialism about sex/gender in particular), and the fixed 
mindset can become activated through patterns of salience in language and the mind. 
Given their epistemic and ethical implications, these biases might count as the sort of 
unproductive cultural models that these institutions aim to prevent communicators activating 
through their speech. 
Further, my finding that salience can constitute harm represents one way of 
expanding the focus of these institutions, whose current emphasis seems instead to be on 
the epistemic issues that salience can cause. For instance, The FrameWorks Institute focuses 
on furthering “the public understanding [emphasis added]” of various issues, 20 which 
seems to be an epistemic project. Further, they use causal language of cueing, activating, and 
triggering, when discussing how shifts in salience relate to the unproductive cultural models 
mentioned earlier. 21 Why expand their focus in this way? As has been argued in other 																																																								
15 BIT was created in 2010, partly in response to advice from Nobel-prize winning 
economist Richard Thaler, whose book Nudge (2008), coauthored with Cass Sunstein, 
brought nudge theory to prominence. Nudge theory is defined in §7.4.3 below.   
16 BIT (2019a). 
17 BIT (2019b) 
18 They advertise their services as generating “impact quickly and cost-effectively” (BIT, 
2019c). 
19 Service et al. (n.d.). 
20 FrameWorks Institute (2017).  
21 Manuel & Arvizu (2010: 6), FrameWorks Institute (2019a). 
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philosophical debates, offering a way of arguing that certain speech implicates harm in a 
way that does not rely on establishing causal relationships, can be very helpful. Take, for 
instance, the immigration article discussed in chapter 2, and the suggestion it might, by 
mentioning crimes that immigrants have committed before the benefits associated with 
immigration, causally activate xenophobic biases. Demonstrating this might be difficult. 
In Mary Kate McGowan’s words, “As is well known, it is notoriously difficult to 
establish the truth of…complex [causal] claims”.22 If we can instead suggest that this 
article constitutes a way of being xenophobic (i.e. that it constitutes a harm and/or epistemic 
bias), then one can condemn this article without needing to prove complex causal claims.  
Generally, the various philosophical distinctions in this thesis add clarity to the 
critical approaches taken by these organisations. For instance, contrasts between 
epistemic and ethical, as well as instrumental and non-instrumental critiques of salience, 
as well as the contrasts between doxastic, and non-doxastic (including perspectival) forms 
of biases and harms suggested by this thesis, add precision and rigour.  
   
7.4 Limitations and further research 
 
7.4.1. The salience patterns in this thesis 
In the introduction to this thesis, I commented on how the pervasive nature of salience 
will inevitably affect my own writing. I have spent a lot of time reflecting on the ways in 
which I myself am employing salience patterns in this thesis. For instance, I spent time 
editing my linguistic salience patterns in chapter 5, on sex/gender essentialism. In this 
editing process, I noticed that, when talking about sex/gender binaries, I would 
automatically and unreflectively make men/males more salient by mentioning them 
before women/females. I would talk, for instance, about similarities and differences 
between men/males and women/females.  
Once I became conscious of this salience pattern in my writing, I reflected both on 
why it felt intuitive to employ it, and which biases it risks activating. We have already 
heard in the very chapter in question (§5.2) about the cognitive accessibility and social 
license of our androcentric biases, which treat men/males as the norm in our culture. I 
realised that my linguistic salience perspective made salient content central to this bias 
(namely, by talking about men/males first, it made them more salient than 																																																								
22 McGowan (2005: 28). McGowan makes this point in relation to MacKinnon and 
Langton’s discussions of the harms caused and constituted by pornography.   
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women/females). In addition to helping me make sense of why giving relative salience to 
men/males felt intuitive to me, recognising that my salience pattern made salient content 
central to androcentrism demonstrated the potential for my writing to activate 
androcentric biases in the reader’s mind (and my own). Realising this, I changed the 
pattern of salience that I was using by reversing it. In other words, I mentioned 
women/females before men/males. One limitation of this research, therefore, is that to 
my own self-reflection. If I can uncritically use patterns of salience in the very chapter 
that explains why these salience patterns are harmful, it is inevitable that, despite my 
efforts, I will have employed other linguistic salience patterns that unhelpfully and 
harmfully pander to certain biases of ours.  
I admit to this in part to demonstrate the difficulty of becoming aware of the harmful 
(and potentially unwarranted) salience patterns that we use—even those transparently 
written on the page in front of us. I have talked quite a bit about the subtle nature of 
salience perspectives, which does indeed make them difficult to notice. Further research 
would do well to illuminate effective ways of becoming aware of the salience patterns that 
we use in our language and attention. In chapter 3, I mentioned the potential utility of 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy in the context of individual measures for changing 
entrenched cognitive salience perspectives of ours that we have deemed to be 
problematic. We might also look to this and related therapies for suggestions regarding 
how to first notice the salience patterns that we use (before we can begin to think about 
changing them). Indeed, research in this area has developed many techniques for spotting 
unhelpful patterns of thought, which we might apply to salience perspectives.23 Often, 
however, as is the case in therapy, we will need someone else to point out the 
problematic salience perspectives that we use (when it comes to linguistic salience 
perspectives, an editor for our work could play this role).   
 
7.4.2. Empirical studies 
Another key limitation of this research is the lack of empirical studies testing the various 
hypotheses that I have made, such as those regarding how certain salience perspectives 
could activate sex/gender essentialist beliefs, or how the substance salience perspective 																																																								
23 Chapter 3 (§3.4.1). Cognitive Behavioural Therapy has developed techniques for 
making a person conscious of their unconscious habits, including habits of attention 
(Padesky, 1994). I also mentioned eye tracking studies and memory tests as potentially 
being of use when it comes to identifying our cognitive salience perspectives. Further 
research might also look to these techniques. 
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might activate various biases such as the correspondence bias. When making these 
predictions, I instead extrapolated from existing psychology studies into how mere shifts 
in salience perspective can mean the difference between activating certain cultural beliefs 
and ideologies and not. Ideally, further research would conduct the studies needed to 
support the predictions made in this thesis.  
For instance, the potential studies that I discussed in §5.4.3 of chapter 5, inspired by 
that of Susan Bruckmüller and colleagues, would be carried out. 24 These aimed to test 
how salience patterns affect support for sex/gender essentialism. For instance, does 
mentioning women/females and men/males before non-binary identities and conditions 
affect how likely study participants are to endorse statements that intersex or 
genderqueer individuals are odd or aberrant in some way? We might also conduct studies 
that test for the claims in chapter 4, and present information about a person or group 
either by giving relative salience to the properties highlighted by the substance salience 
perspective, or to those highlighted by the process salience perspective. We might, for 
instance, talk about a person’s character before their situational constraints, and vice 
versa, and see whether these different salience patterns affect the participants’ 
endorsement of the correspondence bias, psychological essentialism, or fixed mindsets. 
Given the implicit nature of these various biases, we would need to make use of the 
various implicit measures for testing a person’s attitudes that have been developed in 
psychology.25  
 
7.4.3. The limits of salience regarding social justice 
Finally, further research could reflect on the place that salience perspective change has in 
a broader movement for social justice. Whilst learning about salience perspectives is 
helpful for a variety of reasons, including solely epistemic goals of using patterns of 
salience that are warranted, and that avoid the activation of false beliefs, many might find 
the subject of this thesis appealing for its contribution to ethical goals. Indeed, I have 
focussed on the harms that patterns of salience cause and contribute, given my own 
interest in minimising the harm that we do to others—especially disadvantaged social 
groups.  
One problem that could be raised about the topic of linguistic salience perspectives 
in connection to social justice goals is its potential to be used by apologists for 																																																								
24 Bruckmüller et al. (2012). 
25 Rudman (2011). 
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conservative approaches to institutional and social reform. Consider nudge theory, which 
uses insights from behavioural economics to suggest that simple, low-cost interventions 
can influence people to think and act differently. 26 For instance, simply etching an image 
of a fly onto urinals has been found to reduce the spillage of urine around the urinals by 
80%.27 Framing effects (and therefore, what I call salience perspectives), are discussed as 
one type of nudge.28 Chief political commentator for The Observer Andrew Rawnsley 
suggests that nudge theory has particular successes during recession periods, which is no 
coincidence given the “big appetite for low-cost solutions to public policy challenges”.29 
He continues: “Nudging appeared to offer easy ways of reforming society without 
committing to large spending programmes”.30 Eduardo Porter of the New York Times also 
suggests that nudging “fosters a belief that tweaks based on an understanding of people’s 
psychology could lead to a vastly improved society at little to no cost to taxpayers”. 31 
Porter finds this belief inaccurate, insofar as it is unduly optimistic. He suggests that 
governments push this belief about nudging not necessarily because of a sincere belief in 
its power, but because nudging offers a way of saving money, and of pandering to the 
lack of political will to make more serious and far-reaching changes to how society is run. 
Changing linguistic salience perspectives offers a similar appeal; interventions that 
involve simply altering salience patterns in language are simple and low cost. The risk in 
this is that they detract from larger, more radical social reform that is needed. The utility 
of salience-based interventions could be used as an excuse by governments and 
corporations for avoiding more substantive measures, which require more effort, and 
cost more money.  
Consider, for instance, the Behavioural Insights Team’s intervention in the Avon 
and Somerset Constabulary, aimed at increasing its racial diversity. This involved adding 
a particular sentence to a standard email sent to applicants during the application 
process—a sentence that attempted to create a friendlier tone in that email. (Whilst not 
an intervention involving salience perspectives, it was one of a similarly minimal nature.) 
For reasons that we will not go into here, this intervention managed to increase the 
probability that a Black or minority ethnic (BME) individual passed a certain stage in the 
																																																								
26 Thaler & Sunstein (2008). 
27 Ibid. (3-4). 
28 Ibid. (36). 
29 Rawnsley (2017).  
30 Ibid. 
31 Porter (2016). 
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application process by 50%.32 (Data has not yet been collected regarding whether this 
translated into more BME recruits, however.)  
This certainly seems to be an admirable result. But the appeal of this intervention, 
namely, its simplicity and low-cost nature, might be a double-edged sword. These 
minimalist, headline-grabbing interventions might be used to distract from the lack of 
resources and effort the British Police Force is directing to fix the deeper problems that 
it faces. For instance, many have suggested that the British Police Force suffers from 
institutional racism, which disadvantages BME individuals in a great many ways.33 Nifty, 
cheap prompts placed in emails should not be seen as substitutes for the large scale, 
difficult, and costly moves the police force would need to make to address these deeper, 
more complex ethical issues. To fix institutional racism, for instance, all sorts of different 
interventions would be needed beyond mere nudges (including those that play with 
salience), such as explicit and implicit bias training, the introduction of more counter-
stereotypical exemplars into positions of power, the funding of outreach programmes, 
the overhauling of certain (e.g. stop and search) policies, and so on.34  
Further research, then, would clarify the precise role that salience perspectives can 
play in a wider movement for justice. In particular, it would suggest how best to 
communicate what makes the research in this thesis regarding linguistic salience 
perspectives attractive, without giving the impression that linguistic salience perspective 
change is a miracle cure. So long as it is understood that salience-based interventions are 
but one tool among many for achieving ethical (and prudential, and epistemic) goals, then 
they can play an important role in achieving those goals.  
This is not to undermine the more radical nature of the claims made in this thesis. 
There is something importantly radical about the idea that simply changing the pattern of 
salience in some linguistic or mental content, without changing anything else about that 
content, can mean the difference between causing or constituting harm to a person or 
group, and not. This confronts conventional models of thought, such as those that treat 
individuals as rational and unaffected by mere presentational and structural shifts in 
some linguistic or mental content.35 It confronts conventional models of harm, which 
instead locate harm in phenomena such as false beliefs, malign desires, or physical 
																																																								
32 BIT (2015: 29). 
33 See, for instance, Dearden (2018), Gayle (2018) and MacPherson (1999). 
34 See MacPherson (1999) for some of these suggestions and others.  
35 See chapter 1 (§1.2) and chapter 2 (§2.2.1). 
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violence.36  Indeed, the fact that, even when one’s beliefs, desires, feelings, and actions 
are ethically sound, one can still harm a person or group simply through the patterns of 
salience that one applies to them, is hardly a fact that apologists for conservative reform 
would like to dwell on. Neither would they like to dwell on how the pervasive nature of 
salience, in conjunction with its under the radar nature, means that it is likely that we are 
causing and constituting harm to people and social groups far more than we might have 
thought.  
Whilst we might want to ensure that the attractiveness of salience-based 
interventions is not co-opted into cynical interests, then, the take-home conclusion from 
this thesis stands. Small can be powerful.    
																																																								
36 See chapter 5, and the discussion of hate speech and racism in §7.3.1 in this chapter. 
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